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IN THE 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
AT RICHMOND. 
Record No. 2516 
THE CHESAPEAKE AND omo RAILWAY COM-
PANY 
versus 
S. 0. BUTLER. 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF ER.ROR AND 
SUPERSEDBAS. 
To the Honorable, the Chief ,'1,1.stice and the Associate Jus-
tices of the Su-prenie Court of Appeals of Virginia: 
The petition of The Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Com-
pany, a. corporation, respectfully represents that it is ag-
grieved by a final judgment of the Circuit Court of the County 
of Fluvanna, entered on the 1st day of April, 1941, in favor 
of '8. 0. Butler and against your petitioner, for the sum of 
$500.00, wit]1 interest thereon from the 3oth day of October, 
1940, being the amount of damages by a. jury in their verdict 
ascertained, in an action at law wherein.the said S. 0. Butler 
was plaintiff and your pe~itioner was defendant (Transcript 
of Record, pp. 15-16). For convenience, the parties will be 
hereinafter referred to as plaintiff and defendant, in accord-
ance with their respective positions in the trial court. Rec-
ord page reference hereinafter given, will refer to the pages 
as numbered in the accompanying transcript of the record. 
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MATERIAL PROCEEDINGS IN THE TR.JAL COURT. 
This case involves a suit for damages by a railroad pas-
senii;er claiming to have sprained his foot in getting off of a 
combined passenger and freight train which was then in mo-
tion. 
In his Notice of :Motion for ,Judgment, the plaintiff alleged 
that the defendant's train employees neg·ligently failed and 
refused to stop the train at the station to which he had 
2* bought a *ticket; failed to stop it at a proper place or 
at a place prepared for the discharg·e of passengers; 
and "requested", "permitted", "advised", ''directed'' and 
''required'' him to alight from it while it was in motion, at 
a point beyond his destination. He further charged that be-
cause of this negligence and at the "instance" of the defend-
ant, he got off of tl1e train a.t a dangerous place and while it 
was still moving, and as a. direct result thereof, his left foot 
and ankle were seriously injured. Alleging that his injury 
was permanent, and prevented him from following llis usual 
occupation, the plaintiff sought damages in the sum of 
$5,000.00 (R., pp. 1-5). 
The Motion for ,Judgment was served on the defendant on 
May 18, 1940, and was docketed on ,June 24, 1940. As then 
drafted, this paper alleged that the plaintiff received the 
injury complained of, on May 23, 1939. 
The defendant filed its plea. of t110 general issue on June 
22, 1940, and its Grounds of Defense and Plea of the Statute 
of Limitations (1-year) on August 1, 1940 (R., pp. 6-8). 
Thereafter, at the instance of the plaintiff, a stipulation was 
entered into between counsel, as of Aug11st 20, 1940, by which 
the Motion for Judgment was considered and treated as hav-
ing been amended so as to allege that .June 10, 1939, was the 
date of the plaintiff's alleged injury, instead of May 23, 1939 
(R., p. 19). 
A trial of the -ease was had before a jury on October 29-30, 
1940 (R., p. 18). The plaintiff testified at considerable length 
as to the circumstances under which he claimed to have been 
hurt, and another train passenger a.lso testified ibriefly in his 
behalf on this phase of the case. Several other witnesses 
3* testified as *to the plaintiff's subsequent alleged trouble 
with his foot. The defendant presented no evidence ex-
cept such as tended to show: (1) that the plaintiff had not 
been a passenger upon its train on the date alleged, and (2) 
that the condition of the plaintiff's foot, as complained of, 
was not due to getting off a train, but was attributable to 
other causes for which the defendant was in no wav con-
nected. As to all other questions the ref ore, the case" is al-
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most wholly dependent upon the oral testimony of the plain-
tiff himself, considered in conjunction with anpropriate in-
ferences arising therefrom, and undisputed physical facts. 
At the conclusion of the plaintiff's evidence, the defendant 
made a motion to strike such evidence, upon specific grounds 
then assigned, but a ruling· upon this motion was deferred 
by the court until all evidence was introduced by both sides 
(R., pp. 83-87). Upon the conclusion of all of the evidence, 
the defendant's motion to strike all evidence introduced was 
renewed, upon the same ground, but this motion was over-
ruled by the court, to which ruling the def end ant then ex-
cepted (R., pp. 12.3-126). The defendant further objected 
to the court gTanting any instructions authorizing a recovery 
·by the plaintiff, but the court also overruled this objection 
(R., p. 126). 
The case was thereupon submitted to the jury upon written 
instructions dealing· with issues of negligence of the defend-
ant, contributory neg·ligence, proximate cause, sole proximate 
cause, assumption of risk, burden of proof and the amount of 
the plaintiff's damages. 
4 * • After the jury had returned a verdict for the plain-
tiff, as set forth above, the defendant by a motion in 
writing, with supporting grounds assigned, moved the court 
to set aside the verdict as contrarv to the law and evidence 
and without evidence to support it, "and to enter up final judg-
ment for tl1e defendant, and failing so to do, to award the 
defendant a new trial (R., pp. 13-14, 126-128). On April 1, 
1941, the court overruled this motion of the defendant and 
entered up the judgment complained of (R., pp. 14-16, 128). 
No written opinion was filed by tlle court. 
ASSIGNMENTS OJ.i.., ERROR. 
In its rulings, actions and final judgment, it is respect-
fully submitted the trial court erred in the following par-
ticulars: 
1. The Court erred in overruling the motion of the de-
fendant to set aside the verdict of the jury and to enter UlJ 
judgment for the defendant on the following· grounds, to-
wit: 
(1) No negligence on the part of the defendant is shown 
as the proximate cause of the aceident. 
(2) The evidence shows that the plaintiff had actual knowl-
edge of the danger of alighting from the moving train, and· 
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of his own free will and accord deliberately assumed the risks 
thereof. 
(3) If upon any possible theory, it could be held *that 
5* the defendant were negligent under the circumstances 
of this case, then under the same circumstances the plain-
tiff was guilty of contributory negligence which bars his re-
covery as a matter of law. 
( 4) The plaintiff's act in alighting from the train was the 
voluntary act of a responsible party under no compulsion, 
which insulated or cut off any possible neg·lig·ence on the 
part of the defendant and represented a free choice on his 
pa.rt. Consequently, in thus alighting from the train the 
plaintiff's voluntary action was the sole proximate cause of 
the accident. 
2. The Court likewise erred in overruling the motion of 
the defendant to set aside the verdict of the jury and to 
enter up judgment for the defendant, on the following 
grounds, to-wit : 
(a) Plaintiff has failed to sustain the burden of proof by 
showing that the injuries complained of resulted from alight-
ing from the train on the occasion in question; 
(b) The evidence shows that the cause of such condition 
as the plaintiff complained of is just as probable to have 
come from some cause for which the defendant was in no 
way responsible. 
( c.) The injuries complained of by the plaintiff are 
6* *not shown to be the natural and probable consequences 
of any act complained of against the defendant. 
All of the foreg·oing grounds for setting aside the verdict 
and entering· up judgment for the defendant were duly pre-
sented to the trial court, and exceptions duly taken to the 
action of the court in overruling the said motion and in en-
tering up judgment for the plaintiff (R., pp. 13-14, 15-16). 
QUESTION1S INVOLVED. 
The questions involved are embodied in, and will he here-
inafter discussed under the following; divisions: 
1. The evidence does not show any negligence of the de-
fendant as the proximate cause of the accident; 
2. Plaintiff assumed the rh,k of the injuries of which he· 
complains; 
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3. The evidence shows that the plaintiff was guilty of con-
tributory neg·ligence; 
4. Even if the plaintiff were not negligent, the interven-
ing·, independent act of the plaintiff in getting off the train 
while it was in motion was the sole proximate cause of the 
accident; 
5. The plaintiff has failecl to sustain the burden of proof 
by showing that the injudes complained of bv him resulted 
from alighting· from the train on the occasion in question. 
7* :1sTATEMENT OF THE CASE. 
The plaintiff, a farmer, 65 years of age, had lived neal' 
Carys brook, in Fluvanna ,County, for about 20 years. Dur-
ing that time, he had been accustomed to traveling by train 
from Carysbrook to Palmyra, two intermediate points, 4 
miles npart, on the Virginia Air Line Branch operated by· 
the defendant. He testified that on the morning of June 10, 
] 939, he proceeded to Carys brook, bought a ticket for Pal-
myra, and boarded the defendant's combined passenger and 
freight-train for that destination (R.., pp. 20-21.). This was 
between 9 :00 and 10 :00 A. M. (R., pp. 45-46). The passenger 
coach was at the rear of the train, behind a considerable num-
ber of freight cars (R., p. 51). There were two other pas-
sengers going to Palmyra. One was a man named Carlisle, 
who testified as a witness in the case, and another was a man 
with a traveling· ,bag-, who was not identified (R., pp. 22-23). 
After the train had passed Rockaway, the nearest station 
in approaching Palmyra, the defendant's Conductor, Duke, 
in coming through the passenger coach, called attention to 
the fact that he hacl a. '']1eavy train" that morning. He then 
asked the three passengers for Palmyra.: '' If I show this 
train down, will you a11 try to g·et off?" (R., pp. 21, 43) 
Each of the passengers, including the plai_ntiff, '' readily 
agreed to accommodate'' the conductor, a.nd as the train 
neared that station, the plaintiff started down on the rear 
platform step of the coach. As he did so, Conductor Duke, 
who was also on the platform, touched him on the shoul-
8* der and asked him, "as the oldest •man", to wait and let 
the other two younger men get off first, since by then 
the train would be running· '' a little slower-", or "slightly 
slower" (R., pp. 21, 45, 46). The plaintiff complied with 
this request and the two other passengers passed by him and 
got off at the station platform (R., p. 21). At that time the 
train was still moving, although slowing up continuously (R., 
p. 24). 
In na.rrating what subsequently happened, as he alighted 
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from the train while it was still in motion, the plaintiff said 
(R., pp. 21-22) : 
''So I stayed on until it got around the bluff, trying to 
pick a smooth place to leave the train. It got around the 
curve some 100 yards, I reckon, as near as I can come a.t it, 
from the station._ So it looked tolerable smooth and I stepped 
off, catching my whole weight on this foot, striking a rock, 
leaning from the train in case I lost my footing I wouldn't 
fall under it; leaning from the train I stepped on the rock 
and this pain struck me right there and ran up in this ankle.'' 
The testimony of the witness Carlisle, hereinafter referred 
to, shows that the plaintiff neither fell nor lost his balance 
as his feet reached the ground (R., p. 69). The plaintiff said 
that the train wasn't then g;oint{ at any "excess speed", but 
·was proceeding "very slow", and "apparently" slowing up 
all the time. Duke, he said, had started applying the air 
brake soon after passing the whistle post in coming in to 
Palmyra, and didn't release it at all until after he had gotten 
off (R., pp. 23-24, 46). 
The plaintiff said he thought he could have gotten off safely, 
"if I had landed in the proper place'' (R., pp. 26, 46). Before 
alighting, he was standing on the coach step, watching for a 
place to get off, but "paying no strict attention to the move-
ment of the train''. The door was open and he was look-
9"' ing off to the *side of the train, the side on which the 
station was located, looking for "a smooth place". His 
eyesig'ht, he said, is fairly g·ood, and when he got off, he could 
see the ground beneath him and -could see what was there 
(R.., pp. 46-47). 
He further said that he got off the train when he did, of 
his own volition; tl1at no one pushed him off; that he "had 
every rig·ht" to believe that he could get off, and he could 
have gotten off, with safety, if he had gotten off' 'in the, place 
in which I should have gotten off", and that he didn't see any 
reason to the contrary. He ''noticed the rocks", but ''didn't 
know'' he "was going to hit them". He knew there was a 
certain distance down from the train to the ground. He knew 
;-is much before he g·ot off as afterwards (R., pp. 47-48). 
There was nothing in his hands at the time, and he was sat-
isfied that there was no falling weather on that morning. He 
admitted ha.vinp; gotten off moving trains ·before, in his 
"younger days" (R., pp. 44, 45). 
After the plaintiff l1ad alighted, the train proceeded on 
without stopping. He said he then ''stopped and leaned back 
against the bank awhile", which ''kind of deadened" the pain 
Chesapeake and Ohio Ry. Co. v. S. 0. Butler 7 
in his foot; that later "it beg-an to get pretty painful'', and 
made him "right sick" (R., p. 22). He stood around and 
''sort of got over it", and then walked on up and attended to 
his business, which was either at the bank or at the office of 
the demonstrator. He afterwards walked back to the sta-
tion and received a shipment of disk billers, at the same 
time sending· back to the shipper, Buhrman & Sons at Rich-
mond, an excess quantity of these articles. In returning 
to Carysbrook, he rode on a. laundry truck by the highway 
( R., pp. 22!' 39-40) . 
10* *The plaintiff also stated that '' the train was slow 
enough'' for him to hnve g·otten off safely at the station 
1Jlatform, and he would have done so, if Conductor Duke bad 
not stopped him; that he. watclrnd the other two men get off, 
nnd they "seemed to g·et off mighty easy" and "made only a 
few steps after they alig·lltecl" (R., pp. 23, 26). He said that 
when he did get off, Duke, who was still standing at the rear 
of the coach, "holding the air on'\ dicln 't indicate that he 
didn't want him to get off at that time. Due to the noise of 
the escaping air, however, he could not have heard anything 
which Duke might l1ave then said. He said he was not fa-
mi.liar with the railroad track around the bend above the 
station and underpass crossing, having been over it several 
times on the train, but having liad '' no occasion to notice the 
surroundings''. The place ,,rhere . he g·ot off was a;bove or 
beyond a spur switch wl1ich he knew was '' something like 
75 or 100 ya,rds" from the station (R.., pp. 24-25). 
R. A. Carlisle testified that he was a. passenger on defend-
ant's train from Fork Union to Palmyra · on some date 
uaround" June 10, 1939, and that Mr. Butler and anot)ler 
man whom he did not know, were also on the train on that 
occasion. He recalled the train conductor lmd spoke of hav-
ing a heavily loaded train and understood him to ask the 
three Palmyra passengeTs, including himself: '' If we would 
get off the train going·", or ''while it was moving", on ac-
count of tl1e difficulty of starting up again. He replied to 
the conductor in the affirmative (R., pp. 64, 66, 68). · 
This witness furtlrnr said that the train commenced to slow 
up about at the end of the switch, "below" or before reach-
ing· the station; that it was slowing· up all the time; was 
11 * "slowed up "'cousiderably'' when it reached the station 
platform, and ''wasn't making· no fast speed but ·still 
it was going''. He didn't hear any request from Butler to 
stop the train (R., pp. 67, 68, 69). He said Butler started 
to get off first, but the conductor asked him to wait and be 
the last one to get off, when the train ''would be going 
slower". He him~elf actually got off first, on the platform, 
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right in front of the station, with the unidentified passenger 
following him, and Butler got off beyond both the station and 
the overhead bridge. He saw Butler get off, "make a few 
steps"', and then either sit down or lean over on the side of 
the right of way bank (R., pp. 64-65, 69). This witness fur-
ther said that after havin~; walked up to Mr. Hannah's office, 
Im later came back ·by the depot, and from a distance of about 
100 yards away, again saw Butler in about the same position 
(R., pp. 65-66, 69). He did not have any conversation with 
him after getting· off the train and did not see him again for 
several months (R., p. 69). 
The plaintiff had known :Mr. Cosby, the defendant's agent 
at Palmyra, for 30 odd years. In spite of his dealings with 
Cosby on the day he -claimed to have been hurt, the plaintiff 
didn't say anything to him about it. Nor did he mention the 
subject to Conductor Duke, on subsequent trips made on thn 
train, in spite of having known Duke '' for quite awhile'', and 
having lived '' right on the railroad at Carys brook ~ years'' 
( R., pp. 45, 50, 122). It was further stipulated and agreed 
bet.ween counsel for the plaintiff and defendant, that no 
claim of injury on behalf of the plaintiff was ever brought 
to the attention of the defendant company until May, 1940 
(R .• p. 121). 
12* -rn explanation of the allegations made in his Notice 
of Motion for Judgment, filed in May, 1940, that he had 
been injured on May 23, 1939, the plaintiff testified that this 
then represented his opinion as to the correct date, and he 
had so informed his attorney. He said that during a very 
short period around that date, he had been to Palmyra five 
or six times. Later .on, sometime after suit had been brought, 
he said that in looking· over his papers with his wife, he found 
that he had been mistaken as to the date. The bill of lading 
for the disk billers which he had shipped back to Buhrman 
& Sons, as well as a sales ticket for gasoline purchased by 
him from W. C. Baker & Co., at ·Carysbrook, both dated .June 
10, 1939, made him positive that this was the date on which 
he had been hurt ( R., pp. 35-38, 43-44). The testimony of the 
plaintiff's wife was to the effect that these transactions coin-
cided with the beginning of his foot trouble (R., pp. 71-72). 
R. W. Talley was clerk for W. C. Baker, who both operated 
a store and was agent for the defendant at Carysbrook. He 
testified that he was the only person handling passenger 
tickets at that point and he kept the records. He produced 
the original cash book and ticket stubs, which disclosed that 
no tickets were sold at Carys brook on June 10, 1939, for any 
point. These records also showed no tickets sold at Carys-
brook for Palmyra, between May 20, 1939, and October 25, 
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1939 (R., pp. 91-93, 95, 97-1.01). The price of such a ticket 
was ten cents ( R., p. 97). 
The plaintiff testified that his injury was entirely confined 
to his left foot and ankle. He bad treated it as '' merely 
13* a *sprain", using hot water and various liniments. He 
said the foot had become swollen and sore and had 
caused him pain continuously up to the time of the trial. He 
also said that be had not been able to do as m11ch work on 
the farm as previusly, due to the fact that his injmed foot 
would not permit him to walk around as much as he had 
formerly done (R., pp. 26-27, 33-35). The testimony of the 
plaintiff's wife was to the same general effect (R., pp. 73-74). 
There was no definite proof presented of any medical ex-
penses incurred except small amounts for liniments (R., pp. 
88-90). 
Three of the plaintiff's neighbors testified to liaving ob-
served him ''hopping'' around or limping about, beginning 
sometime during· June or .J ulv, 1939, and said he was still 
doing this on other occasions when seen by them, up to the 
date of the trial (R.., pp. 61, 77-79, 81-83). 
Dr. J. H. Yeatman testified that the plaintiff had come to 
him for an examination of his foot on October 25, 1940, which 
was just a few days before the trial. This was the only time 
he saw him. H.e said he found llis foot ''extremely tender" 
at that time, "espeeially around the joint tllat connects the 
foot with the large hones of the leg." Upon a history of a 
foot injury being given by tbe plaintiff, and finding a depres-
sion in the back of the leg about 8 inches above tbe heel, hi~ 
''impression" was, that there bad been a severe sprain of 
the foot, and ''possibly at tl1e time of the injury the lig·a-
ments and tendons were torn." He said that it was almost 
impossible to tell without X-ray plates (which he didn't have), 
whether there was any permanent injury, but judging solely 
by the fact that a. tendon in the back of his leg "apparently 
had not been repaired", he thought there was "more 
14* or less a *permanent injury". Although this wouldn't 
be any disability to a person working in an office, he 
thought that for one whose occupation required a. lot of walk-
ing, there would be a. disability of about twenty-five per cent 
(R., pp. 53-56). 
Dr. A·. C. Whitley, summoned and testifying on behalf of 
the defendant, stated that the plaintiff had come to him in 
Palmyra for examination during the month of March, 1940. 
Upon a complaint of pain only on the upper pa.rt of the left 
foot, he found upon pressure, a little tenderness on a spot. 
a:bout the size of a quarter, over the navicular bone, or at 
a.bout the location of the third shoe lace. The foot was not 
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then swollen. In an effort to find the cause of this tender-
ness, the plaintiff was sent to the University Hospital for 
X-ray. Later, having received an X-ray report, this witness 
had reported what it showed to the plaintiff. Upon objec-
tion of the plaintiff, however, Dr. "Whitley was not permitted 
to testify to what it showed. He stated that in his opinion, 
the pain complained of was due to arterio-sclerosis, since he 
''couldn't elicit any other physical findings so far as his foot 
was concemed" (R., pp. 113-118). 
Dr. 1F .• J. Clements testified that he had been a practicing 
physician in Palmyra between 1928 and 1938, and during that 
period had treated the plaintiff for heart trouble. In doing· 
this, he had found that the plaintiff had bad teeth, which in 
his opinion might be the cause of the pa.in in the foot of which 
the plaintiff was now complaining. He further stated that 
the plaintiff had evidence of hardening of the arteries when 
treated by him, and that this condition in an adv~nced state 
usually causes pain in the legs and feet (H., pp. 104-108). 
15* * AR.GUMENT. 
I. 
No Negligence of Defendant ls Shown As the Proximate 
Ca.use of the Accident. 
It will be observed at the outset, that the train. on which 
the plaintiff claimed lie was a passenger, and bad purchased 
a ticket at Carysbrook for Palmyra on ,June 10, 1939, the date 
of the accident ( although the records of the defendant showed 
that no tickets were sold at Carys brook on that date for any 
point) was a. combined freight and passenger train, consist-
ing· of a single passenger coach at the rear of the train, be-
hind a considerable nurn bor of freight cars. The train that 
morning is furtl1er described as being '' heavily loaded'' (R., 
pp. 21, 43, 64). 
The cause of action set forth in the motion for judgment 
is that the defendant failed to stop its train at the station at 
Palmyra so as to permit the plaintiff to alight; and that it 
also failed to stop at a "i=mitable, safe or proper place". It 
is further alleg·ed that following a request, direction and ad-
vice from the defendant's agents and servants to alight, and 
a refusal to stop the train, that the plaintiff being required 
and forced so to do, alighted at the ''instance'' of the 9ef end-
ant, while the train was in motion. There was also an alle-
gation charging that the place·· at which the plaintiff alighted 
was unsafe. 
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But the plaintiff himself proved that there was no negli-
gence of the defendant in these particulars, and certainly 
none as the proximate cause of- the accident. 
Thus, his testimony on direct examination is as follows 
(R., pp~ 21-22): 
16* *'' Coming up here, I wouldn't say exactly the spot, 
but between Rockaway, the watering· station, and Pal-
myra, the conductor came throug·h-it was three of us-and 
he said, 'If I slow this train down will you try to get oflT 
Vve readily agreed to accommodate the man. He said 'I have 
a heavy train this morning'. Well, when we approached Pal-
myra I walked down-started down on the step, b.eing ac-
quainted with the surroundings at the depot, knowing it was 
smooth and being an old man I preferred to get off on the 
smooth place. He touched me on the shoulder and says 'You 
are the oldest man on this train. Now let the two younger 
men get off and the train will be a little slower.' Well, I 
stepped back and made room for them to walk down on the 
step. Well, when they got off the train was too near then 
the underpass for me to try to get off the train. So I stayed 
on until it g·ot around the bluff, trying to pick a smooth place 
to leave the train. It got around the curve some hundred 
yards, I reckon, as near as I can come at it, from the station. 
So it looked tolerable smooth and I stepped off, catching my 
whole weight on this foot, striking a rock, leaning from the 
train in case I lost -my footing I woulcln 't fall under it; lean-
ing from the train I stepped on the rock and this pain struck 
me right there and ran up in this aJ1kle. Well, I stopped and 
leaned back ag·ainst the bank a while, it kind of deadened it, 
and it began to get pretty painful, made me right sick. · I 
stood there a while and sort of got over it and walked ou up 
here and attended to the business.'' 
Surely, under this testimony of the plaintiff not the slight-
est evidence of any negligence on the part of the defendant is 
Rhown. The arrangement for getting off the train while in 
motion was voluntary on th';! part of the plaintiff, and made 
prior to the arrival of the tra.in at .Palmyra. Plaintiff was 
a mature man, 65 years of ·age. Every one of full age is pre-
sumed.to be "sui juris" (Bouvier, Law Diet.; Storr, ag. 10), 
by ,vhich term, in modern law, is meant .''having· the capacity 
to act in one's own right" (60 Corpus Juris, p. 1000). The 
evidence shows that for '' twenty odd years'' the plaintiff had 
been ~ccu~tomed to traveling· _from his home near Carysbrook 
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to Palmyra, generally traveling by train. Plaintiff =X•fur-
lT" ~her -admitted that he had previous experience in getting 
off of moving trains in his "younger days" (R., pp. 44-
45), and· testified that while traveling on the train some time 
after this suit was brought, he started to get off the train at 
Palmyra while the train was in motion, and apparently the 
only thing that prevented him from doing so was the protest 
of the conductor (R., pp. 48-49). 
There was no compulsion on the part of the conductor of 
the train, or any other agent of the defendant in the present 
case exerted against the plaintiff in the previous voluntary 
arrangement for getting off the train while it was in motion, 
and there was no compulsion, direction or even suggestion 
by the conductor, or any other agent _of the defendant, that 
the plaintiff should g·et off the train at the place where he 
actually alig·hted; but the whole transaction was agreed to 
and executed all along· the line from its inception to its con-
clusion, with the full knowledge of the plaintiff, and of his 
own free will and choice. 
Furthermore, plaintiff's testimony shows that the request 
the conductor made to the passengers, prior to the arrival of 
the train at Palmyra, was a request to "try to get off" afte1· 
the train was slowed down. This proof establishes the fact 
that the request was purely a conditional one, if conditions 
became favorable, and that it was "readily" agreed to by 
the plaintiff and other passengers on this basis. The con-
ductor did not direct the plaintiff to get off at any particular 
spot or to get off at all events. He even restrained the plain-
tiff from getting off at the station on account of his being· 
an elderly man, and specifically asked him to wait until the 
train had further reduced its speed. There is no suggestion 
in the plaintiff's testimony that the plaintiff was in-1s• capable *of making the ultimate decision for himself, or 
that he put the responsibility for such a decision upon 
the conductor. Indeed, the exact contrary thereof is shown. 
In the testimony quoted above, the plaintiff states that he 
stayed on the train until it got around the bluff, himself "try-
ing to pick a smooth place'' to leave the train, and that he, 
without any objection or suggestion by the conductor, selected 
the alighting place ( which was about one hundred yards in 
distance from the station). 
Again, there is no evidence to support the charge that. tho 
place at which the plaintiff alighted was unsafe. The plain-
tiff simply states that he stepped off on a rock-''catching-
my whole weight on this foot''. He does not claim to have 
slipped or fa1len and lost his balance, or that what he stepped 
i 
I 
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on gave way. The accident happened in the morning-in 
the broad daylight-apparently on one of the ·'perfect days" 
in June, the plaintiff being at least.positive that there "was 
no weather falling". Plaintiff testified as stated above, that 
he was looking for a '' smooth place'' at which to get off, that 
he could see the ground below and it looked '' tolerable 
smooth". He noticed the rocks and he knew that there was 
a certain distance down from the train to the ground. There 
was no hidden defect, or any element of surprise present (R., 
pp. 21, 22, 47, 48)-in fact the plaintiff testified that he knew 
as much about the condition of the premises before he got 
off the train as afterwards (R., p. 48). 
No negligence on the part of the defendant as to the speed 
of the train is alleged. On the contrary, it is freely conceded 
that the train was not moYing "at any excess speed; it was 
very slow''; that the conductor had started to apply the 
19* ''air'' soon after *passing the whistle post in approach-
ing Palmyra and was '' still holding the air on'' wlien 
the plaintiff alighted; it is not claimed that there was any 
sudden jerk or speeding up of the train at that time, and 
the testimony shows that the train was slowing down all the 
time. Furthermore, the plaintiff definitely asserted that the 
train was going· slow enough for him to have alighted safely 
at the depot (R., pp. 23, 24, 26, 47). 
The plaintiff, in response to questions on direct examina-
tion, further testified as to the position of Mr. Duke, the con-
ductor of the train, at the time the plaintiff alighted from the 
train, as follows (R.., pp. 24-25) : 
'' Q. Now at the time you actually left the train, where was 
Mr. Duke? 
"A. He was standing at the rear of the car right by the 
air lever. 
''Q. Was he in a position to see you when you left the train t 
"A. Sure he was. 
'' Q. How close was he to you 1 
"A. Oh, well, from where I was on the step to leave the 
train, not a bit farther than from me to you. I just walked 
down on the step, that is all and he was standing on the rear 
on the right-hand side holding the air lever in his hand. 
"Q. Did Mr. Duke at that time immediately prior· to the 
time that you left the train or alig·hted from the train, sa:v 
anything to you about not getting off the train or make any 
statement? 
'' A. If he had said anything· I couldn't have heard it be-
cause of the escaping air. 
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'' Q. \V ell, did he make any motions or anything to indi-
cate that he didn't want vou to leave the train at that time? 
"A. Not at all. ., 
"Q. Are you familiar with the railroad track around that 
bend? 
20-~ '~" A. No, sir, not at all, been over it several times 
on the train, but had no occasion to notice the surround-
ings.'' 
It thus appears from the plaintiff's own testimony that, 
in the language of the motion for judgment, he was not '' re-
quired'', "advised'', "requested", "forced" or "directed" 
by the agents and servants of the defendant, to get off the 
train at the point in question. Neither was the plaintiff urged, 
invited or encouraged to get off the train at such point. The 
selection of the point to alight, if he alighted at all while the 
train was in motion after it passed the station, was left by 
the conductor to the free will and choice of the plaintiff, and 
the plaintiff likewise assumed that responsibility upon him-
self-a responsibility which is increased, rather than lessened, 
by his statement that he was not familiar with the railroad 
track "around the bend". This last-mentioned statement, 
moreover, is supplemented by his statement on cross examina-
tion, that he knew as much before he got off the train as after-
wards (R., p. 48). In other words, on plaintiff's own testi-
mony, notwithstanding his unfamiliarity with the railroad 
track at the point in question, his foresight was as good as 
his hindsight in this instance. Hence, he was not misled or 
prejudiced by anything the conductor did, or failed to do, in 
this particular. There was nothing therefore which should 
not have been foreseen or estimated by the exercise of or-
dinary care on his own part. 
It is urged that the conductor was negligent because he 
was present on the platform of the car and made no objection 
to the plaintiff's alighting from the train at the point in ques-
tion, and that the implication from such inaction on the part 
of the conductor was that he tacitly directed or invited the 
plaintiff to alight at that particular point. This, how-
21* ever, is a non-sequitur, *and is in the teeth of the plain-
tiff's own construction (as well as version) of the inci-
dent, as shown in the preceding quotation from the plaintiff's 
testimony. That the plaintiff assumed the sole responsibility 
in getting off the train at the point in question is likewise re-
iterated by him on cross examination (R., pp. 46-48). In fact 
the complaint of the plaintiff was not against the non-action 
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where he actually alighted, but in precisely an opposite cou-
tention--namely, in the action of the conductor in objecting 
to his getting off the train at the station platform, where he 
claims he "should have gotten off". 
Thus, in response to questions asked him 011 cross examina-
tion, plaintiff testified as follows (R., p. 47) : 
'' Q. And you got off when you did of your own volition f 
'' A. Sure. 
'' Q. You thought it was a.11 right to get off, didn't you? 
"A. I felt I was safe in getting off the train. It wasn't any 
excess speed, as I said a while ago; it was moving. I had 
every right to believe I could g·et off, and could have gotten 
off with safety, if I had gotten off in the place in which I 
should have gotten off.'' 
A.part from the fact that the substance of the p1aintiff>s own 
testimony, as above shown, is that the presence of the con-
ductor on the platform of the car at the time the plaintiff 
alighted from the train in no way affected the plaintiff's free-
dom of action or had any causal relation to the accident, the 
law is well settled that such a position of the servant or agent 
of the defendant in no wise creates any liability upon 
22* the defendant, or *relieves the plaintiff from his own re-
sponsibility for the accident. 
In Solo,mon v. Manhattan Ry. Co., 103 N. Y. 437, 442, 9 N~ 
E. 430, 432, Andrews, J., states the law as follows: 
"In Burrows v. Erie Ry. Co., 63 N. Y. 556, the court re-
versed a judgment recovered for an injury to a passenger in 
alighting at his station from a moving car: and in Morrison 
v. Erie Ry. Co., 56 N. Y. 302, the court reversed a verdict for 
the plaintiff under very similar circumstances. It is said by 
Rapalls, J., in Hltrrow8 v. l?rie Ry. Co., that 'The cases in 
which a recovery has been allowed notwithstanding that the 
passenger undertook to leave the car while in motion are ex-
ceptional and depend upon peculiar circumstances'. In short, 
as we now understand the rule estahlis]1ed by the decisions, 
it is presumptively a negligent act for a passenger to attempt 
to alig·ht from a moving train, and it is not sufficient to re-
hut the presumption that the trainmen acquiesced in the ac-
tion of the passenger, or tlmt the company violated its duty 
or contract in not stopping· the train, or that to remain on 
the train would subject the passenger to trouble or incon-
venience, but that to excuse such an act and free the plaintiff 
from the charg·e of contributory neg·ligence there must be a 
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coercion of circumstances which did not leave the passenger 
in the ·free and untrammeled possession of his f aculti0$. 
'' Negligence, no doubt, is usually a question of fact of 
which the jury must inquire, but the inference of negligence 
in a given case may be so clear and convincing that the judge 
may direct a verdict. The conclusion that it is pr-irna facic 
dangerous to alight from a moving train is founded on our 
general knowledge and common experience, and is akin to the 
conclusion, now generally accepted, that it is in law a danger-
ous and therefore a negligent act unless explained and justi-
fied hy special circumstances to attempt to cross a railroad 
track without looking for appl'oaching· trains.'' 
To the ~;ame effect is the case of Mearns v. Central R. R. 
Co. of N. J., 163 N. Y. 108, 57 N. E. 292. In this case, where 
a passenger got off a train while it was in motion, the con-
ductor or guard "was partially facing the plaintiff as he 
passed out of the car into the vestibule, but gave no 
23"" warning or intimation that *the car had not stopped". 
As the conductor or guard after announcing the station, 
stood facing the door of the vestibule which had not yet been 
opened and the train was still in motion, plaintiff leaned 
against a partition and stood waiting for half a minute, when 
the guard opened the vestibule door and stepped across to 
the vestibule of the other car, and plaintiff erroneously sup-
posing that the train had stopped, stepped out into the vesti-
bule, took the rail in his right hand, passed down the steps, 
and thence off onto the platform. In doing so, he fell and 
was injured. It was held, that since the facts did not show 
such a direction to the plaintiff as interfered with his free 
agency, and divided his attention from the danger of alight-
ing from the train while moving, he was guilty of contribu-
tory negligence, and his complaint for damages was the re-
fore properly dismissed. 
In 13 Corpus Juris Secundum, pp. 1573-4, Sec. 793, this is 
said: 
'' The fact that the carrier's agent fails to warn a passen-
ger of the danger of alighting while the vehicle is in motion, 
even though such agent knew or might have known of the 
passenger's intention, does not relieve the passenger of the 
legal results of his contributory ne_gligence.'' 
In the case of Bat·tley v. Weste·rn Maryland R. Co., 81 W. 
Va. 795, B5 S. E. 443, where a passenger stood on the steps 
of a moving train preparatory to a1ighting therefrom, it was 
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held that the failure of a nearby brakeman to warn him against 
his apparent design to alight did not excuse the passenger's 
negligence in stepping· clown from the moving train. The syl-
labus by the court is as follows : 
'' Generally it is negligence per se for a passenger in full 
possession of his senses and faculties to alight from a train 
while it is in motion, and the failure of a brakeman who hap-
pens to be near by to warn a passenger standing on the 
24 * steps of a car ready to alight does not *excuse such con-
tributory negligence.'' 
It is contended by counsel for the plaintiff that the defend-
ant owed ''to its passengers the highest degree of care for 
their safety known to human prudence and foresight, and is 
liable to the plaintiff for damages for the slightest negli-
gence against which human care, skill and foresig·ht could 
have foreseen and g·uarded" (Richmond-Ashland Ry. Co. v. 
,Jackson, 157 Va. 628), whereas the passenger was only re-
quired to exercise '' ordinary care'' for his own safety, and 
upon these premises it is urged that the conductor owed a 
higher degree of duty to the plaintiff than the plaintiff owed 
to himself; and that, as a consequence it was the duty of 
the conductor to warn the plaintiff not to get off the train 
at the place in question, while the train was in motion. The 
fallacy of this contention, however, is not only exposed by 
the foregoing authorities, but is obvious on its face. The 
contention disreg·ards the fact that the law of comparative 
negligence has no application to this case. It overlooks-
'' The familiar doctrine, that the court in such cases, will 
not undertake to balance the negligence of the respective par-
ties for the purpose of determining which was most at fault, 
as the law recognizes no gradations of fault in such cases.'' 
Yeary v. Holbrook, 171 Va. 266, 286, and cases cited. Con-
sequently, the law is an elementary one in this State, that, 
howsoever gross may be the negligence of the defendant, the 
plaintiff still cannot recover if his negligence suhAtantially 
contributed in any degree to the proximate cause of the ac-
cident. 
That this doctrine has frequently been applied in cases in-
volving the public carriage of passengers, may be seen by 
reference to the following· cases in Virginia, hereinafter to be 
more fully cited: 
18 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
25* ~'Richmond and Danville R. Co. v. Morris, 31 Gratt. 
200; 
Jamrn-ison, v. C. ,db 0. R. Co., 92 Va. 327, 23 S. E. 758; 
C. & 0. Ry. Co. v. Wills, 111 Va. 32, 68 S. E. 395; 
C. & 0. Ry. Co. v. Paris, 111 Va. 41, 68 S. E. 398, 28 L. R. 
A. (N. S.) 773. See also R. & D. R. R. Co. v. Pickelseimer, 
85 Va. 798; 10 S. E. 44; s. c. 89 Va. 389, 16 S. E. 245. 
Moreover, as above indicated, even tµe duty of the highest 
degree of ca re does not require a conductor to admonish an 
adult passenger against the dangers of alighting from a mov-
ing train, where the fact the train is moving is as obvious 
to the passenger as it is to the conductor; and hence, in such 
a case, the conductor is not in any way negligent for his fail-
ure so to do. 
Thus, in the case of Da,vidson v. Washington, etc., Ry. Co., 
129 Va. 99, 107, 105 S. E. 669, the court said: 
''Passeng·crs are entitled to expect and demand from car-
riers the hig·hest degree of care for their protection and 
safety, but this rule does not go to the extent of requiring 
carriers to exercise a guardianship over passengers who are 
adults and mentally competent, or to undertake to coerce 
them into the exercise of ordinary care for their own safety." 
In Virginia Ry. & P. Co. v. Burr, 145 Va. 338, 346, the state-
ment of the law in the identical language of the foregoing 
decision is ag·ain approved and confirmed by the court. 
In Wright v. Boston a.nd J.J,Ja;ine R.R. Co. (N. H.), 139 Atl. 
370, 56 A. L. R. 975, it was held, in accordance with the fore-
going· principles, that a public carrier is under no obligation 
to warn a passenger about to alight from a car not to alight 
until the car stops, if the fact that the car is moving is known 
to the passeng·er, the court saying: 
26* *''If she [ the passenger] knew the car was moving·, 
there was no duty to warn her. In that situation her ap-
preciation of the dang·er was equal to the defendant's. The 
danger of leaving a moving conveyance is a matter of com-
mon lmowledge, and there was no duty to warn her of a dan-
g·er which she knew as much about as the defendant. If it 
was careless not to warn her, it was equally careless on her 
part for her to do as she did, with knowledge that the car was 
moving. 'The fact that one person is injured and the other 
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ployee ( or passenger )-will not authorize the imposition of 
<lifferent rules of care as to matters of common knowledge 
about which each has equal information.' " 
In connection with the suggestion of the plaintiff that the 
conductor was negligent in inducing the plaintiff not to get 
off the train while it was moving past the station platform-
which is apparently the sole ground of negligence relied upon 
by the plaintiff in his evidence-it is manifest that this act of 
the conductor was not a ncg·ligent act. The train at that time 
was going at a faster speed than it was when the plaintiff ac-
tually alighted, and there was an underpass at the end of 
the platform towards which the train was moving, which 
would have increased the danger to the plaintiff had he 
alighted at that point. That the conductor was acting in good 
faith to prevent injury to the plaintiff from such a danger, 
or combination of dangers, there can be no question. More-
over, the plaintiff acquiesced in the suggestion of the con-
ductor not to get off the train at that time; and this act of 
the conductor had no causal relationship to the accident. 
In the case of C. ,& 0. Ry. Co. v. Paris, 107 Va. 408, 59 S. 
E. 398, it was held that even where the act of the trainman 
had a causal relationship to the accident, it was the duty of 
a brakeman on a passenger train to endeavor to prevent one 
from stepping off a moving train, when it is more than or-
dinarily dangerous to do so, that is if, in addition to the mo-
tion of the train there are superadded dangers of which 
27* the passenger may be unaware, and if while acting· *in 
good faith to prevent an apparent danger, his efforts 
fail and the person steps or falls off and is injured, there 
can be no recovery against tlie Company, although it is prob-
able he might have alighted in safety but for the interference 
of the brakeman. On a second appeal of the same case, this 
ruling was reaffirmed by the Court. C. & 0. Ry. Go. v. Paris, 
Ill Va. 41, 45. 
A fortior-i, can there be no re~overy for such an act of the 
trainman where it has no causal relationship to the accident, 
or is only a remote cause or condition of the injury, aFl herr. 
" * * * To warrant a recovery for an injury to a passen-
ger, the negligence complained of must stand as the proximate 
cause of the injury sustained-that is, it must be the direct 
and efficient cause of the injury. Under no circumstances is 
a carrier of passengers held as an insurer of their safetJ·. 
Con.1n.ell v. C'. & 0., 93 Va. 44, 24 S. K 467." 
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Virgin_ia fl., etc., Co. v. McDmnmick, 117 Va. 862, 869, 86 
S. E. 744. 
So l1kewise, assuming that the defendant was negligent in 
not stopping its train for the plaintiff to alight therefrom at 
Palmyra station, such negligence, if any, does not warrant a 
recovery for the injuries sustained by the plaintiff, since it 
is manifest that such failure of duty on the part of the de-
fendant was not the proximate cause of the accident. 
In Janim-ison v. Chesapeake & 0. R. Co., 92 Va. 327, 23 S. E. 
758, 53 Am. St. Rep. 813, it was held that if a passenger train 
fails to stop at a station to which a passenger has purchased 
a ticket, it is the duty of the passenger to retain his seat until 
he arrives at the next station at which the train stops; and 
if he feels aggrieved, to institute his action against the com-
pany for any loss or injury he may have sustained by 
28* reason of the failure ,Ecto stop the train at the proper 
station. But if he fails to do this, and in passing from 
one coach to another in search of the conductor to get him to 
stop the train, he is thrown from the train and injured, his 
neglig·ence is the proximate cause of the injury and he cannot 
recover damages therefor. 
This same doctrine is approved and held applicable to 
passengers who are injured in getting off moving railroad 
trains, under similar circumstances, in the cases of C. db 0. 
Ry. Co. v. J,Vills, 111 Va. 32, 68 8. E. 395, 32 L. R. A. (N. S.) 
280; and 0. & 0. Ry. Co. v. Paris, 111 Va. 41, 68 S. E. 398, 28 
L. R. A. (N. S.) 773. In all three of the foregoing cases, 
judgments were entered by the Supreme Court of Appeals 
of Virginia in favor of the defendant carriers on demurrers 
(in the Wills Case on demurrer to the declaration, and in the 
other two cases, on demurrers to the evidence), thus hold-
ing that there was no liability upon the defendant as a mat-
ter of law. 
So, also, it was held as a matter of law in the case of Rich-
nwnd .& Danville R.R. Co. v. ]J{orris, 31 Gratt. 200, that where 
a passenger was negligently carried past his station, and 
jumped off the train while it was in motion, he cannot re-
cover for the injuries thereby occasioned him. In this case, 
,Judge K C. Burks, who delivered the opinion of the court, 
quotes with approval the following language of Chief Jus-
tice Black, on the case of Rail·road Co. v. A.spell, 23 Penn. St. 
147: 
·'It has been a rule of law from time immemorial, and is 
not likely to be changed in all time to come, that there can be 
no recovery for an injury by the mutual fa ult of both parties. 
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,vhen it can be shown that it would not have happened except 
for the culpable negligence of the party injured concurring 
with that of the other party, no action can be maintained. 
A railroad company is not liable for an accident which 
29* *the passenger might have prevented by ordinary at-
tention to his safety; even though the agents in the train 
a re remiss in their duty • * • . From these principles it fol-
lows very closely that if a passenger is negligently carried 
beyond the station where he intended to stop and where he 
had a right to be let off, he can recover compensation for the 
inconvenience, the loss of time and the labor of traveling· back; 
because these are the direct consequences of the wrong done 
to him. But if he is foolhardy enough to jump off without 
waiting for the train to stop, he docs it at his own risk; be-
cause this is gross negligence for which he can blame nobody 
but himself. If there be any man who does not know that such 
leaps are dangerous, especially when taken in the dark, his 
friends should see that he does not travel on a railroad.'' 
The same quotation from the opinion of Chief Justice Black 
is cited with approval by President Keith in delivering the 
opinion of the court in the case of C. & 0. Ry. Co. v. Paris, 
111 Va. 41, 48. In the Paris Case, Paris, the plaintiff's de-
cedent, had entered the train in order to assist a passenger, 
who was his daughter, with her suit case. Two witnesses tes-
tified that Paris, when he entered the car inquired of a brake-
man if he would have time to take his daughter's dress-suit 
case into the car, set it down and get off before the train 
started, and was told that he would, to '' go ahead". It also 
appeared that Paris asked the brakeman not to start the train 
until he could get off; that although the train was movinµ,· 
slowly when the deceased got on the steps to alight, he could 
have done so successfully, but for the interference of a brake-
man who grabbed him and then let him g·o, unbalancing him 
and thus preventing him from alighting safely, and causing· 
his fatal injury. 
The court said ( at pp. 45, 49) : 
''The case made by the evidence, it may be conceded, showR 
that the railway company was neg·ligent in failing to give 
Paris a. reasonable time within which to leave the train. Th(l 
· fact remains, however, that in *attempting to alight 
30* from a moving train he was the author of his own 
wrong. 
''Negligence, whether contributory or otherwise, is a mix(~d 
question of la,,T and fact. If the facts be doubtful, or about 
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which reasonable men may differ, their determination becomes 
a question fo1· the jury; but where the facts are undisputed, 
the law applicable to them is a question for the court * * * . 
"The person injured in this case was upon the train where 
he had the right to be as an invitee. He was in a place of 
safety. Had he elected to remain upon the train, his right 
of action was complete for whatever inconvenience he had 
suffered or might suffer, as the direct consequence of the rail-
road company's neglig·ence. But when he undertook to alight 
from the train, the neg·ligence of the railroad company had 
ceased to operate, and it was the voluntary act of Paris which 
became the proximate cause of his injury.'' 
Again, the court says (at pp. 50, 51): 
'' There is another view, which we think is not without 
merit. Where an injury is inflicted by a negligent act, it is 
the duty of the party injured by reasonable care to diminish 
the consequences of the wrong he has suffered, in the interest 
of the wrong-doer. This is not merely good law but good 
morals, and flows from that rule which has the hig·hest pos-
sible sanction that we should do unto others as we would have 
others do unto us. 
'' Where a passeng·cr bas been wrongfully carried beyond 
his station, or has not been given a reasonable time to leave 
a train, this principle requires him to submit for the time to 
the situation, secure in his rig·ht ultimately to recover for the 
inconvenience he may suffer, but forbids him to step "from 
a moving train, thereby imperilling his life and limb, and then 
turn around and engraft the consequences of his own rash act 
upon the antecedent neglig·ence of the railroad and recover for 
both.'' 
In C. db 0. Ry. Co. v. Wills, S'U,1Jra, the plaintiff was a passen-
ger on the defendant's railway, to be carried from its station 
at Gordonsville to Louisa, Virginia, for a certain fare which 
was paid, and was misdirected by the agents and servants of 
the defendant into getting upon a train that was bound 
31 * in the opposite *direction to that which he wished to go. 
As soon as the train started to move, the plaintiff dis-
covered that he was on the wrong train, and he went at o.nce 
to the exit of the coach in which he was, and "when the train 
had not attained any speed, but was moving -very slowlv" 
and while exercising ordinary care on his own pai:t (a.s ";as 
aJleged) attempted to alight therefrom, and while thus at-
tempting to alight the plaintiff was thrown under the train, 
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and injured, by the '· careless and negligent conduct of the 
defendant in carrying him away from his destination". 
The court, in sustaining a demurrer to the declaration, said 
(at p. 35); 
'' vVben, tberef ore, the plaintiff found himself moving in 
<l direction the opposite of that in which he wished to go he 
liad, in the case supposed, a complete right of action against 
the defendant company to recover the damages flowing from 
the breach of duty owetl to him by the railroad company. 
"But that is not the injury for which this suit was brought. 
The plaintiff, :finding himself moving from instead of toward 
his home, went at once to the door of the car and undertook 
to alight from the train while in motion and suffered the in-
jury which resulted in the amputation of his leg. It does 
not appear from the declaration that the defendant directed, 
requested, encouraged or sugg·ested that the plaintiff should 
step from the car while in motion. It does not appear from 
the declaration that the defendant was advised in anv man-
ner of the situation in which the plaintiff found himself. He 
ucted solely upon his own responsibility in alig·hting from the 
train, and that act was the proximate cause of the injury 
which he received, and the negligent conduct of the railroad 
-company in causing him to enter the wrong train, conceding-
that it was g;uilty of neglig·ence, was the remote cause." 
Again the court says (at p. 39) : 
"The direct and efficient cause of the injury for which this 
suit was brought was the alighting from the train while in 
motion. In that act the railroad company had no part. As 
we have seen the declaration does not ·aver that anv 
i32* agent of the company directed, ,a.advised, encouragecl 
or even l1ad knowledge of the plaintiff's intention to 
alight from the train; so that between the negligent act of 
the railroad company and the injury suffered by the plain-
tiff there was the intervening act of a responsible agent, tliat 
responsible ag·ent being the plaintiff himself.'' 
So, in the case nt bal', it does not appear that the defend-
ant, or the defendant's conductor, ''directed, requested, en-
couraged, sng·g-estcd or advised'' that the plaintiff should, 
contrary to his own volition, a.light from the train whi1e it 
wns in motion. On the other hand, it appears here from the 
plaintiff's own testimony that in alighting from the train when 
he did, he selected the place and time by his o,vn free will· and 
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choice, upon his own volition, and solely under his own re-
sponsibility. 
It is true that in the Wills case, no agent of the company 
had any· l~nowledge of the plaintiff's intention to alight from 
the train· while the train was in motion; and the court men-
tioned this fact in the above citations from its opinion, as an 
additional reason why there was no liability upon the defend-
ant. It is also true that in this respect, the ·wills case is un-
like the case at bar; and that here the conductor was stand-
ing on the platform of the car at the time the plaintiff alighted 
from the train. But, as we have hereinbefore shown, on iea-
son and authority, that notwithstanding the fact the conduc-
tor of a train may have complete knowledge in advance of 
the intention of au adult passenger to alight from a moving 
train, the conductor is under no legal oblig·ation to warn such 
passenger against the dangers of getting off the train 
33* while it is in motion, or to prevent the passenger from 
*so doing when it is perfectly obvious that the passen-
ger knows the train is in motion and is equally as conscious 
of the danger as is the conductor. 
All persons who are siti jitris are presumed to know that 
which is a matter of common knowledge; and as said by Chief 
Justice Black, of Pennsylvania, in language approved by such 
eminent jurists as Judge E. C. Burks and President Keith 
of the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, if there be 
any man who does not know that such leaps from a moving 
train are dangerous, '' his friends should see that he docs n.ot 
travel on a railroad". 
F,urthermore, the decision of the plaintiff to alight from 
the train when he did, was the deliberate act of a responsible 
person, which completely insulated any possible preceding 
negligence on the part of the defendant. In C. db 0. Ry. Co. 
v. Paris, 111 Va. 41, 50, this is said: 
"It has often been held that the act of a responsible agent 
intervening between the negligence of the railway company 
and the injury sued for, relieves the railway company of re-
sponsibility. If the inten,en.in,q act of a. third person has that 
effect, how niuch more where the person injured ·wa.s himself 
the author of his own wrong.'' (Italics supplied.) 
Undoubtedly, therefore, the proposal of the conductor to 
the three passengers on the train prior to its arrival at Pal-
myra-" If I slow this train down, will you all try to g·et off'' 
-is bound to have been merely a remote cause or condition of 
the injury, as distinguished from the proximate cause thereof, 
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in whatever light that statement may be viewed. The state-
ment on its face was a: conditional one : It implied that the 
conductor would stop the train at Palmyra. in accordance 
B4* with his duty to do *so if the passeng·ers so desired; 
and if, on the other hand, the passengers agreed to tlie 
proposition, then they were to assume the risks in getting off 
the train while it was in motion, because, they, under the terms 
of the proposal, were to "try to get off", and not to get off 
the train while the same was in motion at all events, or with-
out selecting for themselves the choice of the time and place 
for alighting from the train, if they alighted therefrom at 
all, while the same was in motion. In other words, under the 
terms of the proposal there was no compulsion whatsoever 
placed upon the free will of the passengers. 
Besides, the plaintiff not only testified that he of his own 
free will "readily" agreed to the proposition; bu,t, as above 
'indicated, in alighting from the train when he did, he selected 
the place and time by his own free will and choice, upon his 
oum volition and solely ·itnder his own responsibility. 
Whether therefore the agreement made prior to the ar-
rival of the train at Palmyra was valid or invalid is imma-
terial to this controversy. Assuming· that the conductor was 
negligent in not stopping the train at Palmyra, notv,ithstand-
ing the plaintiff's agTeement undertaking to exonerate the 
defendant from that obligation, it is perfectly apparent from 
the plaintiff's own testimony that such negligence, if any, was 
· merely the remote cause or condition of the accident, and that 
the plaintiff himself was the author of his own misfortune. 
No Liability Upon Defendant As a Matter of Law. 
In South Hill Motor Co. v. Gordon, 172 Va. 193, 205, 200 
S. E. 637, the court says : 
35* *''The plaintiff can make no stronger case than i~ 
shown by his own testimony. He is bound by his own 
account of what he saw and did.'' Citing the following· eases, 
wherein the same doctrine has been consistently applied: 
Thalhimer Bros. v. Casr-·i, 160 Va. 439, 168 S. E. 433; 
Chakales v. D.iiovanides, 1.61 Va. 48, 170 S. E. 848; 
Virginia Electric .<t Poiuer Co. v. Vellines, 162 Va. 671, 175 
S. E. 35; 
BaBsett <f Co. v. lVood, 146 Ya. 654, 132 S. E. 700; 
Davis Bakery v. Dozier, 139 Va. 628, 124 S. E. 411; 
Massie v. Firmston.e, 134 Va. 450, 114 S. E. 652. 
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As a logical consequence of the foregoing doctriue--which 
is now commonly known to the leg·al ·profession as the doc-
trine of" Massie v. E'innstone'' (having been first prominently 
announced in the decision of the Supreme Court of Appeals 
of Virginia in that case, cited s1ipra )-the case at the bar is 
clearly one for the Court to decide; for as said by Keith, P., 
in C. db 0. Ry. Co. v. Par-is, 111 Va., at p. 45: 
'' N eg'ligence, whether contributory or otherwise, is a mixed 
question of law and fact. If the facts be doubtful, or about 
which reasonable men may differ, their determination be-
comes a question for the jury; but where the f <tcts are undis-
puted, the law applicable to them, is a question for the C01fft. '' 
(Italics supplied.) 
Certainly the facts a re undisputed in any case, insofar as 
the plaintiff is concerned, where a plaintiff testifies and under 
the law '' can make no stronger case than is shown by his own 
testimony''. 
This consequence of the doctrine is brought out with great 
clearness in Massie v. Pinnstone, itself, where the court says 
(at p. 462): 
36* *''As a general rule when two or more witnesses, in-
troduced by a party litigant, vary in their statement of 
fact, such party has the right to ask the court or jury to ac-
cept as true the statement most favorable to him. In such 
a situation he would be entitled to have the jury insfructed 
upon his contention, or if there were a demurrer to the evi-
dence, the facts would have to be regarded as established in 
accordance with the testimony most favorable to him. This 
is not tr-ue as to the testi:Jnony which he gives hi1nself. No 
liti,qant ca;n siwcessf11ily ask a court or fu.ry to believe that 
he ha,S not told the trnth. His statem,ents of fact ancl the neces-
sary inf er enc es there/ rom are binding. 'Upon hini. He can-
not be heard to ask that his case be made stronger than he 
1nakes it, where, as here, it depends upon facts within h'is own 
knowledge and as to which he has testified.'' (Italics sup-
plied.) 
In addition to the doctrine of MaBsie v. Firmstone, there is 
still another reason in the present case why the case should 
not have been submitted to the jury, and judgment should be 
entered for the defendant as a matter of law. In no Sfa.te i1,. 
the Uni011, is the doctrine that a passenger on a railroad frain. 
( as distinguished from, a sl'reet car) is guilty of negligence 
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per se in voluntarily alighting from a mo-ving railroad train, 
more rigidly adhered to th0111, in Virginia. The fact that there 
is considerable conflict in other states on this subject has been 
conceded by the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia; but, 
with the full knowledge of that coufiict, the court has pni-
formly and consistently held to the doctrine that there is no 
liability upon a defendant railroad company in such a case, 
as a matter of law, except under special circumstances not 
applicable to the case at bar. 
Thus, in C. & 0. Ry. Co. v. Paris, 111 Va. 41, 45, Keith, P., 
in delivering- the opinion of the court, says: 
37·:« *'' The decided cases with reference to alighting from 
moving· trains are almost without number. Many of them 
deal with passengers alig·hting- from street cars, and it is 
almost universally held that to alight from a slowly moving 
street car is not negligence per se. ·where a passenger is in-
vited to alight by an officer of the train, or is told that he 
may do so, in safety the cases hold that circumstance to jus-
tify his action provided the train has not attained such a 
speed that the danger would he obvious. If he is induced to 
leap from the train by a well founded apprehension of peril 
to ]if e or limb, induced by occurrences which might have been 
g·uarded against by the utmost care of the carrier, he is en-
titled to recover for any injury he may have sustained thereby, · 
nlthoug-h no injury would have occur·red if he had remained 
quiet; and we admit that there are cases wl1ich have held the 
earrier responsible where there waR no invitation extended, 
no assurance given, and no peril apprehended. But we a.re 
of opinion that the just and proper rule of decision is that 
which we understand to prevail in this Stale.'' (Italies sup-
plied.) 
\Vhich rule, the learned Chief Justice goes on to show, is 
that there is no liability upon the defendant as a matter of 
Jaw, except under the circumsta.11ces mentioned i11 the citation 
above, namely : 
(a) Where a passenger leaps from the moving train by a 
well-founded apprehension of peril to life or limb induced by 
1rngligcnce of the carrier ; or 
(b) ·where a passeng·er is invited to alight by an officer 
of the train or is told that he may do so in safety, vrovided 
the tmvn has not attained such n spMd tha.f the danger would. 
be obvious. 
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Exception (a), of course, has no application to the case at 
bar. 
As to Exception (b), there is no evidence whatsoever in 
·.. .-this case that the conductor at any time told the plain-
3g,l tiff that he *might alight from the train in safety; on 
the contrary, the concluctor restrained the plain ti ff from 
alighting from the train, on account of the hazards thereof, 
while the train was moving past the station at Palmyra, and 
at no time thereafter did the conductor tell the plaintiff that 
he mig·ht alight from the train in safety; nor nt any time 
thereafter did the conductor, either by word of mouth or ac-
tion, invite the plaintiff to alight from th(~ train, or iu any 
way induce the plaintiff to alight from the train when he did. 
Furthermore, as hereinbefore fully shown, the plaintiff him-
self testified that he alighted from the train ,,,.here he did, of 
his own free will and choice, independent of und uninfluenced 
by any actions, words or conduct on the part of the con-
ductor. 
We have also shown hereinbefore that t11e request made by 
the conductor prior to the arrival of the train at Palmyra-
"lf I slow this train down, will you all try to get off"--was 
a conditional request. It was conditioned upon t11e voluntary 
acceptance thereof by the plaintiff as well as the other passen-
gers; and the plaintiff by ''readily'' agreeing thereto, ac-
cepted the further condition that he was not to get nff the 
train at all events but only to "try to get off''. That is to 
say, the plaintiff in the exercise of his own cliseretion, and of 
his own free will and choice, was to determine the time and 
place for getting off the train, if he got off at all; and by his 
own actions and conduct thereunder, as well as by his testi-
mony in court, the plaintiff so construed the agreement. 
Hence, no ''invitation" by the conductor to thf~ plaintiff to 
get off the moving train at the spot where he did, se-
39• lected exclusively of his own volition hy •the plaintiff, 
can be implied by the arrangement made between the 
conductor a.nd the plaintiff prior to the arrival of the train 
at Palmyra. Certainly, to recover on any such alleg,~d "in-
vitation'' of the conductor, it must be shown that the "invi-
tation'', as such, was relied upon by the passenger to the ex-
clusion of his own untrammeled will and choice; which is tl1e 
exact opposite of the testimony of the plaintiff himself in the 
present case. 
Moreover, the proviso to the exception (b), supra, operated 
on the plaintiff in the present case. The passeng·er (lan rel~.,. 
upon an invitation of t]1e officer of the train to alig;ht there-
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from, only when "the train has not attained such a i-;peed that 
the danger would be obvious". 
'I1he train was going at such a speed and under 8uch cir-
cumstances that at the time the plaintiff alig;hted therefrom 
the danger was obvious in the present case, especially to a 
man who like the plaintiff, was 65 years of age ~1.nd was un-
familiar with the railroad track around the bend, at the very 
place where he alighted, which was something like 75 or 100 
yards from the station (R., pp. 24-25). 
We have already cited authorities to show that it is a mat-
ter of common knowledge that it is dangerous to alight from 
moving railroad trains. This is especially true where the per-
son alighting from the train is an elderly man of the plain-
tiff's age, who by implication described himself as being in a 
different situation in this respect from what he was in his 
"younger days'' (R., pp. 44, 45). It is also a matter of com-
mon knowledge that it is particularly dang·erous for a 
40* person of such an age to alight at *a spot between sta-
tions with which he is not familiar. 
In fact, the case at bar is much stronger for the defend-
ant in this respect than were the cases of C. ,~ 0. Ry. Co. v. 
Wills, and C. & 0. Ry. Co. v. Paris, sitpra. In both the Paris 
and 1Vills Ca.ses, the trains in each case had just started to 
move from the station and were moving "very slowly", and 
apparently in neither case had the trains gotten beyond the 
station grounds, when the passengers alighted therefrom, and 
yet in both cases it was held on demurrer by the def.enclant, 
and therefore as a matter of law that the passengers, 110t-
withstanding· the conceded negligence of the def en<lai1t in each 
case, were not entitled to recover for their injuries. With how 
much greater reason is the plaintiff disentitled to recover 
damages in the present case where the train, while it was pro-
ceeding "very slow" and "apparently'' slowing up all the 
time (R., pp. 23-24) had never come t.o any stop at all, and 
the plaintiff was an elderly gentleman, admittedly not as ac-
tive as he was in his "younger days", of his own volition 
alighted from a passenger coach ~t the rear of a predomi-
nantly long and l1eavy freight train, 75 to 100 yards r.,ast the 
station a.t an unbeaten spot in the country nlo11g the railroad 
track with which he is not familiar-the unfamiliarity of tlie 
plaintiff with the premises being of course fully known too to 
himself and unknown to anyone else. 
Also, both in the ·wills Case and the Paris Case, it was con-
tended that the parties were taken by surprise when the trains 
started to move from their respec.tive stations, and Wills and 
Paris had no time for deliberation over the dangers of getting 
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off a moving railroad train. .Judge Buchanan, in the 
41*'' Paris Case, bases his ,;.:dissenting opinion upon the 
ground that Paris in particular was taken by surprise 
when the train started to move, because the defendant's brake-
man had promised not to let the train move until Paris 
should have time to get off the train, and Paris was thus 
compelled to act hastily under the circumstances without any 
opportunity for deliberation. No such suddenness or snrprise 
of action by the defendant, contrary to the will of the plain-
tiff, exists in the present case; and the plaintiff. here not only 
had ample time in which to consider the dangers of getting off 
a moving railroad train, but of his own volition expressly 
accepted the proposal, in advance of its arrival, not to stop 
the train at Palmyra, and of his own free will and accord de-
liberately assumed the risks of getting off the train while it 
was in motion. 
In conclusion of the discussion of this branch of the sub-
ject, it is worthy of observation that upon mature delibera-
tion, the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia has held that 
it is per se negligence for a passenger to alight from a mov-
ing· railroad train, under circumstances such as exist in the 
case at bar. This rule announced with great clearness and 
distinctness by Judge E. C. Burks in delivering the decision 
of the Court in Richmond,& Dan.ville R. R. Co. v. Morris. 31 
Gratt. 200, has been followed and fully approved by the Vir-
ginia. Court ever since that day; and in the cases of C. cf; 0. 
Ry. Co. v. Wills, 111 Va. 32, and C. cf; 0. Ry. Co. v. Paris, 111 
Va. 41, the doctrine was again elaborately considered and 
the rule tlms prevailing· in this State was again ratified, ap-
proved and confirmed. Keith, P ., in delivering· the opin-
42«· ion of the Court in the Paris Case, *further asserts (at 
p. 46) that the "just and proper rule of decision is that 
which we understand to prevail in this State''. 
If the rule was '' just and proper'', then it is even more so 
now when we are in the midst of '' perilous days'' such as 
never existed before. The rule declaring it ver se neg·lig·euce 
for a passenger to alig·ht. from railroad trains while in mo-
t.ion undoubtedly tends to diminish perils to human beings iu 
this particular; while a contrary ruling would tend to incrense 
such accidents. The principles underlying the doctrine of 
stare decisis arc peculiarly applicable to the rule in question. 
No doubt rules should cease when it is certain that the rea-
sons for the rule have ceased; but when the reasons for the 
rule have increased or liave not ceased, or even where there 
is doubt whether the reason for the rule has ceased or not-
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in all such cases the doctrine of stare decisis is embedded in 
justice, and has its fixed application. 
Moreover, under the decisions of the Supreme Court of Ap-
peals of Virginia, in the T1Vills and Paris Cases, the propriety 
.and justice of the rule prevailing in Virginia was thus defi-
1iitely announced in the year 1910, the date of those decisions. 
Thereafter, in the Revision of the Code of 1919, the Revisors 
-0f the Code, although making many radical changes in the 
laws as they prevailed in Virginia at that time, with full 
knowledge of the fore going decisions, made no change in the 
law in this respect. And this Revision of the Code having 
been ratified and approved by the Legislature, and the rule 
in the Wills and Paris Cases having remained unchanged since 
the time those decisions were rendered, the rule has evidently 
received both legislative and popula1~, as well as judicial, sanc-
tion in Virginia. 
'*II. 
Plaintiff Knew the Danger and of llis Own Pree }Vill Assumed 
the Ris].~ of tlie ln,furies of Which He Complains. 
The arrangement made between the conductor of the train 
<llld the plaintiff prior to the arrival of the train at Palmyra-
for the plaintiff to "try to get off" after the train was slowed 
down, without stopping at Palmyra-was wholly voluntary 
on the part of the plaintiff; and, as we have hereinbef ore 
shown, on the plaintiff's own testimony, the whole transaction 
was agreed to all along the line from its inception to its con-
clusion with the full knowledge of the plaintiff and of his own 
free will and choice; and that in alighting from the train while 
it was in motion, the plaintiff selected the time and place for 
so doing upon his own volition and solely under his own re-
sponsibility. 
The risk of injury in alighting from a moving railroad train 
is a matter of common knowlcdg·c, and therefore a risk of 
which the court will take judicial notice tl1e plaintiff assumed 
when he did so of his own free will and choice. Moreover, 
that the plaintiff alighted from the moving train when he did 
Ro, of llis own free will and choice, and that in doing so he ap-
preciated the danger from the very injury of whic11 he com-
plains, is forceably demonstrated by the following testimony 
which he himself g·ave (R., pp. 46-48}: · 
'' Q. You were looking out for a Hpot to leave the train. 
'' A. Yes., a. smooth place. 
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'' Q. And the door was open Y 
'' A. Yes, I was on the step. 
44* *''Q. And you were looking off to what side to get 
off? 
'' A. The · right side. 
"Q. That is the side the station is on °l 
'' A. Yes, sir. 
'' Q. And you were looking off in that direction f 
'' A. Yes, sir. 
"Q. When you got off you could see the ground beneath 
you? 
'' A. Sure, I could .. 
' ' Q. And you could see what was there t 
'' A. Yes, sir, I could see .. 
' ' Q. Your eyesight is all right T 
"A. My eyesight is fairly good. 
'' Q. Mr. Duke didn't push you off or shove you off, did 
he? 
'' A. No, sir.. · 
'' Q. And you got off when you did of your own volition! 
'' A. Sure. 
'' Q. You thought it was all right to get off, didn't you! 
'' A. I felt I was safe in getting off the train. It wasn't a.ny 
excess speed, as I said a while ago; it was moving. I had 
every right to believe I could get off, and could have gotten 
off with safety if I had gotten off in the place in which I should 
have gotten off. 
'' Q. You didn't see any reason why it wasn't perfectly safe 
to get off when you did get off? 
'' A. I didn't see any reason why, but a man never knows, 
the train going the same way he was going-I noticed the 
rocks, but I didn't know I was going to hit them. 
4541< :IC<,' Q. You knew that before you got off, as a mature 
manf 
' 'A. Of course, I did. 
'' Q. You knew as much before you got off as afterwards! 
'' A. Yes, sir. 
''Q. ·what is your age1 
"A. Sixty-six years, born in 1874. 
''Q. And you knew there was a certain distance down from 
the train to the ground? 
'' A. I knew that. 
"Q. Did you have anything in your hand at the time¥ 
'' A. Nothing in my hands.'' 
In alig·hting· from the train, the plaintiff said he was "lean-
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ing from the train in case I lost my footing I wouldn't fall 
under it". As already pointed out, however, he did not lose 
his footing. Having alighted from the right side of the train, 
his right foot no doubt touched the ground first; and what-
ever injury followed he attributed to putting his entire weight 
on his left foot (R., pp. 22, 123). This was not only an ob-
vious risk, but a risk necessarily incident in alig·hting· from 
a moving train, due to the commonly known physical laws of 
momentum, of which the plaintiff by bis testimony shows that 
he was fully conscious at the time he alighted from the train. 
The danger from the specific injury of which the plaintiff 
complains, was thus fully foreseen and estimated by the plain-
tiff before he got off the train; and the injury of which he 
complains, was not caused or even remotely contributed to, 
by any act, circumstance or condition which, prior to 
46* his *voluntary acceptance of the risk of such an injury, 
had not been fully foreseen and estimated by the plain-
tiff. In fact, the plaintiff so testified when he admitted that 
he knew as much before he got off the train as he did after-
wards ( R., p. 48). 
The decision of the plaintiff to alight when he did, was not 
only the deliberate act of a responsible person which com-
pletely insulated any possible preceding negligence on the 
part of the defendant, but there could hardly be a clearer case 
of a person making· his own independent calculation as to the 
risks involved and thereby becoming the author of his own 
misfortune. In other words, the case at bar presents a per-
fect illustration for the operation of the legal maxim volenti 
non fit injuria. 
The LO!W .A.s to Non-Contractual .Assumption of Risk. 
In Shearman and Redfield on Negligence ( Revised edition 
by Clarence S. Zipp, 1941), Vol. 1, Chap. 6, under the head-
ing '' Assumed Risk As a Defence to Aetions for Negligence 
Generally", sub-heading "JT olenti non fit injuria ", this is 
said: 
"It is proposed to treat in this chapter the doctrine of as-
suming, taking or accepting the risk as a defense to actionR 
founded on negligence generally existing independently of 
contributory negligence and irrespective of the contractual re-
lation of master and servant. 
'' It is well settled that independently of the relation of 
master and servant, there may be a voluntary assumption of 
the risk of a known danger arising from the negligence of 
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another which will debar one from the recovery of compen-
sation in case of injury to person or property therefrom, 
even though he is in the exercise of due care. • • * . 
'' Where no contractual relation exists between the plain-
tiff and defendant, this assumption of risk rests on the g·en-
eral principle expressed in the maxim volenti *non fit in-
47>K< jier-ia, which is broad enough to cover all cases where an 
injury results from a risk knowingly and voluntarily 
incurred. * * • . 
"The doctrine has sometimes been applied to the case of a 
trespasser frequently without express reference to it. In like 
manner, it has been more frequently applied to risks volun-
tarily incurred by passengers and by travelers on highways.'' 
The learned authors then announce the elements for deter-
mining when the doctrine applies, as follows: 
'' The essential elements of assumed risk are lmowledge, 
actual or implied, by the plaintiff of a specific defect or dan-
gerous condition caused by the negligence of the defendant 
in the violation of some duty owing to the plaintiff, the public 
or persons in his position, together with the plaintiff's ap-
preciation of the danger to be enco1mtered and his voluntary 
exposure of himself to it.'' 
Assuming that defendant was negligent in failing to stop 
the train at Palmyra, can there be any possibility of a doubt, 
on the plaintiff's own testimony, that he knew in advance that 
the train was not going· to stop at Palmyra; that of his own 
volition it was so stipulated in the agreement; that the plain-
tiff knew as well as anybody, the dangers incident to getting 
off a train while it was in motion; and he of his own fren 
will and accord, voluntarily exposed himself to that dangur 
and assumed its risks? 
As said by Chief Justice Cardozo in Zurfok, &c., In.r,. Co. 
V. Childs co·., 253 r. Y. 324, 171 N. E. 391: 
'' Whether the phrase [i. e. assumption of risk] can be ap-
plied with technical precision, in ·view of the associations it 
has· gathered, to relations not contractual, there is no occa-
sion to determine. If it be so extended for convenience, it 
Htands for nothing more in its application thus enlarged than 
is expressed in the maxim volenti non fit injuria. McFarlane 
v. r.ity of Nia_qara Falls, 247 N. Y. 340, 349, 160 N. E. 391, 57 
A. L. R.. 1. The prineiple compact within the maxim 'does 
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not result from an implied term in a contract creating· 
48* *the relation, it applies equally to any relation volun-
tarily assumed-contractual or not.' Bohlen, Studies in 
the Law of Torts, p. 441. One will .not. be heard to complain 
of results one has invited. Smith v. Charles Baker db Son,S, 
L. R. 1891, A. ·C. 325, 360." 
In Jif' eston's .Adrnx. v. St. Vincent's Hospital, 1'31 Va. 587, 
593, Judge M. P. Burks, speaking for the court, says: 
''While assumption of risk is often a matter of implied con-
tract, as in case of master and servant, it is not always and 
necessarily so. The mere doing of an act in the absence of 
any contract, may be the assumption of risk as is illustrated 
by eng·aging in athletic sports and the like. A man who crosses 
a railroad track in front of an approaching train assumes the 
risk of getting across in safety. ·vv e assume risks in many 
ways every day, without any relation to contract." 
In Hunn v. Windso1· Hotel Co. (W, Va.,"1937), 193 S. E. 
57, an action for damages was brought by a hotel guest, who 
sustained a broken ankle by slipping and f~lling on certain 
hoards while descending· a flight of steps which were being 
repaired. Upon proof that the plaintiff knew that the hoa1·ds 
were apt to move, which caused her to fall, and that there were 
other safe means of exit from the hotel, the court in holding 
that a verdict for the defendant had been properly directed, 
said in part, as follows : · 
"The doctrine of contributory negligence and of asstimp-
tion of risk are not identical, yet the distinction between them 
]ms not always been closely observed in our opinions. This 
failure, so far, has not affected the integrity of the decisions; 
but approach to these doctrines will be more orderly if the 
distinction be marked. The essence of contributory negligence 
is carelessness; of assumption of risk, venturousness. Thus 
an injured person may not have acted carelessly; in fact may 
have exercised the utmost care, yet may have assumed~ voi-
untarily, a known hazard. If so, he must accept consequence. 
This doctrine has developed from the maxim; volenti · non fit 
-in.fitria. 'If this is a maxim', said Lord Bramwell, 'is it any 
the worse f What are maxims but the expression of that which 
good sense has made a rule?' Smith v. Baker [1891], App. 
Cas. 325, 344. The doctrine rests on two premises: First, 
that the nature and extent of the risk are fully appreci-
4!)* ated; and *second. that it is troluntarily incurred. The 
doctrine was formerly con.fined hy many courts to cases 
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where a contractual relation existed; but the weight of au-
thority now ~·ecognizes no such limitation. For informative 
discussions of the distinction between the doctrine of con-
tributory negligence and assumption of risk, see Beach, 
Contrib. Neg. §37; Shearman and Redfield, Negligence (6th 
Ed.) §114b; 45 C. J. subject Negligence, §600; Pollock, Torts 
(13th Ed.), page 170; Schlenimer v. B1.ilf'alo Ry. Co., 220 U. S. 
590, 596, 31 S. Gt. 561, 55 L. Ed. 596; Miner v. Conn. R. Co., 
153 Mass. 398, 26 N. E. 994; Gover v. Central Yt. R. Co., 96 
Vt. 208, 118 A. 874; Indiana Nat-ural Gas Co. v. O'Brien, 160 
Ind. 266, 65 :N. E. 918, 920, 66 N. K 742. In the last citation 
the distinction is strikingly drawn as follows: 'Where a per-
son has knowledge of and fully appreciates a danger, and 
under such circumstances, without any special exigency com-
pelling him, he exposes himself to such danger or peril, his 
act in the premises may have been deemed to have been volun-
tary. Contributory negligence in such a case cannot properly 
be said to be an element therein, for certainly the voluntary 
act of a party in exposing himself to a known and appreci-
ated danger is wholly incompatible with an act of negligence 
or carelessness, for it must be manifest that carelessness in 
regard to a matter is not the same as the exercise of a de-
liberate choice in respect thereto. Freedom of the will, in 
fact, is the thing emphasized by the principle asserted in the 
maxim volenti non fit injuria.' '' 
The doctrine of the non-liability of the defendant becauHe 
of the voluntary assumption of the risk by the plaintiff of 
the injuries of which he complains, has frequently been ap-
plied in actions for damages by passengers against public 
carriers. 
Thus, in the case of J ammison v. C. db 0. Ry. Co., 92 Va. 
327, the plaintiff purchased a ticket over the defendant's rail-
way from Newport News to Ewell's station. The train passed 
Ewell's station without stopping so as to enable the plaintiff 
to get off. It slowed up, however, to enable another passen-
ger, one E. M. Canady (in this respect also being similar to 
the case at bar), to alight safely '' though not without some 
risk of injury". When it became evident that the train 
50* would not stop at Ewell's station, the *plaintiff, after 
conferring with a fellow passenger, passed out of the 
front end of the coach in which she was sitting, seeking the 
conductor of the train, for the purpose of inducing him to halt, 
in order that she might get off. The proof was that when the 
train passed Ewell's station it had slowed down to a speed of 
about eight miles an hour; that upon passing the station it 
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beg·an gradually to accelerate its movement, and as the plain-
tiff passed out of the door at the front of the car, with a long 
bundle under one arm and a small package under the other 
and had reached the platform of the car, the train being at 
that time in the act of passing around a curve, its speed was 
suddenly accelerated to such a degree as to cause a jerking 
motion, whereby the plaintiff was thrown from the car and 
injured. · 
The court based its judgment for the defendant in that 
case upon three distinct grounds of defense, each requiring a 
judgment for the defendant as a matter of law; namely, 1. 
Contributory negligence of the plaintiff; 2. The act of the 
plaintiff was the sole proximate cause of the accident; and /J. 
Plaintiff assumed the risk of the injuries of which she com-
plained (pp. 329-330). ,vith respect to the defense of the 
assumption of risk by the plaintiff, the court makes the fol-
lowing comments, directly applicable to the present case (at 
p. 330): 
'' Railroad corporations owe a high degree of duty to their 
passengers. They must do all for their safety that human 
skill and foresight inay suggest, and are responsible for any, 
even the slightest, neglect; but that the passenger may hold 
the company to this high degree of responsibility, it is in-
cumbent upon him to occupy the position upon the train as-
signed to passengers, and if he voluntarily assumes a po-
sition ?I peril, and injury tesults from it, he cannot re-
cover. 
51 * •"In this case the plainti.ff in error voluntarily placed 
herself in a position of peril without justificatio1i <fr 
excuse. when, encumbered with bundles which incapacitated 
her for self.:;protection, she walked out upon the platform of 
a moving train. 
''The principles relied upon in this opinion have been so 
fully and so frequently enforced by the decisions of this court 
that they may be considered as establis11ed law." 
If the plaintiff assumed the in:cidental risk of being· thrown 
from a moving train ;by voluntarily wAlking- out 1ipot1 the plat-
form of .a coach while the train was in motion, as in the .Tarn-
mison Chse-with how much g:rea.ter reason did the plaintiff 
jn the present case assume the dfrect risk of being injured 
by a moving traitj, when, as here, he voluntarily alighted 
fro,m the train· wl1.ile it was in motion; The pertinency of the 
reference in the Jammison Case to the .fact that the plaintiff 
in that case was encumbered with bundles-was the fact that 
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the risk in that case was incidental. Where, however, as in 
the present case, the peril is immediate and direct and the 
plaintiff was a.n adult in the full possession of his faculties 
as an intelligent human being, the fact that he was or was 
not encumbered with bundles when he voluntarily a.lighted 
from the moviup: train, is obviously immaterial to the in-
quiry; for in such cases, it is presumed as a matter of law 
that the plaintiff appreciated the risk--n presumption, more-
over, supported by the facts in the present case, as shown 
by the plaintiff's own testimony. · 
In Hines v. Garrett, 131 Va. 125, 108 S. E. 690, an action 
for damages against a common carrier was brought by a 
young woman passenger, negligently carried beyond her 
52* destination, who *suffered serious injuries after liav-
ing left the train at a dang·erous and unprotected place. 
There was a conflict in the evidence as to whether the plain-
tiff had been forced to alight from the train at the point where 
she did alight, instead of riding to another station and be-
ing brought back on another train, or whether she had '' ex-
erciRed a free and voluntary choice in leaving the train" 
(p. 141). 
In reversing a. judgment for the plaintiff and remanding 
the case solely' fot a trial on tl1is issue, due to the failure of 
the lower court to instruct on such issue, the court said 
(at p. 136): 
"It only remains to say that if the jury sl1ould find that 
the plaintiff did exercise a free will and deliberate judgment, 
unincumbered by anv improper conduct on the part of the 
conductor, a.ncl decided to leave the train rather than incur 
the inconvenience of taking· the other course, then she did 
terminate her relationship M a passenger and assumed the 
risk of the consequences which befell her. She had not at-
tained her majority~ hut was an intelligent young woman, 
in business for herself, accustomed to riding on trains, and 
legally competent to make a deliberate choice." 
Again, the court, having adjudicated that the damages 
w·~re fixed by the first trial, said (at p. 141): 
'' •. * «< The . plaintiff should recover the amount of the 
damages fi~ed by the verdict of the jury, unless at another 
trial a. jury, upon instructions in accordance with the views 
, l1ereinbef ore expressed, should find for the defendant upon 
the question as to whether the plaintiff exercised a free and 
voluntary choice in leaving . the train. If thev should so 
fin cl, there should be a final judgment for the defendant.'' 
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So, there can be no question as to the fact that the plain-
tiff exercised a free and voluntary choice in leaving the train 
in the present case. Furthermore, there can be no ques-
53:111 tion *that the plaintiff in the present case fully appre-
ciated the risk of the very injury he suffered when he 
alighted from the train; whereas, in t1ie precedent ease the 
''fiendish" injuries which the young woman received, per-
petrated by brutal criminals after she got off tl1e train, could 
hardly have been foreseen and estimated by her when she 
alighted from the train, notwit]u;tanding the court's ruling 
that she assumed such risk if she got off the train "delib-
erately and voluntarily" (p. 139'). 
If the plaintiff under the circumstances above set forth in 
the Hines v. Garrett Case, assumed the risks of the injuries 
of which she complained, when she got off the train "de-
liberately and voluntarily"; then, most assuredly, the plain-
tiff in the case at bar assumed the risks of the injuries of 
which he complains when he got off the train "deliberately 
and voluntarily.'' 
In R. & D.R. R. Co. v. Morr-is, 31 Gratt. 200; C. & 0. Ry. 
Co. v. Wills, 111 Va. 32; and C. & 0. Ry. Co. v. Paris, 111 Va. 
41-all being cases where passeng·er8 alig·hted from moving 
trains-the opinions of the court are replete with expres-
sions sl1owing that the passengers assumed the risks of the 
injuries of which they complained· in those cases; although 
the decisions of the court in favor of the defendants in those 
cases were not expressly placed on such a ground, but were 
placed on the ground that it is per se negligence for a pas-
Reng-er voluntarily to alight fro.m a moving railroad train, 
no matter how slow the train is moving, or ,else the act of 
the passenger in such a case is the sole proximate cause of 
the accident. 
54• *The only claim of neg·lig·ence in tl1e case at bar which 
with any plausibility can be urged to be valid, as against 
the defendant, is the failure of the defendant to stop the 
train at Palmyra, notwithstanding tl1e plaintiff's voluntary 
and deliberate waiver of such requirement. In this connec~ 
tion, the language of Keith, P ., in delivering· the opinion of 
the court in the ,Jmmnison CasP., supra· (at p. 329) is strik-
ingly appropriate to t11e present case: -
'' ~ * * I am at a loss to discover in the record of this case 
any evidence whatever of negligence upon the part of the 
Company; save and except its failure to hnlt its train at 
Ewell's station; but that act, as we have seen, was the remote 
and not ·the proximate cause of the injury, and cannot be 
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taken into consideration as constituting an element of de-
cision in this case.' ' 
.Accordingly, where the plaintiff voluntarily alights from 
( or att~mpts to get on) a moving train under such circum-
stances · as exist in the case at bar, the authorities are not 
merely generally to the effect that the plaintiff cannot re-
cover. They are universally to such effect. 
Thus in the case of Gmm v. United Railway Co., 270 Mo. 
517, 193 S. \V. 814, L. R. A. 1917D, 1131, the Court says: 
'' There is a. consemms of opinion of the courts of the coun-
try in support of the general rule that there is no cause of 
action against the cafrier in favor of one who is injured as 
a result of his boarding or leaving a moving car where no 
~ct of neg·ligei1ce of the carrier is shown beyond the m~rP 
fa.ct that the ca.r was so moving at the time. Some of the 
coui'ts hold that such an a.ct is neg·ligence per se, ,vhile others 
hold that though g·etting on or off a slowly moving car is not 
neg'lig·ence per se, yet the passenger assumes all risk~ in so 
doing. We cite Haldan v. Great ~weste.rn R. Co., 30 U. C. 
0. P. 89; Browne v. Raleigh & G. R. Co., 108 N. C. 34, 12 S. E. 
958, 6 Am. Neg. Qas. 106; Hivnter v. Cooperstown & 8. Valley 
. R. Co., 126 N. Y. 18, 12 L. R. A. 429, 26 N. E.,958, 5 Am. 
5fV" Neg. Cas. 289; T_obin v. Pennsylvania *R. Co., 211 Pa. 
457, 60 A tl. 999, 18 Ain. Neg. Rep. 602 ; Da.mont v. New 
Orleans & C. T. Oo., 9 La. Ann. 441, 61 Am. Dec. 214, 3 Am. 
Neg. Cas. 504; Gavett v. Ma;nc.he.';ter <t. L. R Co., 16 Gray, 
501, 77 Am. Dec. 422, 3 Am. Neg·. Cas. 742 ; Laieterer v. Man-
hattan R. Co~, 63 C. C. A. 38, 128 Fed. 540; Murphy v; North 
Jersey Street R. Co., 7L N. J. L. 5, 58 Atl.. 1018; Ricks v. 
Georgia 8. & F. R. Co., 118 Ga. 25'9, 45 S. E. 268; Denver, S. 
db A R~ Co. v. Picka.rd, 8 Colo. 163, 6_ Pac. 149, 2 Am. Neg. 
Cas. 216; ll' eber v. New Orleans a. R. Co., 104 La. 367, 28 
So. 892; Kelly v. Hannibal dJ St. J. T. Co;, 70 Mo. foe. cit. 609, 
4 Am. Neg. Cas. ~03; Schepers v. Union. Depot R. Oo., 126 
Mo; loe. cit. 676, 29 S. W. 712, 4 Am. Neg. Crts. 781.'' 
As a. summm·y to its analysis of the authorities, the court 
adds the following eomritent: 
"We make bold to assei·t, after a rather diligent search 
of the authofities, that we have found no case denying that 
general rule, though we have found ca~es where it ,vas in-
volved but overlooked. It nccessadly follows that a person 
sriekii1g to recover damages for inj11ries recaived while board-
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ing or leaving a moving car must show that the defendant 
ca.used the plaintiff to be put in a. dilemma such as to cause 
excitement of mind rendering him for the moment unable to 
properly choose between two courses of action, or there must 
be some order, request or direction by defendant's agents 
that the person shall board or leave the car, or some sudden 
shock or acceleration of the speed of the car while the per-
son is getting off or on, or some defect in the ca.r, or some 
other facts showing n_eg·ligence of the defendant other than 
the mere fact that the car was in motion when the attempt 
was made.'' 
With respect to the c~::mtention that the agreement made 
prior to the arrival of the train at Palmyra was equivalent to 
an order. request or direction by the conductor that the plain-
tiff should get off the tra.in when he did, we have already 
shown herein: that the proposal of the conductor was tenta-
tive and conditional-that is to say, the conductor plainly in-
dicated that he would stop the train at Palmyra, unless the 
passengers of their own free will a.greed that this would be 
not required, then the conductor was to slow down the 
56• train and the passengers were not ,..to be compelled to 
get off the train at all events but were merely "to try 
to get off", thus showing that when or where the passengers 
should get off or whether thlly should get off the train at 
all, was left to the free will and discretion of each of the pas-
sengers, respectively. By no possible interpretation, could 
it be said that the language was equivalent to an "order, re-
quest or direction by the conductor" that the plaintiff ~houlcl 
g-et off-that is be compelled to get off the train while it was 
in motion. Furthermore, as we have also observed, the tes-
timony of the plaintiff shows that he did not interpret the 
agreement he made as to its being mandatory upon him to 
get off the train when he did, or to get off the train at all; 
but that the acceptance of the agreement, and everything to be 
done in connection with· it ( other than the fact that the train 
was to be slowed down by the conductor, about whose action 
in this particular there is no complaint) was left to the plain-
tiff's own free will and choice. And the plaintiff further 
testified that when he alighted from the moving train, he did 
so of his own volition, without any order, request or direc-
tion by the conductor. In fact, the plaintiff did not complain 
of any action on the part of the conductor in requesting him 
to alight from the moving train-what he complained of wai:; 
the coercion of the conductor in requesting him not to alight 
from the moving train while it was moving past the station at 
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Palmyra-a circumstance which, although having no causal 
relationship to the accident, corroborates the fact that the 
conductor, neither by the agreement made prior to the ar-
rival of the train at Palmyra, nor at any other time, or-
57:e <lered, requested or directed *that the plaintiff should 
g-et off the train while it was in motion. 
In 10 American Jurisprudence, sec. 1510, p. 299, this is 
said: 
'' In order for any act on the part of the carrier to assume 
the character of an invitation to a passenger to alight from, 
. or board, a moving vehicle, it is essential that it be direct 
and unequivocal in nature, and calculated to impel such ac-
tion by the passenger." · 
In Hwnter v. Cooperstown, <tc., R. Co., 126 N. Y. 18, 26 N. E. 
958, 12 L. R. A. 429, the plaintiff claimed the defendant was 
liable because the passeng·er was requested or directed by 
the conductor to get on a train moving slo,,rly past a nassenger 
station at a speed of '' between one and two miles an hour''. 
The train slackened its motion, but did not stop, and as the 
passenger coach a pp roached, the conductor standing at the 
forward end, said to the plaintiff's decedent, "If you are 
going, jump on." Plaintiff's decedent, in attempting to board 
the moving train, was fa.tally injured. 
The Court said: 
"The invitation, request or conunand of the conductor, 
however his words may be regarded, in no respect compelled 
the deceased to leave the place of safety upon the platform 
or to cbang·e his position. Re was a free agent a.nd had the 
opportunity of choice between staying where he was and 
complying· with the conductor's request.'' 
Even, the ref ore, if the arrangement made prior to the ar-
rival of the train at Palmyrn, could be construed as a request 
hy the conductor to alig·ht, from the moving train, the plain-
tiff in the case at bar wa.s a free agent, and had the oppor-
tunity-a deliberate opportunity in the present case-of 
choice between having the train stopped at Palmyra, or 
58~ in any event of staying where *he was on the train in a 
position of safety, a.nd complying with the conductor's 
request; and hcnee whatever injury he received in alig·hting· 
from the moving train was the direct and immediate conse-
quence of the exercise of his own free will-a wholly volun-
tary course of conduct, deliberately chosen and independentl5· 
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exercised by the plaintiff. In such a ca.se, the plaintiff has 
no valid pretension for attempting to offer the conductor as 
a vicarious sacrifice on the altar of his own independence 
of action: "You cannot shake your gory locks at me, and 
say I did it." 
Moreover, in· the case at bar, as we have indicated, the 
fact that the conductor never intended the agreement made 
prior to tl1e arrival of the train at Palmyra as an order, re-
quest or direction that the plaintiff should alight from the 
train while it was in motion, regardless of its hazards, or as 
an assurance to the plaintiff that it would be safe for him to 
do so, is not only sl1own by the ·Conditional character of that 
agrBement as requiring the exercise of discretion on the part 
of the plaintiff, but is also demonstrated by the action of the 
conductor in restraining the plaintiff from attempting to 
alight from the train when th~ train was moving past the 
station at Palmyra. So far from being guilty of any words 
or acts which could be construed as impelling the plaintiff, 
contrary to the plaintiff's own free will~ to alight from the 
train wl1ile it was in motion, whatever influence the conductor 
actually exerted upon the free will of the plaintiff was exactly 
of an opposite nature, to-wit, to keep the plaintiff from alight-
ing from the train while it was moving past the station at Pal-
myra-an act wllich, instead of being an invitation to 
59* the plaintiff to *alight from the moving· train, consti-
tuted an admonition to the plaintiff .of its dangers. :B,ur-
tbermore, tl1e plaintiff did not thereafter ask the conductor's 
advice when he could get off the train, or tell the conductor 
that he was going to get off the trnin when he did; ·ancl we 
have alreadv shown from reason a.nd authority the fact that 
the conductor was standing· on the platform of the car at the 
time the plaintiff alighted therefrom, does not relieve the 
plaintiff from responsibility for llis own voluntary act in 
alighting· from the train while it was in motion, or create any 
liability upon the defendant for such an act by the plaintiff. 
In addition to the foreg·ohrn; facts and circumstances of 
this case, it is still further to be remembered that tl1e law is 
well settled that a passenger caunot rely upon an invitation 
by the c-0ncluctor to alig·11t from a movirnr train if the danger 
of so doing is obvious. The danger of alightin~ from a mov-
ing· train ( as distin!!;uished from a street car) is so obvious, 
that, prima farie. at least, n passenger who voluntarily does 
so is held to he g11ilty of contributory negligence per se in 
Virginia (Par,is Case, su,JJra., and cases therein cited). 
In the present case, that the dang-er was obvious is conclu-
sively shown b? the testimony and conduct of the plaintiff 
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himself. It is a matter of common knowledge that it is dan-
gerous to get off a moving train between stations, at a point: 
along the. right of way with which the passenger is not fa-
miliar:, espoo'ially where the passenger is 65 years of age, and 
is not as active as he wa~ in his younger days. Furthermore, 
the. plaintiff himself knew it was dangerous to do so. He 
60* had just been admonished of *the danger by the act of 
tq.e · conductor in restraining him from getting off the 
train wnile it was moving past the station at Palmyra. And 
that even the very great danger of death or great bodily harm 
to the plaintiff was obvious, and that be was conscious of 
such dang·er, is inevitably exhibited by his testimony that in 
alighting from the moving train he was ''leaning·'' from ·the 
train-"in case I lost my footing I wouldn't fall under it" 
(R., p. 22). 
In Slaven v. B. & 0. R. R. Co., 114 ,v. Va. 315, 171. S. E. 
818, which was an action for damages by a passenger against 
a common carrier for injuries suffered in getting off a mov-
ing train, in reversing· a judgment for the plaintiff, the court 
said: 
'' A passenger who attempts to alight from a moving train, 
when he knows it is dangerous to do so, and is injured there-
by, is guilty of such negligence as will preclude recovery, 
notwithstanding he may have been directed or told by the 
conductor to get off. And 'negligence of a railroad company 
in failing to stop its train long enough at a station to per-
mit passengers to alight will not absolve a passenger from 
neg·ligence in attempting to alight from the train after it has 
again been put in motion' * • •. 
'' Plaintiff voluntarily assumed the risk of danger conse-
quent upon the performance of his own act which was the 
proximate cause of his injury. and cannot recover. There 
is no lawful excuse alleged for his rash and unreasonable 
act; and his injury is the result of his own negligence.'' 
In Whitlock v. Comer, 57 Fed. 565, it was said that a pas-
senger who, on approaching his destination, jumps from the 
train while it is in motion, cannot recover if his danger is 
so obvious that a. prudent ma.n would not encounter it; and 
'' the fact that he acted upon the advice or urgency or instruc-
tion of the conductor of the train will not change the charac-
ter of the act''. 
In Durham, v. L. & N. R. R. Co., 16 Ky. L. R. 757, 29 S. 
61 * *W. 737, it was held that where a train conductor prom-
ised to put a. passenger off at a place not a. regular stop, 
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and after passing· such place and slowing up a little, an em-
ployee told him to alight, the passenger was not justified in 
relying on the employee's direction where the danger inci-
dent thereto was obvious. 
III. 
Contributory N egl-igence of Plaintiff As a Matter of Law 
Shown by His Own Testimon,y. 
Undoubtedly, the law is settled in Virginia. that it is, prim.a. 
facie at least, contributory negligence as a matter of law for 
a passenger to alight from a moving train, as distinguished 
from a street car. C. <I; 0. RJJ. Co. v. Paris, 111 Va.. 41; R. & 
D. R. R. v. Morris, 31 Gratt. 200. Also compare the follow-
ing cases which arc essentially to the same effect: C. db 0. 
Ry. Co. v. JiVills, 111 Va. 32, and Jammison v. C. db 0. Ry. Co., 
92 Va. 327. This being true, the burden of evidence is upon 
the plaintiff to show that he comes within some exception 
to that rule. 
Thus in Hoyl1na.n v. Kanawha. & M. R. Co., 65 W. Va. 264, 
fi4 S. E. 536, 22 L. R.. A. (N. 18.) 741, syllabus 2 by the Court 
i;;tates the law as follows: 
'' The act of getting on or off a moving train is evidence 
of contributory negligence and imposes upon one who is in-
jured in doing so the burden of proving that the peculiar cir-
cumstances of the case justified him in such course.'' 
62.. *But so far from showing that he came within any 
exception to the rule that it is contributory negligence 
as a matter of law for a passenger to alight from a moving 
train, the testimony of the plaintiff himself very consider-
ably intensified the app1ica.tion of that rule by showing that 
the danger of a.lighting from tlie moving trnin was open and 
obvious, and although he was perfectly conscious of such 
danger, he of his own free will voluntarily· exposed himself 
to its perils. Thus, in the present case, under the plaintiff's 
own testimony, it appears that he both (1) assumed the risks 
of the injuries of which :he complains; and (2) was guilty of 
negligence, if not as the sole proximate cause of the injuries 
of which he complains, at least as substantially contributing· 
thereto. In neither event, therefore, is the plaintiff entitled 
to recover dama.ges against the defendant for such injuries. 
Plaintiff c.annot recover for such injuries, because as above 
shown he actually knew the danger, and voluntarily assumed 
the risk. As stated in 45 C. J. 1043-
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'' Even (though) the doctrine of assumption of risk as 
usually a.pplied is not applicable bccaus~ of the absence of 
any contractual relation, nevertheless when plaintiff has 
brought himself within the operation of the maxim volenti 
·uon fit injurfo, he cannot recover." 
In further commenting on the doctrine of "incurred risk" 
or '' taking the risk or hazard'', or '' running· the risk'' inci-
dent to a known and appreciated danger, as embodied in the 
maxim, 45 C .• J. 1044, states the law as follows: 
'' This doctrine is to be distinguished from the doctrine of 
contributory neg·ligence beca-use appl-icable even though the 
person injured was in the exerc-ise of ordinttrJJ care" (Italics 
supplied). 
63* *On the other hand, while the mere fact that one knew 
and appreciated, or in the exercise of ordinary care, 
should have known and appreciated the danger, and volun-
tarily encountered it does not necessarily show neg·ligence, 
if under the same or similar circumstances, an ordinarily 
prudent person would have incurred the risk, yet such knowl-
edge and conduct is an important factor in determining 
whether a person of onlina ry prudence, with an ordinary 
ca re for his own safety would have incurred such risk; and if 
. not, then the plaintiff cannot recover for such injuries be-
cause he is guilty of contributory neg·Jigence. When it is 
shown tl1at it is contributory neglig~nce as a matter of law 
for a passeng·er voluntarily to alig·ht from a moving train, 
and that a person exercising· ordinary care for his own safety 
would not be guilty of such an act, unless it is proven that 
'' the peculiar circumsta.nccs of the case justified'' the plain-
tiff in such a course-it assuredly does not justify such an 
act, by showing t11at the plaintiff actually knew of the dang·er 
thereof and voluntarily assumed the risk. So far from justi-
fying the act, it presents a perfect illustration of the familiar 
proverb that "Two wrongs do not make a right"; and it 
shows that the plaintiff, according to his own exposition and 
narrative of the transaction, is disentitled to recover from 
tl1e defendant on both grounds. 
Thmi, Justice Van Devanter, in Chica,qo, etc., R. Co. v. 
Crotty, 141 Fed. 913, 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 832, states the law 
as follows: 
'' While assumption of risk and contributory negligence 
rest upon different p;rounds and are distinct and independent 
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defenses, they are not necessarily "'incompatible, )mt 
64"" may and sometimes do arise out of the same facts, as 
where tlw dan{Jer is not only known or obvious, but in-
jtttry therefroni is so iniminent that n,o person of ordinary 
pru,dence would assmne the risk" (Italics supplied). 
Furthermore, where as here, the plaintiff knew the danger 
and appreciated the risk 11e assumed in alighting from th~ 
moving train, and such danger indeed was a matter of com-
mon lmowleclge about which he and the conductor of the train 
l1ad equal information, then under such circumstances any 
attempt to convict the conductor with negligence in not re-
straining· the plaintiff from alighting from the moving train, 
must in equal justice inevitably convict the plaintiff of con-
tributory negligence in so alighting· from the train. 
Plaintiff was no infant; he was su.i juris; he was in the 
complete possession of his faculties ; and, as said in Dav-ids on 
v. Washington, etc., R. Co., 129 Va.., at p. 107 ( cited supra) 
tlie ''highest degTee of care" which carriers are required to 
exercise for the protection and safety of its passengers does 
not require carriers "to exercise a guardianship over pas-· 
sengers who are adults and mentally competent, or to under-
take to coerce them. into the exercise of ordinary care for 
their own safety''. · 
See also R. & D.R. Co. v. Morris; Bartley v. TV estern Mary-
land R. Co.; TVright v. Boston.R. R. Co.; and.other authori-
ties above cited in this connection. · 
We have already shown that the plaintiff was a man 65 
years of age; and that he got off the train of his own volition 
at an unbeaten spot along· the railroad track, 75 to 100 
65* yards *from the station, ·with which he was not familiar .. 
We have further shown that immediately prior thereto 
while the train was passing tho station at Palmyra, the con-
ductor had warned t]1e plaintiff~ particularly on account of 
bis age, of the danger of alighting therefrom; and while the 
conductor was standing on the platform of the car at the 
time the plaintiff alighted from tl1e train, he never, accord-
ing to the plaintiff's own testimony, by word of month or 
action, requested, directed or invited the plaintiff to get off 
the train at that time. It is not even claimed that the con-
ductor knew for certain that the plaintiff was going to get 
off the train when lie did. In any event, the plaintiff did not 
give the conductor any definite warning that he was going 
to alight from the train at that time, or seek the conductor's 
ndvice in regard thereto; but, as bis testimony shows, the 
plaintiff selected the spot and got off the train of his own 
volition. 
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We have still further shown that the speed and momentum 
of this heavy mixed train-predominantly a freight train-
was such that the plaintiff "leaned from" the train, in alight-
ing therefrom,. so that, in the exact words of the plaintiff's 
testimony..:..__ : 
"* •. «<· In· case I lost my footing I wouldn't fall under 
it.'' 
Thus does the plaintiff show that there was imminent dan-
ger of death or great bodily harm to the plaintiff by alight-
ing from the train a.t the time and place selected of his own 
volition, and that l1e was perfectly conscious of such danger 
before he alighted therefrom, and voluntarily assumed 
66* such risks by *alig·hting from the train under such con-
ditions. 
This testimony also conclusively shows that the plaintiff 
was guilty of contributory neg·ligence as a matter of law. It 
further marks the complete union of the defense of assumed 
risk with the defense of contributory negligence in the same 
case. The case is identical with the situation referred to 
by Justice Van Devanter in Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Crotty, 
supra, in which the learned justice stated that the two de-
f ens es would be operative under the same state of facts. The 
danger of injury was not only known to the plaintiff and 
voluntarily assumed by him; hut the danger of injury there-
!rom was so imminent that no person of ordinary prudence 
m law would have assumed the risk. 
In Hoylman v. Kanawha, &c., R. Co. (W. Va.), 64 S. E. 
536, 22 L. R. A. (N. S.) 741, the following citation from a 
·note in 1 A. & E. Ann. Cas. 779, is quoted with approval: 
'' Even where the train is moving· slowly the act of alight~ 
ing therefrom may constitute contributory neg·ligence as a 
matter of law if the person so alighting is in a weak physical 
condition or of advanced age.'' · 
'' Even in jurisdictions where the mere act of alighting · 
from ru moving railroad train or street car is not considered 
neg·ligence per se, it is well recognized that cases some time 
!1rise in which the facts are. so clearly established, and the 
mference as to the course directed by ordinary prudence is 
so certain and jnvaria:ble that it becomes the duty of the 
court to take the question from the jury. Thus it has been 
held that where the act is obviously dangerous and without 
reasonable necessity real or apparent, it constitutes con-
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tributary neglig·ence as a matter of law and defeats a recovery 
by the person injured.'' 
In the annotation to the lloylnian oase in 22 L. R. A. (N. S.) 
a.t p. 747, this is said: 
67* *''If the danger was apparent there can, of course, 
be no recovery. Thus, in Willia-ms v. Southwestern R. 
Co. (Tex. Civ. App.), 36 S. W. 329, where plaintiff's testi~ 
mony showed that she knew that the train was moving too 
fast for her to alig·ht in safety, the Court held that a verdict. 
was properly directed for defendant on the ground of con-
tributory negligence.'' 
If it is '' of course'' contributory negligence as a matter 
of law for the plaintiff to alight from a moving train where 
the danger is apparent and known to him in jurisdictions 
where it is not considered neg·ligence per se to alig-ht from a 
moving train-with how much g-reater reason is it contribu-
tory negligence as a matter of law for the plaintiff to alight 
from a moving train under such circumstances in jurisdic-
tions where, as in Virginia, it is contributory neg·ligence per 
se to alight from a moving railroad train in the absence of 
peculiar circumstances of justification for such conduct 011 
the part of the plaintiff. 
In the H oyl1nu11n case the views of such courts as the Vir-
ginia court are accurately set forth as follows: 
" 'All experience has demonstrated that to get off a mov-
ing car is higllly dangerous; therefore it is held that such an 
act is negligence per sf!,, and the passenger, if thereby injured, 
except in very rare cases, is µ;uilty of contributory negli-
gence and cannot recover.' O'Toole v. Pitt8bitr,qh db L. E. 
R. Co., 158 Pa. 106, 22 L. R A. 606, 38 Am. St. Rep. 830, 27 
Atl. 738. '.An adult who knowingly and unnecessarily steps 
from a railroad train in motion is guilty of contributory neg-li. 
gence as a matter of law.' 11'Valtet·s v. Chicago & N. W.R. Co., 
113 Wis. 367, 89 N. W. 140. Such is held to be the law in 
most of the courts. 2 Wood on Railroads, Minor's ed., p. 129B, 
says that, in view of the danger necessarily attending such 
an act, it should be held, as a math~r of law, that it is neg·li-
gence to attempt to board or alight from a train while it is 
in motion, and the question should not be left to the jury 
unless there are exceptional circumstances tending to excuse 
or justify the act.'' 
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68* *"\:Vith respect to the alleged "invitation,, by the con-
ductor, for the plaintiff to alight from the moving train 
-alleg·ed to be implied in the agreement made prior to the 
arrival of the train at Palmyra-we have hereinbefore fully 
dh;cussed this subject under previous headings, and as we 
believe sufficiently demonstrated that there was no such inter-
ference. with the plaintiff's free will contained in this agree-
ment as to relieve the plaintiff from the ordinary respon-
sibility for bis own acts. This discussion therefore1 we be-
lieve, needs neither repetition nor further elaboration in this 
connection. 
Moreover, the law is well settled, as we have seen, that the 
plaintiff cannot rely upon an invitation, request or even c.om·· 
mand of a conductor to alight from a moving train as reliev-
ing the plaintiff from responsibility where as here the danger 
of alighting· from the moving train was perfectly obvious to 
the plaintiff, and, as shown by his own testimony, as fully 
known to him as it was to the conductor, and he of his own 
free will alighted therefrom. 
Hitnter v. L. & N. R. Co. (Ala.), 43 So. 802, 9 L. R. A. 
(N. S.) 848, wa.s an action f01· damages by a passenger in-
jured in alighting from a. moving train based upon a charge 
that be was '' directed and invited'' bv the defendant's con-
ductor to alight at a station while the"' train was still in mo-
tion. After statimr that whetl1er there was or was not such 
an invitation to alig·ht was wholly immaterial, the court af-
firming a judgment for the defendant on a directed verdict. 
said: 
69~ «=" Here the undisputed facts nre that the train was 
a.t the time running from 6 to 10 miles an hour; that 
the plaintiff stood upon the steps from two to three minute~ 
before attempting· to alight, able to discem and in fact dis-
cerning the general outline of objects which the train was 
passing· and thereby enabled to determine the speed of the 
train, and familiar with the place and its surroundings, hav-
ing lived there for fifteen years, and, being encumbered at 
the time with his ·baggage, voluntarily attempting to alig·ht 
from the train. In making the venture, it is very evident 
that the plaintiff did not rely upon any iuvitatioii, express 
or implied, from the conductor to debark. By his own state-
ment be stood upon the steps from two to three minutes while 
the train was continuing· to· slacken its speed, and neither -the 
conductor nor any other servai1t of the defendant was on the 
platform and no one said anything to him. He exercised his 
own judgment and made his own calculations, without any 
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fault attributable to a.nvone else than himself; and there 
was no error in the trial°' court's instructing the jury that the 
plaintiff was, on the undisputed evidence, as a. matter of law, 
guilty of negligence which contributed proximately to his 
own injury.'' 
While in the Hunter case the conductor was not standing 
on the platform when the plaintiff got off the steps of the 
car, as here, we have not only shown that this circumstance 
did not change the status of the case from a legal stand-
point, but the plaintiff himself here testified that the conduc-
tor did not '' say anything to. him'', or by action or conduct 
request the plaintiff to alight from the train at the time he 
did so. In the case at bar, it is very evident from the plain-
tiff's own testimony (as similarly indicated in the Hunter 
case) that the plaintiff did not rely upon .any invitation, ex-
press or implied, from the conductor to .debark; and that 
'' he exercised his own judgment and made his own calcula-
tions without any fault attributable to anvone else than him-
self'' in this connection. This fact is emphasized by the cir-
cumstance that in the case at bar, the 011ly influence exerted 
upon the plaintiff ,by the conductor, of which he com-
70* plained, was *pre-cisely of an opposite na.ture; to-wit, 
the action of the conductor in restraining the plaintiff 
from getting· off the train while the train was passing the 
station at Palmyra. Of course, this action of the conductor, 
as a.hove shown, was not a negligent act and it had ·no causal 
relation to the accident. On the other hand, however, it is 
a. circumstance showing that the conductor was ·not unwatch-
ful of the plaintiff's safety; that, he thereby, particularly on 
account of the plaintiff's age, forewarned the plaintiff of the 
danger of alig·hting· .from the moving· train; and that when 
tl1e plaintiff actually alighted from the train he did so of his 
own volition, not relying "upon any invitation express or 
implied from the conductor to debark'', but ra.ther with the 
forewarning of the conductor, coupled with his own fore-
knowledge, as shown by his own testimony, that it was very 
greatly dangerous for him to do so. 
The oft-repeated lang'Uag·e of Mas8ie v. Firmstone, supra, 
is, therefore, peculiarly applicable to the present case: 
''No litigant ca.n successfully ask a court or jury to ·be-
lieve that he has not told the truth. His statements of fact 
and the necessary inferences therefrom arc binding· upon 
him. He cannot be heard to ask that his case be made 
stronger than he makes it, wl1ere as here, it depends upon 
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facts within his own knowledge and as to which he has testi-
fied.'' 
Those _facts, so testified to by the plaintiff, bring the case 
at bar in complete accord with the following statement of the 
law contained in the similar case of R. ~ D. R. R. Co. v. 
Pickelsim,er, 89 Va. 389, 391, where a passenger was injured 
in attempting to get on board of a slowly moving train: 
'' • * • The case does not fall, as Judge Richardson very 
properly said on the former hearing in this court, 
71 * •within the class of r.ases 'where a passenger is excused 
from his rash act by reason of some imminent peril 
confronting him, due to the defendant's negligence' ; neither 
does it fall within that other c.lass of cases where 'the direc-
tion or invitation or assurance of safety' given by the com-
pany's servant so qualifies the act of the plaintiff as that 
it relieves it of the quality of negligence which it would other-
wise have. Pierce on Railroads, p. 329. The case clearly be-
longs to that class of cases where the injury results from 
some act of recklessness amounting to folly or foolhardiness 
on the part of the plaintiff, in which cases the plaintiff is 
not entitled to recover. Pierce on Railroads, sitpra. 1 iShear. 
& Redf. ( 4th ed.), §§91, et seq. Scheff er v. Railroad, 105 U. S. 
252.'' 
In Farley v. N. & W., Ry. Co., 67 W. Va. 350, 67 S. E. 1116, 
27 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1111, it was held on a demurrer to the 
declaration that '' a passenger who attempts to alight from 
a moving railroad train when he knows it is dangerous to 
do so, and is injured thereby, is guilty of such neg·ligence as 
will preclude recovery, notwithstanding he may have been 
directed or told by the conductor to get off" (Syllabus by 
the court). 
In the opinion of th1;~ court, this is said: 
"In the present case the proximate cause of the injury 
was the alighting from the moving train and not the failure 
to stop the train long enough at the station to allow the pas-
sengers to get off. Was the act of jumping off the moving 
train a voluntary or an involuntary act of plaintiff? The 
declaration does not allege that he was induced by force or 
threat of the conductor to jump. He was simply told 01· 
directed by him to do so. Consequently, it was plaintiff's 
voluntary act. The declaration also alleges that 'the train 
was then running· at a rate of speed which made it extremely 
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dangerous for one to get off said train without suffering 
serious bodily injury.' Plaintiff voluntarily assumed the 
risk of danger consequent upon the performance of his own 
a.ct which was the proximate cause of his injury, and cannot 
recover. There is no lawful excuse alleged for his rash aucl 
unreasonable act. and hi~ injury is the result of bis own 
negligence.'' 
72*' *IV. 
Intervening, Independent Act of the Plaint·iff TVas the Sole 
Proximate Cause of thP- Accident. 
This subject has been, we believe, sufficiently discussed 
herein under the heading I above ; and, hence, for any fur-
ther consideration of the subject, we must content ourselves 
by referring· the Court to the very learned and able discus-
sion showing how a passenger who voluntarily alights from 
a moving railroad train, as here, and thereby causes his own 
injury, even where he is without any negligence, cannot re-
cover damages therefor, because his act is the sole proximate 
~ause of the accident, as contained in the opinions of the Court 
in the cases of 0. & 0. Ry. Go. v. Wills, 111 Va. 32, 68 S. E. 
395; and C. & 0. Ry. Co. v. Paris, 111 Va. 41, 6S '8. E. 398. 
We should, however, observe that the ratio decidendi of 
those cases applies with far greater force to the case at bar 
than it did to the precedent cases. In both the 1WiUs and 
Paris cases, the passengers were suddenly put to the choice 
of alighting from the moving train, or staying· thereon until 
stopped, through no fault of their own; and there was a con-
fusion of mind and a coercion of circumstances necessarilv 
attendant upon their acts in voluntarily alighting from the 
trains just after the trains had started to move and still wer~ 
moving "very slowly"; .and in neither case does it appear 
that the trains had gotten beyond their station platforms. 
And in the Paris case, the brakeman not only knew of the in-
. tention of Paris to alight from the train, but had prom-
73• ised not to •move the trflin until Paris had sufficieu1 
time to alight therefrom. 
In the case at bar, the plaintiff on his own testimony, de-
liberately alighted from the moving train of his own free 
will and choice, uninfluenced by any action, conduct or word 
of the conductor, and without any confusion of mind or co-
ercion of circumstances in regard thereto. Surely, therc-
f ore, if there were ever any case where a plaintiff's volun-
tary action was the sole proximate cause of an accident, then 
the case at bar is such a. case. 
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V. 
Pl(l.i'l1.tijJ's Failure to Sustain the Burden of Proof Showing 
Connection Between Injury and Alleged N egli,qence. 
There was a coincidence of such unusual circumstances 
established ·by tbe evidence as a whole, as to make the plain-
tiff's uncorroborated account of his injuries and how they 
were received, incredible and entirely insufficient to support 
the burden of showing that the physical conditions complained 
of at the trial were due to any act of getting off of a train. 
TheAe circumstances are as follows: 
1. The fact that no notice of claim or report of the alleged 
accident was made by the plaintiff to any employee or agent 
of the defendant until after eleven months had elaosed from 
the time he claimed to have been injured, in spite of his 
74• having *ridden on the train on subsequent occasions, 
and in spite of his limping: a.nd bopping· around so con-
spicuously in front of his neig-11 hors (R., pp. 45, 48-50, 61, 
77-79, 83, 121). 
2. The fact that in giving directions to ]1is counsel for 
bringing suit, more than eleven months after the alleged ac-
cident, and up to the time the defendant had filed a plea of 
the statute of limitations and its grounds of defensQ, the plain-
tiff insisted that the accident occurred on May 23, 1939, rather 
than on June 10., 1939, the latter date being· shown. by the 
records of the defendant as a date on which no ticket was 
sold between the two points involved. (.Stipulation, R., pp. 
19, 43-44, 91-92.) 
R The fact that the plaintiff did not consult any doctor 
at all from the happening of the alleged injury in June, 1939, 
until :March, 1940 (R., pp. 49-50, 113-114). 
4. The fact that plaintiff's counse·l objected (successfully) 
to any statement being made at the trial as to the result of 
X-ray pictures taken in March, 1940, at the instance of Dr. 
Whitley, wl10 upon examination had been unable to observe 
any connection between the alleged act and the condition 
complained of; whereas the plaintiff had already testified to 
having such pictures taken, and Dr. Yeatman had also stated 
that it was "almost impossible" to tell about the permanency 
of such disability as the plaintiff then had, without X-raY 
pictures (R., pp. 42, 56, 114-118). · 
5. The fact that Dr. Yeatman 's diag·nosis in October, 1940, 
of an "old injury to a tendon" with "possibly" a tearing of 
the tendons and ligaments, was based entirely on plain-
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75• tiff's own *recital of an injury and a. ''sink" or ''de-
pression'' in the back of his leg about 8 inches above 
the heel; whereas the pain complained of at the time the 
plaintiff consulted Dr. Whitley in March, 1940, seven months 
earlier, was confined solely to a small spot on the top of 
liis foot at about the location of the third shoe lace (R., pp .. 54-
55, 113-114). 
As l1as been shown, Dr. Whitley, who was the first doctor 
to examine the plaintiff, testified that after having received 
the X-ray report, he was of opinion that the plaintiff's symp-
toms were due to arterio-sclerosis, since he ''couldn't elicit 
any other physical findings" (R., pp. 113-118). 
Certainly this evidence, as compared ~ith the conclusion 
of the ''possibility'' of torn tendons and ligaments from an 
old injury, announced by Dr. Yeatman, :based upon an ex-
amination without X-rays, made seven months later, makes 
it at least equally probable that the plaintiff's .troubles were 
attributable to bodily causes for which the defendant was in 
no way responsible (R., pp. 54-55). Furthermore, Dr. Whit-
ley's conclusion is supported by the testimony of Dr. Cle-
ments, who had treated the plaintiff in previous years and 
bad found evidence of hardening of the arteries at that time. 
as well as bad teeth, either of which causes was sufficient to 
have produced the conditions complained of (R., pp. 104-
108). 
Under well settled principles of law, therefore, the evidence 
as to the plaintiff's physical condition is not sufficient to 
sustain the burden of showing the essential connection be-
tween the alleged act of negligence and such physical condi-
tion. See Titgman v. Rive,N,ide Mills, 144 Va. 473, 132 S. E. 
179. 
76~ ii<CONCLUSION. 
Whcref ore, for the foregoing· and other errors appar~nt on 
the· face of the record, your petitioner prays that a writ of 
error and supersedeas may be awarded your petitioner to 
the said judgment of the Circuit Court of the County of Flu-
vanna, and that the same may be reviewed and reversed, and 
that final judgment may be entered np for your petitioner in 
this court. 
Pursuant to Section 9 of Rule 9 of this Court, vour peti-
tioner adopts this petition as its opening brief. · 
Your petitioner further avers that in accordance with Sec-
tion 4 of Rule 9 of this Court, on ,T uly 12, 1941, a true copy 
of this petition and brief was mailed to opposing counsel 
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in the trial court, and that this petition will be filed in the 
office of the Clerk of this Court at Richmond . 
. R~spectfully submitted, 
THE CHESAPEAK}J AND OHIO RAIL-
. WAY COMPANY, 
By LEAKE & SPICER, 
Counsel. 
We, the undersigned counsel, practicing· in the Supreme 
Court of Appeals of Virginia, and both having the office ad-
dress, Mutual Building, in the City of Richmond, Virginia, 
are respectfully of opinion that the jndgmt.mt complained of 
in the foregoing petition is erroneous, and that the same 
should be reviewed and reversed .. 
WALTER LEAKE, 
MEADE T. SPICER, JR. 
Received July 12, 1941.. 
M. B. WATTS, Clerk. 
77* >&September 10, 1941. Writ of error and supersedeas 
allowed by the court. Bond $1,000.00. 
RECORD 
VIRGINIA: 
}I. B. W. 
Pleas before the Circuit Court of the County of Fluvanna, 
at the Courthouse thereof, on the 1st day of April, in the 
year 194-1. 
B:fil IT REMEMBERED, That heretofore, to-wit: In th(? 
Circuit Court af oresa.id, on the 20th day of May, in the year 
1940, came the plaintiff S. 0. Butler and docketed his N oticP. 
of Motion tor Judgment against the defendant, The Chesa-
peake & Ohi9 Railway Company, in t.lle following words and 
ftgures, to-wit: 
Chesapeake and Ohio Ry. Co. v. S. O. Butler 57 
Virginia: 
In the Circuit Court of the County of Fluvanna. 
S. 0. Butler, Plaintiff 
v. 
The C. & 0. Railway Company, Defendant. 
NOTICE OF MOTION. 
To the Chesapeake and Ohio Railway ·Company, Incorpo-
rated, a Corporation chartered under the laws of the State 
of Virginia : 
Take notice that I shall, on the 24th day of June, 1940, at 
the Court House of the Circuit Court of Fluvanna County, at 
Palmyra, Virginia, at 10 A. M. on that day, or as soon there-
after as this motion may be heard, move the said Circuit 
Court of Fluvanna County for a judgment and award of 
execution against you for the sum of Five Thousand Dollars 
($5,000.00) and for this: 
That I, on the 10th day of June, 1939, in the County of 
Fluvanna, and State of Virg'inia, did apply for and purchase 
.a ticket at Carysbrook, Virginia, in said •County, and on the 
Virginia Air Line Railway, a Branch of the Chesapeake & 
Ohio Railway Company, authorizing and entitling me to safe 
transportation, as a passenger on your Railway, as afore-
said to Palmyra, Virginia, and further entitling me 
page 2 ~ to be discharged as a passenger on your said train, 
at the station at Palmyra, Virginia, and to which 
I held a ticket, and at which place ample provisions were 
made and in use for my protection in leavin~ your train at 
this point.-it being a regular and estaiblished point for de-
livering and discharging passengers holding a ticket to such 
point. 
That in accordance with the contract of carriage, as here-
inbefore stated, I boarded your Train No. 402 at Carysbrook, 
Virginia, on the 10th day of June, 1939, fully expecting that 
you through your agents and servants, operatinp.- the afore-
said train, would afford me safe passage to Palmyra, Vir-
ginia, and discharge me at the regularly used passenger sta-
tion at that point in such manner as to protect me from in-
jury, and otherwise' in aooordance with the contract of car-
riage and discharge thereafter, until I had reached a place 
of safety, as provided by the laws of the State of Virginia. 
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Nevertheless, you, operating through your agents and 
servants, negligently failed to stop, at the station at Palmyra, 
Virginia, your Train No. 402 as aforesaid, and on which I 
was being transported under the aforesaid contract of car-
riage, to the said station at Palmyra, Virginia, so as to per-
mit me to leave your train (which was a mixed passenger 
and freight train) while it was standing still at the said sta-
tion, and to which station I had bought a ticket, and, in utter 
disregard of your duties to safely transport and deliver me 
at the said station and discharg·e me thereat, as aforesaid, in 
a safe manner, you, through your agents and servants afore-
said, did fail to stop your Train No. 402, as afore said, so 
that I might be able to safely alight therefrom, and instead 
of doing and performing your contractual duty, as noted 
herein, did negligently and wholly without that high degree 
of care which you owed to me, a. passenger, fail to stop your 
train, hereinbefore mentioned, and on which I was a pas-
senger, either at the station at Palmyra, or the 
page 3 ~ station platform at that point, or at a suitable, safe, 
· or proper place, and wholly disregarding my 
safety, neglig·ently and carelessly: 
(a) Through your agents and servants, request me to 
alight from said train when it was in motion, and at a point 
North of Palmyra Station, and ·beyond ai point to which I had. 
1Jurchased a. ticket; · 
(b) Through your agents and servants, permit me to alight 
from your train while it was in motion and at a place wholly 
improper and not provided for the discharge of passengers; 
( c) Through your agents and servants, require me to alight 
from your aforesaid train while it was in motion, and at a 
·place wholly improper for the discharge of passengers ; 
( d) Through your agents and servmits, advise me t_o alight 
from your said passenger and freig·ht (mixed) train while 
the same was in motion and at a point not prepared for the 
discharge of passengers, from this or other trains carrying 
passengers, and at a point beyond the station at Palmyra, 
and to whic.h station I held a ticket, and at a place along 
your railway tracks not. prepared for the discharge of pas-
sengers and dangerous to my safety; · 
( e) Through your agents and servants, refuse to stop yo~ll' 
said train on which I was a passenger, as aforesa~d, at the 
station at Palmyra, as aforesaid, to enable µie to alight from 
your said train at a proper place, bnt, on the. contrary, kept 
your said train in motion, forcing me to alight therefrom 
while it was in motion and at a point beyond the said sta-
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tion to which I held a ticket, and at a point not prepared for 
the disc.barge of passengers; 
(f) Through your ag·ents and servants, direct me to alight 
from your said train while it was in motion, and at a point 
not designated or prepared for such purpose, and not at the 
station aforesaid, and to which I held a ticket, but at a point 
along your railway wholly unfamiliar to me, but 
page 4} familiar to your agents and servants in control of 
said train, on which I was a passenger, and at a 
point particularly dangerous to me because of the condition 
of the roadbed, ballast, uneven, surf aces and contour of land 
between the rail and adjoining surfaces and objects. 
And, because of your negligent, careless, and reckless dis-
regard of your duty to me, as shown by your agents and 
servants, I, at your instance; as communicated by your 
servants, alighted from your train, hereinbefore mentioned, 
while it was in motion, and at the time hereinbefore men-
tioned, and at a point beyond (that is-North of) Palmyra 
Station, to which I held a ticket as a passenger on the said 
train, and at a point not prepared for the discharge of pas-
pengers, and dangerous to them and to nie, as a passenger, 
and as a direct result of such negligence, as hereinbefore set 
out, in paragTaphs (a) to (f) inclusive, and of the improper, 
neglig·ent, careless, and reckless manner to which your said 
train was operated by your agents and servants, as herein-
before set out, I suffered injury to my left foot and ankl~ 
by a trauma thereto and thereof, st.raining, and spraining 
the muscles, tissues, ligaments, and structures thereof, perma-
nently, so that I am now unable to use these said members 
of my body in a normal manner and suffer intense pain regu-
larly and continuously, and am ,,,holly disqualified from fol-
lowing my usua] occupation as a farmer and for which occu-
pation, alone, I am qualified, nor win I ever be able to use 
my foot and ankle with any degree of satisfaction, or with-
out pain and suffering ensuing therefrom. 
Furthermore, the condition of my said foot and ankle is 
·becoming, progressively, more painful and tlrn loss of use 
more pronounce<l since the date of injury, and I am advised 
that it may be necessary to amputate my said foot a.ud ankle. 
Furthermore, I have suffered intense mental agony ·because 
of this condition and its affect upon my ability to take care 
of my family, and have been forced to incur medical 
page 5 ~ expenses in the care and attention to my injury in 
the amount of at least .Twenty-five Dollars .($25.00) 
·and have· suffered a tota] damage by reason of your negli-
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gence, through your agents and servants, in the.runount of 
at least Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00). 
Therefore, because of your negligence, as aforesaid, I shall, 
on the day and-~t the time and place hereinbef ore mentioned,. 
move the Circuit Court of Fluvanna County, as aforesaid,. 
for a judgmenf and award of execution against you in the 
amount of ·Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00), as aforesaid. 
Given unde\~ my hand this 18th day of May, 1940 . 
W. N. HANNAH, p. q., 
Palmyra, Virginia. 
. S. 0. BUTLER, Plaintiff. 
By Counsel. 
The following is the Deputy Sheri:ff 's return on the fore-
going notice of motion : · 
Executed this 18th day of May, 1940, by delivering a trne 
copy of the within notice to Dabney Cosby, an agent of the 
Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Company, at Palmyra, Virginia, 
( on its Virginia Airline Branch) and in person to the saicl 
Dabney Cosby, Agent aforesaid, and in Fluvanna County, 
Virginia, and advising· him that this was a process against 
his employer. 
W. A. S. CONRAD, III, D.S. 
1940, May 20th 
Returned executed. 
A. S. HADEN, Clerk. 
page 6 ~ And at another day, to-wit.: In the Circuit Court 
1940: 
aforesaid, on tl1e 22nd day of ,June, in the year 
S. 0. Butler, Plaintiff, 
v. 
The Chesapeake & Ol1io Railway Company, a corporation, 
Defendant. 
PLEA OF NOT GUILTY. 
The said defendant, by its attorneys, comes and says that 
it is not guilty of the premises laid to its charge in manner 
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and form as the plaintiff hath complained in his Notice of 
lvlotion for Judgment. 
And of this the said defendant puts itself upon the coun-
try. 
LEA.KE & SPICER, p. d. 
And at another clay, to-wit: In the Circuit Court afore-
said, on the 24th day of June, 1940: 
S. 0. Butler, Plaintiff, 
v. 
The Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Company, a corporation, 
Def enclant. 
MOTION FOR .JUDGMENT. 
This day came attorney for the plaintiff and also letter 
from attorney for the defendant and for good ca.use shown 
this case is continued until August 27, 1940. 
page 7 ~ And at another day, to-wit: In the Circuit Court 
aforesaid, on the 1st day of August, in the year 
1940: 
This day came again the defendant, by his attorneys, Leake 
& 1Spicer, and with leave of Court filed herein the statement 
of his Grounds of Defense; and the further hearing is con-
tinued. . 
The following are the Grounds of Defense filed herein by 
leave of the foregoing order: 
GROUNDS OF DE·FENSE. 
S. 0. Butler, Plaintiff, 
v. 
The Chesapeake & Ohio Ra.ilway Company, a corporation, 
Defendant. 
GROUNDS OF DEFENSE. 
1. Defendant was not negligent. 
2. Even if defendant were negligent ( which is denied), 
such negligence had no proximate or causal relation to any 
injuries sustained ·by the plaintiff. 
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3. Plaintiff failed to exercise reasonable care for his own 
safety. · 
4. Plaintiff's own voluntary act in alighting from the train 
was the sole pro:xima.te cause of any injuries sustained by 
him. 
5. Pla~ntiff's neg·lig·ence in alig·hting from the train proxi-
mately caused or contributed to any injuries sustained by 
him. 
6. Defendant did not refuse to stop its train and did not 
force or require the plaintiff to alight from it while in mo-
tion. 
7. So far as concerns the defendant, any injuries sustained 
by the plaintiff resulted from an aecident not reasonably to 
be foreseen or anticipated. 
page 8 ~ 8. Plaintiff was not a passenger on defendant's 
train from Carysbrook to Palmyra, Virginia, on 
the date mentioned in the Notice of l\iotion for Judgment. 
9. Plaintiff was not injured in alighting from the train. 
10. Defendant is not liable to the plaintiff in any sum. 
11. Statute of Limitations, as set out in plea filed herewith. 
LEAKE & SPICER, p. d. 
And on the same dav to-wit: In the Circuit Court afore-
said, on the 1st day of August, in the year 1940: 
S. 0. Butler, Plaintiff, 
v. 
The Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Company, a corporation, 
Defendant. 
PLEA OF STATUT~J OF LIMITATIONS. 
The said defendant, by its attorneys, comes and says that 
the supposed cause of action alleged in the plaintiff's N oticc 
of Motion for J udg111ent, is founded upon an injury to the 
person and for a matter not of such nature as to be sur-
vivable in the event of the plaintiff's death, and that the same 
did not accrue to the said plaintiff at any time within one 
yea.r next before the commencement of this action, in man-
ner and form as the said plaintiff hath complained against 
the defendant. 
Aud this the said defendant is ready to verify. 
LEAKE & SPICER, p. d. 
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page 9 } And at another day, to-wit: In the Circuit Court 
af oresa.id on the 26th day of August, in the year 
1940: 
S. 0. Butler, Plaintiff, 
v. 
The Ches{l.peake & Ohio Railway Company, a corporation., De"'. 
fendant. 
ORDER. 
This day came the attorney for the plaintiff and also letter 
from the defendant and by consent of the attorney for the 
plaintiff and defendant, this case is continued and set for trial 
on October 29, 1940. 
And on another day, to-wit: In the Circuit Court afore-
said on the 29th day of October, in the year 1940: 
S. 0. Butler, Plaintiff, 
1). 
C. & 0. Railway Company, Defendant. 
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT. 
This day came the parties by their attorneys, and the de-
fendant by their attorneys filed their plea of not guilty of the 
premises laid to the charge in manner· and form as the plain-
tiff hath complained in this N oticc of Motion, and issue is 
joined thereupon, and thereupon the defendant filed their re-
spective grounds of defense, and also plea of statute of limi-
tations and of this they put themselves upon the Country. 
And thereupon came a Jury, to-wit: R. B. Holberton, 
~Julian Shackleford, W. A. Parrish, C. B. Bell, C. O. Ricbarcl-
son, C. 0. Vines and B. F. Seay, who were sworn the truth 
to speak upon the issue joined, and having heard all of the 
evidence introduced for the plaintiff, the attorneys for the 
defendant moved the Court to strike out the plaintiff's evi-
dence, on the ground that it shows on its face that the plain-
tiff had full knowledge of the surrounding condi-
page 10 ~ t.ions, that he voluntarily agreed to g:et off of the 
train while it was moving without objection, and 
got off of the train where he did voluntarily after observing· 
the surrounding· conditions, the Court will consider said mo-
tion after a.11 of the evidence was introduced. 
The Attorneys for the defendant at conclusion· of all of 
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the evidence moved that all the evidence in the case be stricken 
out; 
(1) .Upon the ground that there is no negligence shown. 
( 2) That the evidence fails to show any negligence which 
bad any proximate casual relation to the injuries complained 
of. 
( 3) That the failure to stop the train prior to the time the 
plaintiff alighted from it had no proximate casual relation to 
any injuries suffered by him, he being an adult in full posses-
sion of his faculties and fully cognizant of the surrounding 
physical conditions when alighting from the train. 
( 4) That his act in alighting from the train if danger were 
incident thereto was the voluntary act of a responsible party 
under no compulsion, an act which insulated or cut off any 
possible neg·ligence on the part of the defendant and repre-
sented a free choice on his part. 
( 5) That in alig·hting from the train he voluntarily as-
sumed all risks incident thereto and his conduct amounted to 
negligence as a matter of law. · 
(6) That the plaintiff has failed to sustain the burden of 
proof by showing by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
injuries complained of resulted from alighting from the train 
on the occasion in question. 
(7) That the cause of such condition as he now complains 
of is just as probable to have come from causes for which 
the defendant is in no way responsible. 
(8) And that the injuries complained of are not shown to 
be natural and probable consequence of any act complained 
of or such a consequence as ought to have been foreseen un-
der the circumstances, and the general statement that the 
plaintiff has failed to sustain the burden of proof. 
page 11 ~ Which motion the Court overruled, to which ac-
tion of the Court in overruling said motion the de-
fendant by Counsel excepted, for reasons stated therefor. 
At this point the Court adjourned until tomorrow morn-
ing at 10 :00 o'clock a. m. 
EDWARD MEEKS, Judge. 
And on another day, to-wit: In the Circuit Court afore-
said on the 80th day of October, in the year 1940: 
S. 0. Butler, Plaintiff, 
v. 
C. & 0. Railway Company, Defendant. 
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MOTION FOR JUDGMENT. 
This clay again came the parties by their attorneys and 
the jury sworn in this case on yesterday, appeared in pursu-
ance of their adjournment. And the ,Jury having been fully 
instructed by the Court and having· heard all of the argument 
of Counsel, retired to their room to consider of their verdict 
and after some time spent therein returned into Court and 
rendered the following verdict: ''We the jury find for the 
plaintiff, S. 0. Butler, against the defendant, the Chesapeake 
& Ohio Railway Company, and assess his damag·es at $500.00. 
R. B. Holberton, foreman.'' 
Thereupon the defendant moved the Court to set aside the 
verdict of the jury as contrary to the law and evidence and 
without evidence to support it and enter up judgment for de-
fendant notwithstanding such verdict or failing so to do, to 
award the defendant a new trial, on the grounds heretofore 
set forth in support of defendant's motion to strike the evi-
dence made at the conclusion of all the evidence and also for 
errors in instructions given and refused and given by the 
Court as amended and on the further g-round that 
page 12 ~ the damages awarded by the jury are excessive, 
and for errors in the introduction and exclusion of 
evidence during the course of the trial. 
Which motion of defendant is hereby continued for argu-
ment. 
EDWARD MEEKS, Judge. 
page 13 ~ And on another day, to-wit: In the Circuit Court 
aforesaid, on the 8th clay of November, in the year 
1940. 
S. 0. Butler, Plaintiff, 
v. 
The Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Company, a corporation, De-
fendant. 
GROUNDS OF MOTION OF DEFE;NDANT TO SET 
ASIDE THE VERDICT OF THE JURY AS CON-
TRARY TO THE LAW AND THE EVIDENCE, AND 
WITHOUT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT IT, AND TO 
ENTER UP FINAL JUDGMENT FOR THI~ DEFEND-
ANT, AND FAILING SO TO DO, TO AWARD THE 
DEF'1DNDANT A N.E,W TRIAL. 
1. No negligence on the part of the clef endant shown. 
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2. The evidence fails to show any negligence on the part 
of the defendant which had any proximate causal relation 
to the injuries complained of. 
3. :B,ailure to stop the train prior to the time the plaintiff 
alighted from it had no proximate causal relation to any in-
juries suffered by him, he being· an adult in full possession 
of his faculties and fully cognizant of the surrounding physi-
cal conditions, when alighting from the train. 
4. The plaintiff's act in alighting· from the train, if danger 
be incident thereto, was the voluntary act of a responsible 
party, under no compulsion, an act which insulated or cut 
off any possible negligence on the part of the defendant and 
represented a free choice on his part. 
5. In alig·hting· from the train the plaintiff voluntarily as· 
sumed all risks incident thereto, and his conduct amounted to 
negligence as a matter of law. 
6. Plaintiff bas failed to sustain the burden of proof by 
showing· by a preponderance of the evidence that the injuries 
complained of resulted from alighting from the train on the 
occasion in question. 
pag·e 14 ~ 7. The cause of such condition as the plaintiff 
now complains of is just as probable to have come 
from causes for which the defendant is in no way respon-
sible. 
8. The injuries complained of are not shown to be the na-
tural and probable consequence of any act complained of, or 
such a consequence as ought to have been foreseen by the 
defendant under the circumstances. 
9. Plaintiff has failed to sustain the burden of proof. . 
10. Error8 in rulings of the Court in the introduction and 
exclusion of evidence during the course of the trial. 
11. Errors in rulings of the Court in instructions given 
and refused, and instructions given as amended by the Court, 
us heretofore pointed out. 
12. Damages awarded by the jury are excessive. 
LEAKE & SPICER, 
p. d. 
And on another day, to-wit: In the ·Circuit Court afore-
said, on the 17th day of December, in the year 1940: 
S. 0. Butler, Plaintiff, 
v. 
C. & 0. R.ailway Company, Defendant. 
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MOTION FOR JUDGMENT. 
This day ag·ain came the parties by their attorneys and the 
defendant on October 29th, 1940, having moved the Court to 
set aside the yerdict of the Jury; on the grounds therein 
stated, and this day the parties by their attorneys having 
argued the said motion before the Court, the Court takes time 
to consider of its ruling on the said motion and the case is 
continued for the further orders of the Court herein. 
pag·e 15 } And on another day, to-wit: In the Circuit Court 
afore said, on the 1st day of April, in the year 1941: 
S. 0. Butler, Plaintiff, 
v. 
The Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Company, a corporation, De-
fendant. 
ORDER. 
This day came again the parties, by their respective at-
torneys, and the Court having maturely considered the mo-
tion made by the defendant, ·with the several g·rounds thereof 
set forth in writing, to set asi~e the verdict of the jury as 
~ontrary to the law and the evidence and without evidence to 
i-:upport it, and to enter judgment for the defendant, and fail-
ing· so to do, to set aside the verdict of the jury and to award 
the def en<lant a new trial in this case, and having heard the 
arguments of counsel thereon and being now of opinion that 
said motion should be overruled: 
It is, the ref ore, considered and adjudged by the Court that 
the said motion of the defendant to set aside the verdict of 
the jury and to enter judgment for the def enda.nt, and failing 
80 to do, to set a.side the verdict of the jury and to award the 
defendant a new trial, be, and the same hereby is, overruled, 
and it is further considered and adjudg·ed that the plaintiff, 
S. O. Butler, do recover of the defendant, The Chesapeake 
& Ohio Railway Company, the sum of Five Hundred Dol-
lars ($500.00) with interest thereon at the rate of six per 
eentum per annum from the 30th day of October, 1940, the date 
said verdict was returned by the jury, as well as his costs in 
this behalf expended, to wl1ich several rulings and actions of 
tho Court, the defendant by its attorneys, objected ~nd ex-
ce·pted. 
Upon tlw trial of this action, the defendant, having ex-
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cepted to sundry rulings of the Court given against it, on its 
motion, leave is given it to file its bills or certificates of ex-
ceptions at any time within the period prescribed 
page 16 } by law, and the defend.ant having indicated its in-
tention to apply to the Supreme Court of Appeals 
of Virgfoia for a writ of error and sitpersedeas to the judg-
ment of the Court herein pronounced and entered, on ·its mo-
tion, it is ordered that execution upon this judgment be sus-
pended _until :~ch petition shall have been presented and acted 
on by the· Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, or until 
the time for presenting such petition shall have expired, upon 
condition, however, that within fifteen days from this date, 
the def enclant, or someone for it, enter into bond in the penal 
sum of One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00) in the Clerk's Of-
fice of this Court, and before the Clerk of this Court, with 
..,urety to be approved by the Clerk, which bond, pursuant to 
the provisions of Section 6838 of the Virginia Code, as 
amended by the Acts of Assembly, 1934, p. 171, shall be a su-
perscdeas bond, conditioned according to law, with all the con-
ditions prescribed by Section 6351 of the Virginia Code, as 
amended by the Acts of Assembly, 1934, p. 173. 
page 17 ~ The following are Bill of Exceptions No. 1 con-
taining the evidence and trial incidents and Bill 
of Exceptions No. 2 containing· instructions signed by the 
,J udg·e of this Court and made a part of this record on the 
28th day of April, 1941. 
page 18 ~ Virginia : 
In the Circuit Court of Fluvanna. County. 
S. 0. Butler, Plaintiff, 
v. 
The Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Company, a corporation, De-
fendant. 
DEFIDNDANT'S BILL ·OF EXCEPTIONS NO. I-EVI-
DENCE A."t\TD TRIAL INCIDENTS. 
BE IT REMEMBERED, that on the trial of this case be-
fore the Honorable Edward :Meeks, on October 29th and 3oth, 
1940, the following evidence was introduced on behalf of the 
plaintiff and the defendant, respectively, which evidence is 
all tlie ·evidence that was introduced in the case, and also the 
following incidents occurred during the said trial, to-wit: 
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Appearances: "\V. N. Hannah, Esq., Counsel for plaintiff. 
Messrs. Leake & Spicer, Counsel for defendant. 
page 19 ~ The followiug stipulation of counsel for the re-
spective parties, entered into on October 7, 1940, 
was filed: 
It is agreed and stipulated by and between the respective 
parties to this action that subject to the approval of the Court 
the plaintiff's notice of motion for judgment may be consid-
ered and treated as amended as of August 20, 1940, to show 
in both its second and third paragraphs, the date on which 
the plaintiff alleges he was injured, as of June 10, 1939, in 
the place and stead of May 23, 1939, and that the defendant's 
pleas and grounds of defense heretofore filed, may be consid-
ered and treated as filed in answer to said notice of motion 
for judgment, as amended. 
page 20} S. 0. BUTLER, 
the plaintiff, introduced in his own behalf, being· 
first duly sworn, testified as follows : 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Hannah: 
Q. You are Mr. S. 0. Butler i 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Where do you live, Mr. Butler! 
A. Down near Carysbrook, about a mile from Carysbrook. 
Q. How do you get to Carysbrook in the country from your 
place? 
A. Walk down the river and take a boat and cross over. 
Q. Suppose you are going from Carysbrook to your home 
by highway1 
A. Go around by the river bridge, up to Bob Jones' and 
Mrs. Parrish's old place and turn to the right. 
Q. About how many miles? 
A. About 6 or 6% miles. 
Q. You are the S. 0. Butler who is bringing· this snit against 
the C. & 0. Railroad for injuries sustained? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. When were these injuries sustained? 
A. Well, a few days previous to the 10th dav of 
page 21 ~ June I had a notice from the agent here at Pal-
myra that I had some freight in the depot and on 
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the morning of the loth of June I went over to the Brook 
to take the train to come up here and my son and grandson-
I told him-I says, "Let me out at the Brook"-he was with 
the wagon with the drum of gas to cut wheat on. Coming on 
up here I wouldn't say exactly the spot, but between Rocka. 
way, the watering station, and Palmyra the conductor come 
through-it was three of us-and lie said,' 'If I slow this train 
down will you all try to get off?" We readily agreed to ac. 
commodate the man. He said, "I have a heavy train this 
morning". Well, when we approached Palmyra I walked 
down-started down on the step, being acquainted with the 
surroundings at the depot, knowing it was smooth, and be· 
ing an old man I preferred to get off on the smooth place. 
He touched me on the shoulder and says, ''You are the old-
est man on this train. Now let the two younger men get off 
and the train will be a little slower". Well, I stepped back 
and made room for them to walk down on the step. Well, 
when they g·ot off the train was too near then the underpass 
for me .to try and get off the train. So I stayed on until it 
g·ot around the bluff, trying to pick a smooth place to leave 
the train. It got around the curve some hundred yards, I 
reckon, as near as I can come at it, from the sta-
page 22 ~ tion. So it looked tolerable smooth and I stepped 
off, catching my whole weight on this foot, strik-
ing a rock, leaning from the train in case I lost my footing· 
I wouldn't fall under it; leaning· from the train I stepped on 
the rock and this pain st.ruck me right there and ran up in 
this ankle. vV ell, I stopped and leaned back ag·ainst the bank 
a while, it kind of deadened it, and it beg·an to get pretty 
painful, made me right sick. I stood there a while and sort 
of got over it and walked on up here and attended to the 
business. I had to go either to the bank or the demonstrator's 
office, I don't know which-it doesn't make any difference-
and went on back to get the disk hillers-that is what they 
were billed at-that Buhrman & Sons shipped me from Ric11-
moild and they shipped me too many. Well, I shipped them 
back prepaid, paid 54c freight on them back. 
Q. "\Vl1at date did you ship them back? 
A. I shipped them back on the 10th. 
Q. That is the day you were injured? 
A. That was the day. 
Q. Now you spoke of two young· men or younger men be-
ing· on the train with you. Who were those young- men? 
A. One of them was l\fr. Carlisle, hut the other- one I don't 
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know who he was and I haven't seen anybody that knew him; 
he seemed to be a traveling man, had a little fold-
page 23 } ing traveling bag in his hand. 
Q. Where was this train when Mr. Duke ap-
}Jroachcd you and asked you to get off, if you would get off 
or whatever the wording was, if he slowed downt About 
where were you? 
A. Well, some place between the water station down here, 
as I me·ntioned a while ago, and Palmyra; at Rockaway. It is 
not Rockaway, it is a watering station; used to get water 
there-somewhere between there and the whistle post at Pal-
myra; I don't know exactly where. 
Q. Was any effort made by Mr. Duke to slow this train 
down? · 
A. He applied the air pretty soon after we pas.sed the 
whistle post, the air on the rear of the coach, and he was a p~ 
plying the air when I alighted from the train, still holding 
fuili~ . 
Q. Was he doing tha.t as you came to the station platform? 
A. When he applied the air on the train I don't remember 
llis releasing it at all until after I got off the train. 
Q. Mr. Butler, you stated I believe, that you were ready to 
leave the train on the station platform? 
A. I started down on the step. 
Q. ·was it or not your opinion at that time that it was safe 
to do so, safe to leave the train? 
A. I had a right to believe that the train was slow enough 
for me to get off with safety at that point and could 
page 24 ~ have gotten off with safety but for. Mr. Duke touch-
ing me on the shoulder and saying· to me, '' Let the 
younger men g·et off beca.use you are the oldest man on tl1e 
train". · 
Q. From that time on Mr. Duke continued to apply the air-
brake and the train continued to slow upf· · 
A. Apparently the train was slowi1ig. He still had tbe air 
on. I don't think he released tl1e air until after I left tl1e 
train. 
Q. Now at the time you actually left the train where was 
:Mr. Dukef 
A. He .was standing at the rear of the car rig·ht by the air 
lever. 
Q. Was he in a position to see you when you left the train f 
A. Sure, he was. , 
Q. How close was he to you f 
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A: Oh,: well, from where I was on the step to leave the 
train. not a bit £arther than from me to you. I just walked 
do'Y}l .. ~n the step, that is all and he was standing on the rear 
on the right-hand side holding the air lever in his hand. 
Q. Did Mr .. Duke at that time immediately prior to the 
time that you left the train or alighted from the train say 
anything to you about not getting off the train or make any 
statement! 
A. If he had said anything I couldn't have heard 
page 25 ~ it because of the escaping air. 
Q. Well, did he make any motions or anything· 
to indicate that he didn't want you to leave the train at that 
time? 
A. Not at all. 
Q. Are you familiar with the railroad track around that 
bend? 
A. No, sir, not at all; been over it several times on the 
train, but had no occasion to notice the surroundings. 
Q. Yon spoke of it as being some distance above the rail-
road station, above the underpass there, designating that as 
the point you left the train. Do you know whether or not 
there is a switch up there somewhere f 
A. I know where the switch is where they put these oil or 
gasoline tanks in there. I know where that spur switch is, 
but I was above that. 
Q. You were above that Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. North of that switch f 
A. Yes, sir, north of it. 
Q. Now can yon give the approximate distance from that 
switch we will say or from the point you alighted from the 
train back to the railway station? 
A. Oh, I would say something· like 75 or 1.00 yards. I never 
noticed it particularly. 
Q .. Now did you see either Mr. Carlisle or that 
page 26 ~ other young man leave the train at the station 1 
_i.\... I saw them both leave. 
Q. Will you state, please, whether there was any apparent 
inconvenience on their part in leaving the train Y 
.A. No, they seemed to get off mighty easy, made only a few 
stens after they alighted. 
Q. Was either of them thrown? 
.A. No, sir. 
Q. Or anything· of that sort f 
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A. No, sir. . 
Q. Would you say that the train was going at such a rate 
of speed that you considered it perfectly safe to leave the train 
while it was moving1 
A. I had every right to believe that I could land with safety 
if I had landed in the proper place. The train wasn't at any 
excess speed; it was very slow. · 
Q. Now coming back to this injury, has that ankle given you 
any trouble since the time of the accident? 
A. Continuous trouble ; continuous. 
Q. Can you explain to the jury just what kind of trouble 
it was or the nature of it f 
A. Well, I treated it as a sprain. I thought it was merely 
a sprain, treated it as a sprain; used hot water, three dif-
ferent kinds of liniments and a jar of iodex; bathed it in hot 
water as hot as I could and rubbed iodex on it and 
page 27 ~ rubbed liniments on it. I could mention them if 
you want them: Noah "s, Y eagers, W·atkins. 
Q. ·what is the condition of your foot nowt 
A. Well, it is as sore right now as it has ever been. Every-
body can see it. ·Can't lace that shoe on it; haven't laced 
it for twelve months. 
Q. Can you take that shoe off and sock and show this jury 
just the condition and, if it hurts, where it hurts? 
A. Yes, sir; can take it right off. 
Note : Witness removes shoe and sock. 
The Witness: Gentlemen of the jury, do you want me to 
come up there and show you or remain where I amt 
A Juror: We can see it from here. 
The Witness : See those red spots right there and right 
here; that is the sore spots and right throug·h this joint right 
here, goes to right there (indicating). See that sunken place 
right there. 
Q. If it is sore, where is it sore f 
A. It is sore right here and right there and right in this 
joint there. 
Q. Have you been able since this injury to do as much work 
as you did before? 
A. No, sir; I can't plow more than half the time. 
page 28 ~ It just gives away on me. 
Q. What percentage of work do you think you 
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can do now as compared with the amount you did before yon 
were injured Y 
Mr. Spicer: If Your Honor please, I submit he can state 
what he did rather than state the percentage. I think a man's 
own idea of the percentage of what he does is liable to be a 
little speculative. 
The Court: He can state, if he can, the work he did before 
on this ankle without any difficulty and what the situation is 
now. Just state the facts. 
Mr. Spicer: That is all right. 
By Mr. Hannah: 
Q. Before this injury ,vhat was your condition f 
A. My physical condition before this injury was about as 
good as any man my age and I think it can be verified by the 
people which I have been with thirty-two years. 
Q. Well, since this injury what is your condition f 
A. Well, I figure I can do just about half of what I have 
generally done. 
Mr. Spicer: I ob.iect to that. I think he can state the facts 
of what he did and could do before ancl what he 
pag·e 29 } can do now, but I don't think a man can give his 
own opinion as to percentag·e. That is just a mat-
ter of speculation and necessarily an opinion. 
Mr. Hannah: I think it perfectly proper to show if he could 
work a whole day before and only a half a day now. 
The Court: He has stated that. Let him tell them the 
facts; that is all. 
Bv Mr. Hannah: 
· Q. Have you been able to do the work since the injury that 
vou did before? 
· .,_\. No, sir. 
Q. v\Tha.t is your business T 
A. I am a farmer, been one for forty-three years. 
Q. And in your farming activities what do you have to do? 
A. Plow, hoe, cut with an axe, harrow, plant; everything 
that is done on a farm. L 
Q. Are you having trouble with any of your other limbs f 
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.A. No, sir. 
Q. About how much on the average is your income or has 
your income been for the last seV'.:eral years from your occu-
pation 7 
1\fr. Spicer: If Your Honor please, that is clearly 
})age 30} speculative. Whether his income has varied or not 
has nothing to do with whatever injuries he claims 
to have ·suffered. As far as that g-oes, farm income might 
vary from a great many factors or business income be varied 
from a great many factors. I submit it is too speculative be-
cause it varies and that any physical condition he might have 
has nothing-is not a measure of any injuries he might have 
sustained. 
The Court: I think he would be able to state, if he can, 
whether or not his earning capacity has been reduced on ac-
count of his injury. 
:M:r. Spicer: Well, if he was working for anybody, yes, or 
has hired somebody to take his place, but if he has farmed on 
his own account, as I assume from the questions asked, I 
think that is entirely too indefinite and vague as a measure of 
nny damage. 
The Court: If he is able to· state whether or not his earn-
ing· capacity or what he has made has been diminished by this 
injury, he can state the facts upon which that is based, if that 
is a fact. 
page 31 ~ Mr. Spicer: He stated his earnings. That is 
the question asked. That is the reason I objected. 
The Court: Those questions should be directed to the di-
minishing of his earning capacity on account of his injury. 
l\fr. Hannah: But how are we going to arrive at any 
amount, assuming for the mome11t they should find the de-
f e}ldant g·uilty of negligence, unless we have some idea of his 
actual earnings heretofore and now? 
l\fr. Spicer: It might be affected by a great many factors. 
Mr. Hannah: But I think that is a proper fRctor to be 
considered. 
Mr. Spicer: Not as a measure of damages. 
Tl1e Court: ,v11at is the question? 
Note: Question read as follows: · "About how much on 
the average is your income or has your income been for t.he 
last several yea rs from your occupation?'' 
The Court: I don't think that is a proper question at tllis 
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time. I think you should ask him first whether or 
page 32 ~. not his earning capacity has been affected by this 
j~j?ry. 
By Mr. Hannah: 
Q. :Mr. Butler, do you own a farm Y 
A. No, sir. 
Q. What are youf 
A. I am a tenant. 
Q. On whose property f 
A. Mrs. Ida G. Parrish's. 
Q. Has your income from your farming operations been re-
duced any during the past year; that is, since the time of 
this accident and reason of this accident? 
A. I would say-
Mr. Spicer: I object, if Your Honor please. I don't think 
that is fair; a man's own opinion of what he suffered is not 
coinpetent evidence to show-
The Court: You can ask him whether or not his earning 
capacity had been affected any on account of this injury. Now 
you may answer that question. 
Mr. Spicer: I except on the g·round previously indicated. 
He does not show any factors as to what he has been able to 
cultivate or gather or thing·s of that sort. 
page 33 ~ The Court: I understand that, but it is almost 
impossible to ask all those questions at one time. 
You can follow it up on direct or cross examination. 
Mr. Spicer: Exception. 
By Mr. Hannah: 
· Q. Has your income been affected by reason of this injury? 
A. Well, to a certain extent. 
Mr. Spicer: I submit the indefiniteness of the answer shows 
it is impro:r;>er. 
Mr. Hannah: I am going to ask right now to what extent 
and why does he say that. 
Mr. Spicer: The objection runs to the whole line of tes-
timony and his answer indicates the very indefiniteness of 
his knowledge. 
The Court: I don't think anything· has been said to preju-
dice anybody by that answer. Let's get along. 
Bv :Mr. Hannah: 
.. Q. In what way? 
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A. vV ell, not being physically able to do the amount of work 
that I could do before. 
Q. What crops do you raise¥ 
A. Tobacco, corn, wheat and grass. 
Q. Are you now able to raise as much tobacco 
page 34 ~ as you did prior to your injury? 
A. Well, I am working about the same tobacco; 
I have an allotment and can't work but two acres of tobacco. 
Q. Have you curtailed by reason of the injury any of your 
farming activities! 
A. No, sir; with the help of my son I am working about 
the same amount of land that I worked before, but I don't 
walk. I have got cultivators that I ride in working. 
Q. The main trouble being then your inability to walk f 
A. Inability to get over the land. 
Q. Can you handle all of your crops with the cultivators·? 
A. All but the tobacco. 
Q. How about your haying activities; does that require 
any walking? 
A. Sure, it does; shocking and hauling. 
Q. Are you able now to handle your hay crop as well as 
vou did before? 
· A. I can handle the hay just as well as I ever could with 
the exception of getting from one place to another; work 
slower, can't get around as quick as I used to. 
Q. Tell me whether there has been a time or not since your 
injury that you have been able to walk without inconvenience! 
A. There has not been a time. 
page 35 ~ Q. Speaking· again of this injury l1ere, how often 
does the foot actually hurt you-pain you? 
A. It is some pain about all the time, but if I step on the 
least little thing that kind of careens over here, then it is 
very painful. 
Q. I asked you how often you are suffering with it. How 
often do you suffer actually? 
A. Pretty well all the time. The sorenes:; has never left 
it. 
Q. I hand you what purports to be an original copy of a 
bill of lading· of the Chesapeake & Ohio Railroad Company 
and ask you if you know anything about thaU 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What does that represent to you¥ 
A. Well, I would say this represents a record of the hap-
penings. 
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Q. What happenings 1 
A. Of this injury of this foot. 
:Mr. Spicer: I object to that. That does not show how a 
bill of lading is connected with his injury. 
By Mr. Hannah: 
Q. In what way is it connected witlJ the injury f 
A. Well, I came up here on that date to g·et this freight that 
I had notice of being here and alighting from the 
pag·e 36 ~ train. That was the day I sustained the injury. 
Q. The day you received this you sustained the 
injury! 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And this is dated on June lOth-6-10-391 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And is written here at Palmyra, signed by Mr. Cosby, 
and shows that the C. & 0. Railroad shipped on that date to 
Buhrman & Sons of Richmond, Virginia, two disk billers, 
weight 15· pounds. Now did you ship these billers to Buhr-
man & Sons? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And was th~t date that you were injured f 
A. Yes, sir, that was the day. 
Q. I hand you a memorandum or salesman's slip or some-
thing-
·A. A Ticket. 
Q. Of W. C. Baker & Co., of Carysbrook, made out to S. 0. 
Butler 011 6-10-39, 30 g·allons of g·as. What do you know about 
thati 
A. That is the ticket showing that I purchased from Mr. 
Baker 30 g·allons of gas on that date. 
Q. And that was on June 10th t 
A. Same day of that bill of lading. 
Q. Are you positive, Mr. Butler, that you purchased that 
gas on the day that you were injured? 
A. Yes, sir. 
page 37 ~ EXHIBIT A. 
Form A. F. 1000 Pad 50 sets 
Revised 8-1-30 
Uniform Domestic Straight Bill of Lading, adopted by Car-
riers in Official, Southern, Wes tern and Illinois Classi-
fication territories, March 15, 1922, as 
amended August 1, 1930 
(1) 
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Shipper's No. . . . . ........ . 
Agent's No ................ . 
UNIFORM STRAIGHT BILL OF LADING 
ORIGIN.A.L---NOT NEGOTIABLE 
THE CHESAPEAKE1 .AND OHIO R.AlLWAY COMPANY 
RECEIVED, subject to the classifications and tariffs in ef-
fect on the date of the issue of this Bill of Lading, 
.At Pahnyra, Va. 6/10 1939 
From S. 0. Butler 
the property described below, in apparent good order, except 
:as noted ( contents and· condition of contents of packages un-
known), marked, consig·ned, and destined as indicated below, 
which said company (the word company being understood 
throughout this contract as meaning any person or corpora-
tion in possession of the property under the contract) agrees 
to carry to its usual place. of de~ivery at sai<;l destination; if 
011 its own road or its, own water line, otherwise to deliveT 
to another carrier on the route to said destination. It i:s 
mutually agreed, as to each carrier of all or any of said prop-
erty over all or any portion of said route to destination, and 
as to each party at any time interested in all or any of said 
property, that every service to be performed :hereunder shall 
be subject to all the conditions not prohibited by law, whether 
printed or written, herein contained, including the conditions 
on back hereof, which are hereby agreed to by the shipper 
and accepted for himself and his assigns. 
(Mail or street address1 of consignee-For purposes of noti-(i-
. cation only.) 
Consigned to Buhrman & Sons. :. 
Destination Richmond State of Va.. County of ......... 1• 
Route .................................. : ............ ,. 
Delivering Carrier . . . ...... Car Initial. . . . . . Car No ...... . 
DESCRIPTION OF ARTICLES, *WEIGHT Subject to Section 7 of conditions, if 
No. SPECIAL MARKS, AND (Subject to Class or Check this shipment is to be delivered to the 
Packages EXCEPTIONS Correction) Rate Column consignee without recourse on the con .. 
signor, the consignor shall sign the fol-
Disc Hillers ...................... 
lowing statement: .. 
2 15 The carrier shall, not make delivery of 
this shipment #ithou(payment of freight 
and all other lawfuJ-charges. · 
.. '" ....... , ........ ' ..... , ..... ' ...... 
(Signature of consignor.) 
If charges are to be prepaid write or 
-----
stamp here, "To be Prepaid." 
Prepaid. 
Received $ .55 to apply in prepay-
ment of the charges on the property de-
scribed hereon. 
D. COSBY, 
*If the shipment moves between two ports by a carrier by water, the law requires that 
Agent or Cashier. 
the bill of lading shall state whether it is "carrier's or shipper's weight." Per .... , ................... ,., ..... ,· 
N ote.-Where the rate is dependent on value, shippers are required to state specifically (The signature here acknowledges only 
in writing the agreed or declared value of the property. the amount prepaid.) 
The agreed or declared value of the property is hereby specifically stated by the shipper Charges advanced: 
to be not exceeding per $ .................................... 
-
S. 0. BUTLER, Shipper. D. COSBY, Agent. 
Per. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Per. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 P. M. . .......... , , .... . 
Perm'inent post-office address of shipper, ........................................................... , ...... , , , . , .... , . , , , .1 
00 
Q 
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CONTRACT TERMS AND CONDITIONS 
Sec. 1. (a) The carrier or party in possession of any of the 
property herein described shall be liable as at common law 
for any loss thereof or damage thereto, except as hereinafter 
provided. 
(b) No carrier or party in possession of all or any of the 
property herein described shall be liable for any loss thereof 
or damage thereto or delay caused by the Act of God, the 
public enemy, the authority of law, or the act or default of 
the shipper or owner, or for natural shrinkage. The carrier's 
liability shall be that of warehouseman, only, for loss, dam-
age, or delay caused by fire occurring after the expiration of 
the free time allowed by tariffs lawfully on file ( such free time 
to be computed as therein provided) after notice of the ar-
rival of the property at destination, or at the port of export 
( if intended for export) has been duly sent or given, and after 
placement of the property for delivery at destination, or ten-
der of delivery of the property t.o the party entitled to re-
ceive it, has been made. Except in case of negligence of the 
carrier or party in possession ( and the burden to prove 
freedom from such negligence shall be on the carrier or party 
in possession), the carrier or party in possession shall not be 
liable for loss, damage, or delay occurring while the property 
is stopped and held in transit upon the request of the shi }J-
per, owner, or party entitled to make such request, or resulting· 
from a defect or vice in the property, or for country damage 
to cotton, or from riots or strikes. 
( c) In case of quarantine the property may be discharged 
at risk and expense of owners into quarantine depot or else-
where, as required by quarantine regulations or authoritieR, 
or for the carrier's dispa.tch at nearest available point in car-
ier's judgment, and in any such case carrier's responsibility 
shall cease when property is so discharged, or property may 
be returned by carrier at owner's expense to shipping· point, 
earning freight both ways. Quarantine expenses of whatewr 
nature or kind upon or in respect to property shall be borne 
by the owners of the property or be a lien thereon. The ca 1·-
rier shall not be liable for loss or damage occasioned by fumi-
gation or disinfection or other acts required or done by quar-
antine regulations or authorities, even though the same mtw 
have been done by carrier's officers, agents, or employee~, 
nor for detention, loss, or damage of any kind occasioned by 
quarantine or the enforcement thereof. No carrier shall he 
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liable, except in case of negligence, for any mistake or in-
accuracy in any information furnished by the carrier, its 
agents, or ofticers, as to quarantine laws or regulations. The 
shipper shall hold the carriers harmless from any expense 
they may incur, or damages they may be required to pay, by 
reason of the introduction of the property covered by this 
contract into any pla,ce against the quarantine laws or regula-
tions in effect at such place. 
Sec. 2. (a) No carrier is bound to transport said property 
by any particular train or vessel, or in time for any particular 
market or otherwise than with reasonable dispatch. Every 
carrier shall have the right in case of physical necessity to 
forward said property by any carrier or route between the 
point of shipment and the point of destination. In all cases not 
prohibited by law, where a lower value than actual value has 
been represented in writing· by the shipper or has been agreed 
upon in writing as the released value of the property as de-
termined by the classification or tariffs upon which the rate 
is based, such lower -value plus freight charges if paid shall 
he the maximum amount to be recovered, whether or not such 
loss or damage occurs from negligence. 
(b) As a condition precedent to recovery, claims must be 
filed in writing with the receiving or delivering carrier, or 
carrier issuing this bill of lading, or carrier on whose line the 
loss, damage, injury or delay occurred, within nine months 
after delivery of the property ( or, in case of export traffic, 
within nine months after delivery at port of export) or, in 
case of failure to make delivery, then within nine months after 
a reasonable time for delivery has elapsed; and suits shall be 
instituted against any carrier only within two years and one 
day from the day when notice in writing is given by the car-
rier to the claimant that the carrier has disallowed the claim 
or any part or parts thereof specified in the notice. ·where 
claims are not :filed or suits are not instituted· thereon in ac-
cordance with the foregoing provisions, no carrier hereunder 
shall be liable, and such claims will not be paid. 
( c) Any carrier or party liable on account of loss of or 
damage to any of said property shall have the full benefit of 
nny insurance that may have been effected upon or on account 
of said property, so far as this shall not avoid tl1e polieics 
or contracts of insurance: Pro1;ided, That the carrier reirn-
hurse tho claimant for the premium ·paid thereon. 
Sec. 8. Except where such service is required as the result 
of carrier's negligence, all property shall be subject to neces-
sary cooperage and bailing· at owner's cost. · Each carrier 
over whose route cotton or cotton linters is to he transported 
Chesapeake and Ohio Ry. Co. v. S. 0. Butler 83 
]wreunder shall have the privilege, at its own cost and risk, 
of compressing the same for greater convenience in han-
dling or forwarding, and shall not be held responsible for 
deviation or unavoidable delays in procuring such compres-
sion. Grain in bulk consigned to a point where there is a 
railroad, public or licensed elevator, may (unless otherwise 
expressly noted herein, and then if it is not promptly un-
loaded) be there delivered and placed with other grain of the 
same kind and grade without respect to ownership ( and 
1Jrompt notice thereof shall be given to the consignor), and if 
so delivered shall be subject to a lien for elevator charges in 
addition to all other charges hereunder. 
Sec. 4. (a) Property not removed by the party entitled to 
receive it within the free time allowed by tariffs, lawfully on 
file (such free time to be computed as therein provided), after 
notice of the arrival of the property at destination or at the 
port of export ( if intended for export) has been duly sent or 
given, and after placement of the property for delivery at 
destination has been made, may be kept in vessel, car, depot, 
warehouse or place of delivery of the carrier, subject to the 
tariff charge for storage and to carrier's responsibility as 
warehouseman, only, or at the opt.ion of the carrier, may be 
removed to and stored in a public or licensed warehouse at 
the place of delivery or other available pJace, at the cost of 
the owner, and there held without liability on the part of the 
carrier, and subject to a lien for all freight and other lawful 
c11arges, including a reasonable charge for storag·e. 
(b) Where nonperishable property which has been trans-
ported to destination hereunder is refused by consignee or 
the party entitled to receive it, or said consignee or party en-
titled to receive it fails to receive it within 15 davs after notice 
of arrival shall have been duly sent or given, tlie carrier may 
sell the same at public auct_ion to the llig-hest bidder, at such 
place as may be designated by the carrier: Provided, That 
the carrier shall have first mailed, sent, or Q.·iven to the con-
sig11or notice that the property .has been refused or remains 
unclaimed, as the case may be, and that it will be subject to 
sale under the terms of the bill of lading· if disposition be not 
a rrang-ed for, and shall have published notice containing n 
description of the property, the name of the party to whom 
consigned, or, if shipped order notify~ the name of the party 
to he notified, and the time and place of sale, once a week for 
two successive weeks, in a newspaper of g·eneral circulation 
at the place of sale or nearest place where sucl1 newspaper is 
published: Provided, Tha~ 30 days shall have elansed before 
publication of notice of sale after said notice that the property 
84 ~npreme Court of A.pJ)eals of Virginia 
was refuseq. or remains unclaimed was mailed, sent, or given. 
(c) Where perishable property which has been transported 
hereunder~to destination is refused by consignee or party en-
titled to receive it, or said consignee or party entitled to re-
ceive it shall' fail to receive it promptly, the carrier may, in 
its discretion, to prevent deterioration or further deteriora-
tion, sell the same to the best advantage at private or public. 
sale: Provided, That if time serves for notification to the 
consignor or owner of the refusal of the property or the fail-
ure to receive it and request for disposition of the property, 
such notification shall be given, in such manner as the exer-
cise of due diligence requires, before the property is sold. 
( d) ,vhere the procedure provided for in the two para-
gTaphs last preceding is not possible, it is agreed that noth-
ing· contained in said paragraphs shall be construed to abridge 
the right of the carrier at its option to sell the property under 
such circumstances and in such manner as may be authorized 
by law. 
( e) The proceeds of any sale made under this section shall 
be applied by the carrier to the payment of freight, demurrage, 
storage, and any other lawful charges and the expense of 
notice, advertisement, sale and other necessary expense and 
of caring for and maintaining the property, if proper care of 
the same requires special expense, and should there be a bal-
ance it shall be paid to the owner of the property sold here-
under. 
(f) Property destined to or taken from a station, wharf, 
or landing· at which there is no regularly appointed freight 
agent shall be entirely at risk of owner after unloaded from 
cars or vessels or until loaded into cars or vessels, and, ex-
cept in case of carrier's negligence, when received from or 
delivered to such stations, wharves, or landings shall be at 
owner's risk until the cars are attached to and after they are 
detached from locomotive or train or until loaded into and 
after unloaded from vessels. 
Sec. 5. No carrier hereunder will carry or be liable in any 
way for any documents, specie, or for any articles of extraor-
dinary value not specifically rated in the published classificn-
tions of tariffs unless a special agreement to do so and a 
stipulated value of the articles are indorsed hereon. 
Sec. 6. Every party, whether principal or agent, shipping-
explosives or dangerous goods, without previous full written 
disclosure to the carrier of their nature, shall be liable fo1· 
and indemnify the carrier ag·ainst all loss or damage caused 
by such goods, and such goods may be warehoused at owner's 
risk and expense or destroyed without compensation. 
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Sec. 7. The owner or consignee shall pay the freight and 
average, if any, and all other lawful charges accruing on said 
property; but, except in those instances where it may law-
fully be authorized to do so, no carrier by railroad shall de-
liver or relinquish possession at destination of the property 
covered by this bill of lading until all tariff rates and charges 
thereon have been paid. The consignor shall be liable for the 
freig·ht and all other lawful charges, except that if the con-
signor stipulates, by signature, in the space provided for that 
purpose on the face of this bill of lading that the carrier shall 
not make delivery without requiring payment of such charges 
and the carrier, contrary to such stipulation, shall make de-
livery without requiring such payment, the consignor ( except 
as hereinafter provided) shall not be liable for such charges. 
P1·ovided, that, where the carrier has been instructed by the 
shipper or consignor to deliver said property to a consignee 
other than the shipper or consignor, such consignee shall not 
be legally liable for transportation charg·es in respect of the 
transportation of said property (beyond those billed against 
him at the time of delivery for which he is otherwise liable) 
which may be found to be due after the property has been 
delivered to him, if the consig·nee (a) is an agent only and 
has no beneficial title in said property, and (b) prior to de-
livery of said property has notified the delivering carrier in 
writing of the fact of such agency and absence of beneficial 
title, and, in the case of a shipment reconsigned or diverted 
to a point other than that specified in the original bill of lad-
ing, has also notified the delivering carrier in writing of the 
name and address of the bene.ficial owner of said property ; 
and, in such cases the shipper or consignor, or, in the case of a 
shipment so reconsig·ned or diverted, the beneficial owner, 
shall be liable for such additional charges. If the consignee 
has given to the carrier erroneous information as to who the 
beneficial o,vner is, such consignee shall himself be liable for 
such additional charges. Nothing· herein shall limit the right 
of the carrier to require at time of shipment the prepayment 
or guarantee of the charg·es. If upon inspection it is ascer-
tained tl1at the articles shipped are not those described in 
this bill of lading, the freight charges must be paid upon the 
articles actually shipped. 
Sec. 8. If this bill of lading· is issued on the order of the 
shipper, or his agent, in exchange or in substitution for an-
other bill of lading, the shipper's signature to the prior bill 
of lading as to the statement of value or otherwise, or elec-
tion of common law or bill of lading liability, in or in con-
nection with such prior bill of lading·, shall be considered a 
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part of this bill of ladiug· as fully as if the same were written 
or made in or in connection with this bill of lading. 
Sec. 9. (a) If all or any part of said property is carried by 
water over any part of said route, such water carriage shall 
be performed subject to all the terms and provisions of, and 
all the exemptions from liability contained in, the Act of the 
Congress of the United States, approved on February 13, 
1893, and entitled '' An act relating· to the navigation of ves-
sels, etc.," and of other statutes of the United States accord-
ing carriers by water the protection of limited liability, and 
to the conditions contained in this bill of lading not inconsist-
ent therewith or with this section. 
(h) No such carrier by water shall be liable for any loss 
or damage resulting from any fire happening to or on board 
the vessel, or from explosion, bursting of boilers or breakage 
of shafts unless caused by the design or neglect of such car-
rier. 
( c) If the owner shall have exercised due diligence in mak-
ing the vessel in all respects seaworthy and properly manned, 
equipped, and supplied, no such carrier shall be liable for 
any loss or damage resulting fi:om the perils of the lakes, 
seas, or other waters, or from latent defects in hull, machin-
ery, or appurtenances whether existing prior to, at the time 
of, or after sailing, or from collision, stranding, or other ac-
cidents of navigation, or from prolongation of the voyage. 
And, when for any reason it is necessary, any vessel carrying 
any or all of the property herein described shall be at liberty 
to cnll at any port or ports, in or out of the customary route, 
to tow and he towed, to transfer, trans-ship, or lig·hter, to load 
and discharge g·oocls at any time, to assist vessels in distress, 
to deviate for the purpose of saving life or property, and 
for docking and repairs. Except in case of negligence such 
carrier shall not be responsible for anir loss or damage to 
property if it be necessary or is usual to carry the same upon 
deck. 
( d) General Average shall be payable according- to the 
York-Antwerp Rules of 1924, Sections 1 to 15, incluAive, and 
Sections 17 to 22, inclusive, and as to matters not covered 
thereby according to the laws and usages of the Port of New 
York. If the owners shall have exercised due diligence to 
make the vessel in all respects seaworthy and properly 
manned, equipped and supplied, it is hereby agreed that ii1 
case of danger, damage or disaster resulting· from faults or 
errors in navig·ation, or in the management of the vessel, or 
from any latent or other defects in the vessel, her machinery 
or appurtenances, or from unseaworthiness, whether existino· 
:.-, 
Chesapeake and Ohio Ry. Co. v. S. O. Butler 87 
8. O. Butler. 
at the time of shipment or at the beginning of the voyage 
(provided the Ia.tent or other defects or the unseaworthiness 
was not discoverable by the exercise of due dilig:ence), the 
shippers, consig·nees and/or owners of the cargo shall nev-
ertheless pay salvag·e and any special charges incurred in 
respect of the cargo, and shall contribute with the shipowner 
in general average to the payment of any sacrifices, losses or 
expenses of a general average nature that may be made or in-
curred for the common benefit or to relieve the adventure from 
any common peril. 
( e) If tbe property is being carried under a tariff which 
provides that any carrier or carriers party thereto shall be 
liable for loss from perils of the sea, then as to such carrier 
or carriers the provisions of this section shall be modified 
in accordance with the tariff provisions, which shall be re-
garded as incorporated into the conditions of this bill of lad-
ing. 
(f) The term "water carriage'' in this section shall not be 
construed as including lighterage in or across rivers, harbors, 
or lakes, when performed by or on behalf of rail carriers. 
Sec. 10. Any alteration, addition, or erasure in this bill of 
lading which shall be made without the special notation 
l1ereon of the ag·ent of the carrier issuin~; this bill of lading, 
Rhall be without effect, and this bill of ladmg shall be enforce-
able according· to its original tenor. 
pag·e 38} 
1\I S. 0. Butler 
EXHIBIT B. 
W. C. BAKER & CO. 
Dealers In . · 
General Merchandise 
Carysbrook, Va. 
.1\.ddress . . . . ......................................... . 
Salesman. . . . . . . . . . . . . . Date 6/10/39. . . . . 193 .. 
30 Gallons 6.00 
page 39} 
dof 
Q. After receiving· this injury here in Palmyra 
when you alighted from the train what did you 
A. I walked a few steps from the train ha.ck this wav and 
leaned up against the bank for a few_ moments to see if the 
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pain would· stop in my foot, for I suppose some ten or twelve 
minutes, not _.over that. 
Q. What happened next 1 
A. I began to get sick, got blind, perspiration began to run 
off me and it seemed this foot was numb-
The Court: Talk louder so these gentlemen can hear you. 
A. ( continued) I say after I alighted from the train I 
stood up against the bank for a few moments, thinking this 
foot would stop hurting. Instead of that, I began to get a 
little blind, perspiration ran off of me and I was sick and I 
stood there ten or fifteen minutes until it wore off. Then I 
walked on down here and attended to my little business, I 
don't remember whether in the bank or the demonstrator's 
office, matters not about that; it was a matter of business 
I had to attend to and went back to the station to get the 
two billers out that I was going to take back with me and 
shipped the other two back to Buhrman & Sons, Richmond, 
prepaid. 
Q. Then what happened? 
A. I caught a laundry truck back to Carysbrook, 
page 40 ~ put these two billers I carried with me on the truck, 
met my son and grandson at the Brook and got 
the gasoline and .by that time my ankle was pretty badly 
swollen and I said to my son and grandson-
Mr. Spicer: I object to that. 
The Court: Objection sustained to that. You can't state 
what you said to them. 
By Mr. Hannah: 
Q. ·what did you do and why? 
A. I says to them-
The Court: You can't state what you told them. 
A. (continued) Well, I took the wagon, not being able to 
walk, and drove the wagon home and let them come across 
the river and bring the boat. 
Q. Did you carry this gas home f 
A. I took the gas home. 
Q. What did you do with this bill of lading- and ticket when 
you got home or after you received it? 
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A. I took it home and handed them to my wife and she put 
these things away. Now I wi.11 explain this as I go. This 
ticket that I got from Mr. Baker I bought my gas from him 
to run my tractor on and I get a rebate or refund on this gas, 
using it for farming purposes, and that is why I found the 
correct date. The first date I was mistaken in, the 
page 41 ~ 23rd day of May; I was mistaken in that date and 
I brought these things to Mr. Hannah, and my 
wife-of course, this bill of lading is the same date of this 
slip Mr. Baker gave me and my wife told me, "You are wrong 
in the date you sustained your injury". She says, "It was 
the day you got your gas and shipped those billers back to 
Richmond''. 
Q. Mr. Butler, you allege here that on the 10th day of June, 
1939, this accident occurred and still no suit is brought here 
until the 18th day of May, 1940. Vlhy didn't you institute 
action or reach an adjustment with the railroad company 
prior to that time! 
Mr. Spicer: I object to any reference to an adjustment. 
By Mr. Hannah: 
Q. Why didn't you attempt to? 
Mr. Spicer: I object to any reference to anything of that 
kind. 
The Court: I don't think that is proper. 
Mr. Hannah: That part is out. 
Q. Why didn't you take such action as you saw fiU 
Mr. Spicer: I ask the jury be instructed to disregard that. 
The Court: That is not proper, gentlemen. Just ask whv 
he delayed bringing suit. · 
A. Well, in 1915, as I remember, I was struck at Carys-
brook-
page 42 ~ Mr. Spicer: I object to anything-
The Court: That is not responsive to the ques-
tion. Just ask the question over again. 
By Mr. Hannah: 
Q. W11y did you delay as much as you did in bringing· action 
against the railway company for this injury? 
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.A. Well, I thoug·ht it was merely a sprain and I didn't want 
to bring any action against the company. I think corpora-
tions_ ought to be treated as private individuals. I didn't 
bring· any action, thought it was nothing in the world but a 
sprain and would wear off and I didn't know anything about 
the conductor's condition, how much family he had, what 
responsibilities he had resting on him and didn't want to 
cause him any trouble, but after finding this injury was per-
manent, being examined, X-ray pictures taken, I felt it was 
my duty to protect my interests as best I could. I had de-
pendent children-
Mr. Spicer: I object to that. 
Mr. Hannah: That is all right; don't say any more. 
The Court: That is not evidence. 
By Mr. Hannah: . 
Q. Now to clear the thing up in my mind, I be-
page 43 ~ Iieve your statement was that at some point about 
Rockaway south of Palmyra Mr. Duke asked you 
to leave the train while still moving because he had a heavy 
train and if he stopped he couldn't get started. Now can you 
give us the exact words he ·used in requesting you to do that j! 
A. Mr. Duke remarked to us three that he had a heavv 
train; that was his remark to us. · 
Q. Is that all he said to you 1 
A. And asked us if he slowed the train down would we try 
to get off, and we readily agTeed to give the man accommoda-
tion to do so. 
CROSS EXA.MINATJ:ON. 
By lVIr. Spicer: 
Q. Mr. Butler, what was the occasion for saying you were 
hurt on May 23, 1939f 
A. V/ ell, I was up here in a very short period five or six 
times and I wasn't satisfied about the date until mv wife 
looked the papers up, looking· for these g·as receipts for me 
to bring up and get the notice and fill out my blank so I would 
g·et my refund. 
Q. But you did tell Mr. Hannah ns late as May, 1940, thnt 
you were injured on May 23, 1939? 
.A. ThHt. was my opinion of it at the time. 
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Q. But here for a year-approximately a year 
page 44 } after you say it happened you had your attorney 
prepare the papers in that form, saying that you 
were hurt-
A. That was my opinion, but after I found I was wrong I 
brought papers correcting that statement. 
Q. Now, Mr. Butler, did you have a ticket that morning¥ 
A. I don't generally ride a passenger train without a ticket. 
Q. I am just asking you the question. 
The Court; Answer the question. 
By Mr. Spicer! 
Q. Did you buy a ticket at OaryslJrook that morningt 
A. Of course, I did. 
Q. Do you always ride the train in coming to Palmyra? 
A. Pretty generally always come on the train. 
Q. How long have you been accustomed to coming to Pal-
mvra? 
0
A. For the past twenty-odd years. 
Q. You have lived in that section all this time? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And you are thoroughly familiar with Palmyra! 
A. Yes, sir, and the surroundings. 
Q. And you have been riding on the train for a long time, 
lia ven 't you 1 
A. Quite a while. . 
Q. How long have you been riding on trains t 
A. That is hard for me to say;_ couldn't answer 
page 45 } that definitely and give a correct answer. 
Q. And you have gotten off trains that were 
moving before that time? 
A. Yes, sir, in my younger days. 
Q. Haven't you gotten off any since your younger days ex-
cept this occasion? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. None at all? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. When you got off the train on this oc~asion did you 
know Mr. Cosby, the agent? 
A. Why, I have known Mr. Cosby thirty-odd years. 
Q. Did you say anything to Mr. Cosby about being hurt f 
A. I didn't mention it to Mr. Oosbv. 
Q. And you did go up to the station after thaU 
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.A. I went.to the station and got my stuff out of there after 
that, the dis~. billers. 
Q. Now yo~.,.say Mr. Duke asked you all to g·et off and that 
you very readily agreed to get off t 
.A. We all agreed, we three. 
Q. I am asking about you. Now what time of day was iU 
A. In the morning; I don't know; I didn't have any watch. 
Q. I mean--
A. It was the morning train, the train that comes this way 
in the morning. 
Q. Between nine and ten o'clock 1 
page 46 ~ A. I suppose somewhere along there. 
Q. And you g·ot out on the pla.tf orm of the coach 
and Mr. Duke held you back? 
.A. Mr. Duke touched me on the shoulder and said, ''You 
are the oldest man on. this train." I think he will verify that 
statement. 
Q. He held you back then f 
A. And says, "Now you wait and let these two younger men 
get off and the train will be slightly slower.'' 
Q. He asked you to wait? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Now, Mr. Butler, in all that time you say he had the 
air on? 
A. If he ever released the a.ir I didn't have any recollec-
tion of it. 
Q. Well, the train was slowing· up all the time Y 
A. Apparently. 
Q. Until you got off T 
A. Apparently. I couldn't tell you. I was watching the 
place; I was paying· no ~trict attention to the movement of 
the train. 
Q. You were looking out for a spot to lenve the train T 
A. Yes, a smooth place. 
Q. And the door was open? 
page 47 ~ A. Yes; I was on the step. 
get off? 
Q. And you were looking off to what side to 
A. The right side. 
Q. Tba.t is the side the station is on? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And you were looking· off in that direction, 
A. Yes, sir. -
Q. When you got off and you could see the ground beneath 
you? 
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A. Sure, I could. 
Q. And you c.ould see what was there? 
.A. Yes, sir, I could see. 
Q. Y oit eyesig·ht is all right 1 
A. My eyesight is fairly good. 
Q. Mr. Duke didn't push you off or Eihove you off, did ]1e Y 
A. No, sir. 
Q. And you got off when you did of your own volition? 
A. Sure. 
Q. You thought it was all right to g·et off, didn't you f 
A. I felt I was safe in getting off the train. It wasn't 
any excess speed, as I said a while ago; it was moving. I 
had every right to believe I could get off and could have 
g·otten off with safety if I had gotten off in the place in which 
I should have gotten off. 
Q. You didn't see any reason why it wasn't perfectly safe 
to get off when you did get off? 
page 48 ~ .A. I didn't see any reason why, but a man never 
knows, the train going the same way he was go-
ing-I noticed the rocks, but I didn't know I was going to 
hit them. 
Q. You knew that before you got <'fr, as a matnre man! 
A. Of course, I did. 
Q. You knew as much before you g·ot off as afterwards? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What is your age? 
A. Sixty-six years, born in 1874. 
Q. And you knew there was a certain distance down from 
the train to the ground f 
A. I knew that. 
Q. Did you have anything in your hand at the time f 
A. Nothing in my hands. 
Q. I believe you said you calculated that it was-you waited 
until it was a prudent time to get off in your opinion? 
A. I don't know whether a pl'udent time or not. 
Q. I beg your pardon. That might have come from Mr. 
Hannah in his opening statement. Now, Mr. Butler, didn't 
Mr. Duke tell you if you would wait he would stop the train 
for you! 
A. No, sir. He told me that the next time I come to Pal-
myra and I started to get off. He said, '' Hold on, I will 
stop the train for you.'' · · 
page 49 ~ Q. What was that you said; sometime since the 
accident? 
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A. Since the accident and since this suit l1as been insti-
tuted. 
Q. Since- the suit has becu -broughU 
A. Yes, sir. He told me when I started to get off-
Q. Since this snit was brought you were riding on the train 
up to Palmyra f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And what did you do¥ You were saying what you 
started to do. 
A. I got up and he told me, ''No, no; I will stop the train 
for you.'' Q: You got up and went towards the platform 1 
A. Started towards the platform. 
Q. Got down on the platform steps, did you? 
A. I don't remember whether I did or not, but I know I 
was on my feet-
Q. You started to g·et off before the train stopped, didn't 
you! 
A. No, I didn't, because wl1en I g·ot up the train was be-
tween the switch and the depot, down at the yard. 
Q. Mr. Butler, you hadn't received any medical treatment 
or hadn't sought any medical treatment in connection with 
your foot until a.fter you went to see Mr. Hannah, had you? 
A. I don't remember whether it was before or since. 
Q. In fact, you went to see Mr. Hanna]1 before 
page 50 ~ you went to see a doctor? 
A. I don't remember whether I did or didn't. 
It mig·ht have been shortly before or shortly after; I won't 
say. 
Q. You knew l\fr. Duke, the conductor? 
A. I've ·been knowing Mr. Duke for quite a while; lived 
right on the railroad track at Carysbrook six years. 
Q. In between May or June, 1939, and the time you brought 
suit did you ever mention to Mr. Duke that you had been 
hurt in getting off the train f. 
A. No, I had no occasion to mention it to Mr. Duke. He 
never said anything· to me a.bout it and he knew of it. 
Q. He knew you got off the train 1 
A. He knew he had a report of it. 
HE-DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
Bv Mr. Hannah: 
"Q. Do you know the number of that train that you were on? 
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A. It is 403 going north-403 one way and 404 the other. 
I think it is 403 going north and 404 going south. 
l\:Ir. Spicer: 402 is the number. 
By Mr. Hannah-: 
Q. It was the morning· train 7 
A. The morning train. 
Q. And this lrnppened in Fluvanna County! 
}Jage 51 } A. Yes, sir. 
RE-CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Spicer~ 
Q. What made up that train; engine and a number of 
freight cars-
A. I don't know the number of cars. 
Q. I don't mean the number, but tl1ere were a great many 
freight cars between the passenger eoacb and tl1e engine T 
A. A considerable number of them. 
Q. And the coach was on the rear? 
A. On the rear. 
Q. And the platform that you got off was on the rear of 
the coach? 
A. Yes, sir. 
By the -Court: 
Q. Mr. Butler, wlmt kind of day was it when this l1ap .. 
pened? 
A. I don't remember. It was no weather falling, as I ca,n 
remember; no weather falling that I can remember .. 
Q. And it happened in the morning? 
A. In the morning, on the morning· train. 
By Mr. Spicer~ 
Q. Do you remember whet1ier t1ie sun was shiningt 
A. I do not, but it was no weather falling, I am satisfied. 
Q. It was some time after eight o'clock? 
page 52 ~ A. Well, I don't think this train gets here until 
nine or half past, something- like that. 
·witness stood aside. 
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page 53 ~ DR. J. H. YEATMAN, 
a witness introduced in behalf of the plaintiff, be-
ing first duly sworn, testified as follows : 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Han:riah: 
Q. You are Dr. J. H. Yeatman? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And the C. & O. surgeon in the County of Fluvanna¥ 
A. Yes, sir. 
By :Mr. Spicer: 
Q. In private practice, too, I talre iU 
A. Yes, sir. 
Mr. Spicer: I think that should show. 
By Mr. Hannah: 
Q. Have you in the capacity of a private physician ex-
amined Mr. ,S. 0. Butler within the last twelve months Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What did you find bis condition to be generally and 
special1y? 
A. Well, the physical examination of Mr. Butler-I believe 
you just want the so-called defects. A man sixty-six years 
of age-
Q. I will ask you right there: you determined he 
page 54 ~ was sixty-six years of age. What was his physic.al 
condition other than the defects-wait a second-
what is his general physical condition for a man of his age 
as com.pared to other men sixty-six years of ageY 
A. I think you could class him as normal for a man sixty-
six years of age, practically normal. 
Q. Did you find a.ny defects? 
A. I did. I would like for you to make that question a 
litt1e more explicit, whether you mean all the defects I found 
or just pertaining to this. 
Q. Did you find any injuries to the body? 
A. I did. Q. What? 
!fr. Spicer: When did the doctor see him? 
Mr. Hannah: He said within the last twelve months. 
The -Court: Can't you be more specific? Ask Dr. Yeat-
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man when he examined him and what he found the matter 
with him. 
By Mr. Hannah: 
Q. When did you make this examination T 
A. October 25th, I think. 
By the Court: 
Q. What year? 
A. 1940. 
page 55 ~ By Mr. Spicer : 
Q. This year f 
A. Yes. 
By Mr. Hannah: 
Q. And at that time from your examination what injuries, 
if any, did you find? 
Mr. Spicer: I object to that form of question. Ask him 
what he found. 
Mr. Hannah: I asked him that to start out with. 
A. Well, as a general thing when a patient comes in you 
a~k him what he is complaining of and Mr. Butler told mo 
he had a foot injury some twelve months ago and upon ex-
amination of the foot I found it to be extremely tender espe-
cially around the joint that connects the foot with the large 
bones of the leg. The motion of the foot was limited and 
there was a depression in the back of the leg about 8 inches 
above the heel which I diagnosed as an old injury to a tendon. 
My impression was Mr. Butler was suffering from a severe 
tea.ring injury of the left foot. 
Q. You say a tearing injury? 
A. In the sense that possibly at the time of injury the 
ligaments and tendons were torn in what we commonly know 
as a severe sprain. 
Q. Now this injury would you call it a tem-
page 56 ~ porary or permanent thing from your examina-
tion? 
Mr. Spicer: I object to the form of question. 
The Court: Why not let the doctor explain to us what 
kind of injury he found there. Just go ahead and tell us in 
98 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
Dr . .1. H. Y eatnum. 
vour ow·n way what injuries you found there and what is 
;·our opi.nion from your examination and to the duration of 
it or probable duration. 
A. Well, it would be almost impossible to tell witho'!lt 
X-ray plates and I had no occasion to have any X-rays made 
as to whether he had a bone injury or not and the only thing 
you could possibly go by was the little siuk or depression 
back here in the back part of his leg; that was evidence of a 
torn tendon. At the encl of a year's time this tendon ap-
parently had not been repaired; very little, if anything, was 
done to it and it certainly was classed as more or less a 
permanent injury now in my opinion. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Spicer : 
Q. Doctor, you do not undertake to say how his leg or foot 
got in that condition, do you? 
A. No, sir. That is the first time I ever remember seeing 
the man. 
page 57 ~ Q. Then all you know about any injury is what 
Mr. Butler told you? 
A. Yes. sir. 
Q. And he told you about a certain part of it was tender 
wl1en pressure was applied to it? 
A. Yes. sir. 
Q. And you don't know what effect, if any, any treatment 
he might have had, if he got such an injury might have had 
at the time, do you? 
A. No, sir, I can't say that. 
Q. Or how that migllt have changed the results of what-
ever injury he goU 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Did you make any invc~tigation as to i\fr. Butler's ar-
teries? 
A. Well, we have one simple method and that is through 
an opthalmoscopc, look at the eye grounds and can see the 
arteries in the back of the eyes wl1ich shows some · evidence 
of hardening· of the arteries or arterio-sclerosis, but I did not 
class it as anything· unusual in a man sixty-six years of age. 
There a.re very f cw you do not find some a rterio-sclerosis in, 
n man of tlrnt age. · 
Q. That is the only time you have examined Mr. Butler? 
A. Yes, sir. 
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})a.ge 58 } RE-DIRECT EX.A.MINA'fION. 
By Mr. Hannah: 
Q. ;From your examination of this man what percentage, 
if any, of disability would you say existed at the present 
timeY 
.A.. Well, Mr. Hannah, the only way I could make a state-
ment there would be in connection with the man's occupa-
tion. .A. man that worked in an office and probably sat down 
all the time, you wouldn't class it as any percentage; if he 
has to do a lot of walking·, why I would say that is a·bout a 
25 % disa.bili ty. 
Q. Now your answer in response to a question by Mr. 
Spicer that you found evidence of arterio-sclerosis, as a mat-
ter of fact arterio-sclerosis begins when a person is young 
practically and gets worse as they get older in every normal 
human; isn't that true-certainly most of them? 
A. Well, you could safely say· as you get older you have 
more of it. 
Q. But you classed llim as a normal person for a man of 
l1is age? 
A. Yes, sir, I do. 
RE-CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Spicer: 
Q. Doesn't arterio-sclerosis mean an impair-
}Jage 59 } ment and a hardening of the arteries and impair-
ment of the circulation? 
A. Well, if you have a severe enough case it certainly im-
pairs your circulation; has a tendency to run your blood· pres-
sure up, yes, sir. 
Q. Would that affect the circulation in your feet, the 
farthest part of your body from your heart? 
A. I can't answer that; I don't know. 
Q. Did Mr. Butler tell you anything about having· a gun-
shot wound several years ago? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. An injury received while hunting? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. If the arterio-sclerosis did eause an impairment of the 
circulation of the blood in the feet, would that cause tender-
ness in the feet and pain f 
A. I don't think so. Not in my experience. 
Witness stood aside. 
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page 60 ~ C. L. TOMLINSON, 
a witness introf].ucf.id in behalf of the plaintiff, be-
ing first duly sworn, testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Hannah: 
Q. You are Mr. C. L. Tomlinson 1 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. \Vhere do you live? 
A. Five miles below Wilmington, down on the Rivanna 
River. 
Q. Do you know :M:r. S. 0. Butler? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How close does he live to you¥ 
A. I suppose about a mile and a quarter, a mile up the 
channel and he lives close around a mile from there. 
Q. You are close neig·hbors then T 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you see him in the month of June, 1939; this June 
a year ago? 
A. I don't know. I can't recall whether I saw him or not. 
Sometimes I don't see him for two or three months, then 
again maybe I see him every day or so. 
Q. Well, during that period around about ,June or July or 
Aug·ust somewhere along there do you recall see-
pag·e 61 ~ ing him at all? 
A. Yes, sir; it was the last week in ,July, I can't 
recall exactly, never expected to think anything more about 
it. He was helping me save hay and it was either the last 
week in July or the first week in Aug11st, I couldn't say 
which. 
Q. v\Tlrnt was llis condition at that time, Mr. Tomlinson? 
.A. Well, I been living- by Mr. Butler there in that distance 
off and on for thirty-two or three years and he was helping· 
me save hay, he and his son and son-in-law and his son and 
son-in-law had gone to the hay house with a load of hay 
and I was g-Ieaning- up hay and he was shocking· hay and the 
:first I 110ticed of it he was hopping· from one shock to the other 
and I said, "vVhat are you hopping· about?" and be told me---
Mr. Spicer: I object to what he stated. 
The Court: You can't state what he said, but can say 
what he did. · 
Mr. Hannah: I am inclined to think the time element here 
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amounts to something. You can't call it a self-serving· decla-
ration. If any question was asked as to his condition what 
he stated as to his condition at that time as to the cause of bis 
condition I think that is proper. 
page 62 ~ Mr. Spicer: This discussion is entirely im-
proper before the jury. 
The Court: He may state what he saw; that is all. 
The Witness: Well, I didn't see anyt]1ing. All I kno,v 
is what I asked him and what he told me. 
Mr. Spicer: I object to all that. 
By Mr. Hannah: 
Q. You just stated he was hopping around 1 
A. That is true. 
Q. On the last occasion you J1ad seen him previous to that 
was he hopping around? 
A. No, sir; never saw him hopping before in my life. 
Q. Now since that time have you seen him on any number 
of occasions or few occasions or anything of that sort since 
this July that you were speaking of in 1939! 
A. I have seen him several times. 
Q. Well, what did you notice, if anything as to his actions 
on these other occasions Y 
A. Well, he was hopping still. 
I; 
Witness stood aside. 
page 63 ~ S. A. CAR,L]SLE, 
a witness introduced in behalf of the plaintiff, be-
ing first duly sworn, testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Hannah : 
Q. What is your full name f 
A. Samuel Anderson Carlisle. 
Q. Where do you live? 
A. Cohasset. 
Q. Where do you work? 
A. I work in Alexandria. 
Q. Do you on occasions ride the Virginia Air Line train? 
A. Yes, sir, sometimes. 
Q. Frequently f 
A. Yes, sir. 
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Q. I call your attention to June 10, 1939. ·were you a 
passenger on the train from Carysbrook to Palmyra on that 
date? 
A. ·wen, I don't just remember it was that date or not, 
but it was around that time. 
Q. Around that time. Who else on this occasion you refer 
to was on this train as a passenger Y 
page 64 ~ A. 1\fr. Butler and some other fellow. I didn't 
know him; traveling- man of some kind, had a little 
hag. 
Q. Some traveling man? 
A. Yes, sir; had looked like a sample case of some kind. 
Q. What, if anything, unusual happened on that occasion, 
Mr. Car lisle? 
A. Well, we was coming in there just before getting to 
Palmyra the conductor asked us if ,ve would get off while 
it was moving and I told l1im I could. 
Q. I didn't hear t.ha t. 
A. He asked us if we would get off the train moving with 
a heavy load and I told him I could. 
Q. Who asked you that? 
A. Mr. Duke. I think it was Mr. Duke; I never did lmow 
his name, but that is the man right there (indicating). 
Q. What reason did he g·ive for asking you get off while 
the train was moving? 
A. It was heavily loaded. 
Q. You were a pa.ssenged 
A. Yes, sir. I got on at Fork Union Station. 
Q. Well, did you get off? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did anyone else p;et off at that point? 
A. Yes, sir, another fellow got off with me and lVIr. Butler; 
he got off right above the overhead bridge, not 
page 65 ~ far a.hove it; I couldn't remember the number of 
feet or yards. 
Q. Just tell the jury what happened· from the time that 
l\f r. Duke, as you say, requested you to leave the train w11ile 
it was moving at Palmyra? · 
A. Well, we got off right there in front of the station-
Q. ·wbo is ''we''? 
A. M:e and the other f el1ow, I don't know who he was, and 
Mr. Butler got off above the station, above the railroad bridge 
across the highway. and I seen him sit down on the side of 
the hank and ]1e was' also sitting on the side of the bank when 
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I went back. I went back through the :station out to the tie 
yard and caug·ht a truck home. ·what happened after that 
I don't know. 
Q. When you left the station the first time where did you 
go? 
A. I come to your office. 
Q. How long did you stay in town? 
A. Oh, a very few minutes. 
Q. Now you say wl1en you went hack you went back that 
,vay? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. By the depot f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And you saw Mr. Butler at that, time? 
A. Yes, sir; he was still sitting on the bank. I couldn't 
say how far up he was. 
page 66 } Q. ·when you speak of up you mean north of 
the station! 
A. Yes, sir, north of the station. I didn't see him any-
more for-I don't know; several months, and I seen him 
hopping around and asked him what was the matter with 
Mm--
Mr. Leake: Don't say what he said. 
Bv Mr. Hannah: 
~Q. Had you known Mr. Butler before thnt timef 
A. Yes, Rir. 
Q. Did you see him any time after that on that day1 
A. .After that day f 
Q. No, on the same day. 
A. No, sir, no more than seeing him sitting· 011 the bank. 
Q. Where did you g-o from Palmyra.! 
.A. I went back to Fork Union or Cohasset, whatever you 
want to call it. 
Q. Well, did you stop at Carysbrook that day? 
A. No,. sir, not going· back; I dicln 't go that way. 
Q. Now just as you and the otllel' p;entleman, who you say 
you don't know bis name, made preparations to alight from 
the railway coacl1 or car was t1rnre any other statement made 
hv Mr. Dukef 
~· A. Well, I didn't hear it if it was, no more fllan he asked 
us if we could g·et off the train going. 
Q. Who started to get off the train at Palmyra :firsU 
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A. Mr. Butler. 
page 67 ~ . Q. lVIr. Butler started? 
A. He wa.s in front and he backed up and I wa~ 
the first 01ie ·that hit the ground. 
Q. You· say you are the first one that hit the ground. Do 
vou mean vour feet or bodv Y 
·· A. On n~y feet. ., 
Q. Still on your feet f 
A. Yes, sir, and went a few steps. 
Q. Had the train slowed down materially from what speed 
it had been making? 
A. Yes, sir, the train was slowed up considerably. 
Q. About where did the train begin to slow up, Mr. Car-
lisle? 
A. Well, it commenced to slow up when it come along to 
the end of the switch; I imagine along about there, I don't 
know how far. 
Q. That is the switch below the station f 
A. Yes, sir, below the station. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By lVIr. Spicer : 
Q. You mean in the direction :from which you came f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Mr. Carlisle, didn't Mr. Duke tell the passengers that 
there was a heavy tonnag·e train and he wouldn't be able to 
stop the coach at the platform 1 
page 68 ~ A. If he said that, I didn't hear him. He said 
he was heavily loaded and if he stopped he couldn't 
start off. 
Q. Wasn't his statement if he made any statement like that 
at all to the effect that he couldn't stop at the platform or 
couldn't get the coach stopped at the platform on account 
of the grade and the curve there and the Ion~; heavy tonnage 
train? 
A. That might be what he meant, I wouldn't say it wasn't, 
but that wasn't the way I understood it. 
Q. Anyway, you got off at the platform f 
A. I g·ot off on the platform. 
Q. And you don't know what might have heen said after 
thaH 
A. No, sir. ·what he said to Mr. Butler after I got off I 
couldn't say. 
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Q. ·while you were on there did Mr. Butler make any re-
quest that he stop the train? 
A. If he did, I didn't hear it. 
Q. The train was g·oing very slowly as it passed the plat-
form? 
A. It wasn't making no fast speed, but still it was going. 
Q. You didn't see the conductor restrain Mr. Butler and 
tell him to wait until the train slowed up and let him off 
further up? 
A. Yes, sir; with him' to be the last one to get off that thf~ 
train would be going slower. 
Q. The train was slowing up all the time? 
page 69 ~ A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Now you didn't have any conversation with 
Mr. Butler after you got off the train, did you Y 
A. No. sir. 
Q. Mr. Butler didn't say anything about being hurt? 
A. No, sir. Tl1at is the only place I seen him; he was sit-
ting on the bank. 
Q. How close were you to him when you saw him Y 
A. Well, I wouldn't like to say; something like a hundred 
yards; may'be a little closer, maybe a little farther. 
Q. You didn't actually see him get off? 
A. I seen him when ]1e stepped off in making a few steps 
and instead of keeping· walking he sat down on the bank; 
either sat down or leaned over on it, I wouldn't like to say 
because I don't know. 
Q. What was the state of the weather that day, do you re-
member? 
A. I really couldn't tell you whether it was clear, raining· 
or snowing. · 
Q. It was in the late spring· or early summer, wasn't it t 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And it was good and lig·ht f 
A. It was around the 1st of June; T dis remember the date. 
Q. Well, it wasn't dark? 
A. No, sir. 
page 70 ~ Q. It was around nine o'clock in the morning·, 
between nine and ten f 
A. I think around nine-thirty wl1en we got over here. 
Witness stood aside. 
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page 71 ~ MRS. MINNIID BUTLER, 
. a. witness introduced in behalf of the plaintiff, be-
ing first duly sworn, testified as follows : 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Hannal1: 
·Q. lvfrs. Butler, you, I believe, are the wife of S. 0. Butled 
A. I am. 
Q. How long have you been married approximately? 
A. A pretty good while, but I disremember. 
Q. A lifetime almost? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You and Mr. Butler live together somewhere down in 
the eastern part of the county or southeastern part 1 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. On the 10th day of June, 1939', do you know whether 
anything out of the ordinary happened? 
A. My h~sband he come up here on the train to get this 
freight stuff and jumped off, he said, and hurt-sprained at 
least, we thought that foot. · 
Q. Why do you think it was on the 10th day of June that 
:Mr. Butler came to Palmvra ! 
A. Well, I had that marked up, you see, on the 
page 72 } calendar on account of some business I had to see 
after that day and that is why I know it was and 
also he give me this bill ·when be come in. 
Q. Is this the one you speak of? 
A. Yes, sir, tl1is is the one. 
Q. He gave you that when he came in 1 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Why did he ~;ive it to you¥ 
A. Well, you see, I always take care of his papers and 
everything- like that. 
Q. Do you know of your own knowledge whether your hus-
band brought anything back from Palmyra that date besides 
that paper? 
A. Yes, sir, he brought some disks where was shipped up 
here to the depot and brought his g-as back. 
Q. The gas and the disks that were shipped to the depot? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. I hand you a ticket of W. C. Baker & Co., that name 
on it. Is that the slip that he brought back with him that 
day and g-ave to you? 
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A. Yes, sir, that is the one. 
Q. Now, Mrs. Butler, you are positive then that it was 
on this 10th day of June of last year that this occurred? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Wbat l1as been 1\fr. Butler's condition since 
page 7B } the loth day of ,June or what was his condition on 
the 10th dav of June when he reached homeY 
A. Well, he come back with his foot all swollen up in his 
ankle when he got home. 
Q. What has peen his condition since that time? 
A. Well, he has been complaining of that foot ever since. 
Q. Do you know whether or not he has been doing any-
thing for it and giving medical attention to it f 
A. Yes, sir. He clone most of it when it was treated .as 
a sprain, 'but that dicln 't do no good that we know of. 
Q. Did you help him do something for it 1 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How did you treat it t 
A. Well. we used hot wa.ter and liniments and different 
kinds of thing·s.· 
Q. Hot water, you say, and 1inimentf 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Do you know whether or not he suffers with that or 
g'ives indication of suffering with his foot at the present 
time? 
A. Yes, sir, he says be do. 
Q. Is he still doing something; for it every now and then? 
A. Yes, sir, he still works on it. ·when it gives him most 
trouble he has to do something·. · 
Q. When he walks on it, does he suffer with iU 
pag.e 74} A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Do yon know wl1ether or not he bas been able 
since this injury to do the work tlrnt he had done before the 
injuryf 
A. No, sir, he has not been able to do the work be bas since 
before that at all. 
Q. How did he come 110me on tl1a t day? Did he have anr 
conveyancef 
A. Yes, sir, the boys went to Carysbrook and they carried 
t.he wagon over there to meet him and he ,vas coming back 
across the river and let the boys come home but after he 
got there and found out about his foot it was badly hurt he 
didn't want to come back across the river and the boys come 
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across the river and he hroug·ht the wagon and the gas and 
disks. 
Witness stood aside. 
page 75 ~ W. C. BAKER, 
a witness introduced in behalf of the plaintiff, be-
ing first duly sworn, testified as follows : 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Hannah: 
Q. You are Mr. W. C. Baker of Carys brook Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. A merchantf 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. I hand you what we have been calling a ticket with the 
name of vV. C. 1Baker & Co., dealers in general merchandise, 
Carysbrook, Virginia, on it and will ask if you can identify 
that as coming from your place of businessf 
A. Yes, sir, that is rig·ht; it came from my place of busi-
ness. 
Q. Is that your handwriting¥ 
A. :My handwriting. 
Q. What does that showf 
A. 30 gallons of gas at 20c., $6.00, S. 0. Butler. 
Q. That means Mr. Butler bought on that day that much 
gasY 
A. That is right. 
Q. Do you have any independent recollection of 
page 76 ~ his buying that gas t 
A. No, sir, I do not. I don't keep those things 
in my mind; I for get it. 
Witness stood aside. 
page 77 ~ W. R. MELTON, 
a witness introduced in behalf of the plaintiff, be-
ing first duly sworn, testified as follows : 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Hannah: 
Q. You are Mr. V{. R. Melt.on Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
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Q. "\¥here do you live? 
A. I live down near ·Wilmington. 
Q. How close do you live to Mr. S. 0. Butler! 
A. Oh, I Jive in about-no ways from his place; three or 
four hundred yards, something like that. 
Q. Do you see him frequently? 
A. Yes, pretty near every day or so. 
Q. Calling your attention to the elate of June 10, 1939,-
J une of last year or a.round about that time, do you remem-
ber seeing him about that date last yearV 
A. Well, I can't really say that I did right on that day, 
I don't remember. I remember his bringing those disks and 
things there; I remember that. 
Q. You remember his bring·ing the disks 1 
A. Yes, sir, and the gas, too. 
page 78 ~ Q. And the gas 1 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Mr. Butler, I believe, lives on Mrs. Kent's place? 
A. Mrs. Parrish's place. 
Q. And you live on the adjoining place? 
A. Yes, sir. Mrs. Kent's. 
Q. And you do remember his bringing the disks and some 
g·as home? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. If you saw him that day, what was his condition, Mr. 
Melton? 
A. Well, I don't think-don't remember seeing- him that 
day. If I did, I don't remember it. 
Q. How soon after that did you see him Y 
A. Well, possibly I might have seen him that day; I don't 
know, but I don't think so; don't think I saw him that day. 
I see him pretty nearly every day. 
Q. Well, after that day or the next time you saw him, 
whether that day or the following day or a week, whateve1· 
it was, what was his condition when you did see him? 
.A. "r ell, he complained of his foot troubling him. 
Mr. Spicer: I object to that. 
The Court: He can't state wl1at Mr. Butler said, but can 
testify as to his condition. 
page 79 ~ By Mr. Hannah: 
Q. Did you see anything unusual about him 1 
A. Well, be was kind of limping. 
110 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
Q. Limping? 
A. Yes, sir. 
N. T. Breeden. 
Q. Had he before that time limped? 
A. No, sir, not that I know of. 
Q. Since that time and up to the present time what has 
been bis condition along· tlmt line, shall we say? 
A. Well, the last time I saw him he tells me about his foot 
hurting him. 
Mr. Spicer: I object to that. 
The ·Court: You can't state what be said. 
By Mr. Hannah: 
Q. You can't tell what he said, but you can tell what his 
condition was f 
A. Well, he has been limping every time I have seen him 
since then. 
Q. Have you ever seen that foot since the 10th of ,Tune? 
.A.. Yes, sir, I have seen it. 
Q. About when did you see it f 
A. Why, I reckon it was along about the last of J"une or 
first of ,July. 
Q. Of last year f 
A. Yes, sir. 
page 80 ~ Q. vVhat was the condition of the foot at that 
time? 
A. Well, it seemed. to he rjght much swollen and red. 
vVitness stood aside. 
pago 81 ~ N. T. BREEDEN, 
a witness introduced in behalf of the plaintiff, be-
ing· first duly _sworn, testified as follows : 
DIRIDCT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Hannah: 
· Q. Your name is Mr. N. T. Breeden? 
A. Yes. 
Q. \¥here do you live i 
A. Down there at-thev call it Hell's Bend. 
Q. How far is that fro"in Mr. S. 0. Butler's or Mrs. Par~ 
rish 's place f · 
A. Where I live is the adjoining· place. 
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Q. ·who lives on Mrs. Parrish's property? 
A. Mr. Butler. 
Q. Mr. S. 0. Butler? 
.A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Do you see him frequently? 
A. Yes, sir, see _him most every day; every week, anyway; 
sometimes two or tliree times a week. 
Q. Around about June 10th of last year; that is, 1939, or 
tl1ereafter did you see him at any time, do you suppose? 
A. Yes, I remember going up on the low grounds where he 
was cultivating corn and stopped aud talked with him. 
Q. Now the ·Court Ims ruled that you cannot 
JJag·e 82 ~ testify to what he told you, but only to the condi-
tion that you saw. Now· go ahead. 
A. Well, he was kind of complaining· about his ankle or 
something of the kind and I asked him-
:Mr. Spicer: I object. 
A. ( continued) I asked him what was the trouble and he 
said he stepped off the train-
The Court : You can't state tha.t. 
Mr. Hannah: You can't testifv what he said. 
The Court: Just tell the condition vou found Mr. Butler 
in, not what he said to you, but what you saw as to his con-
dition. 
A. ( coufinued) Well, he seemed to be-something wrong 
"·ith ·hi~ ankle and he took his.shoe off and showed me it was 
swollen up. 
Q. Did you see it wai.;; swollen! 
.A. Sure, I did. 
Q. And that was, you say, sometime in .June of 19391 
A. Something· along like that; I can't call the date. 
Q. Have you seen Mm frequently since the time? 
.A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What has been hls condition since that time t 
A. Well, he seemed to be kind of limping- on that foot or 
leg, whichever you call it. 
Q. Since that time'f 
page 83 ~ A. Yes. 
Q. Is he now, yesterday or today or any other 
time limping on that foot? 
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A. Well, I haven't noticed him today because he was in 
the car when I come over here with him; I don't know whether 
he was limping or not. 
Q. On each occasion you have seen him since that time 
::;tate whether or not he was limping! 
A. Sure; he was kind of flinching on that foot. 
·witness stood aside. 
Mr. Hannah: The plaintiff rests. 
Mr. Leake: We want to take up a motion and in fairness 
to both sides the jury better be sent out. 
Note : The jury retired from the courtroom. 
Mr. Spicer: We make a motion to strike this evidence 
upon the ground that it shows on its face that the plaintiff 
had full knowledge of the surrounding conditions, that he 
voluntarily agreed to get off the train while it was moving 
upon his own statement without objection, that it was in the 
daytime, that so far as the evidence shows, there were no 
weather conditions that interfered with his observing the 
conditions, that he was generally familiar with 
page 84 ~ the locality, that he looked down at the ground 
and, seeing it, it looked as he said tolerable smooth 
and he considered that he could get off with perfect safety 
and that he had every right to believe ''I could get off safely; 
the train was going at a very slow rate of speed". Now, we 
submit under those statements it shows it was his own act 
in getting off, even his own testimony, and assuming every-
thing to be true that he said, it was a voluntary act on hjs 
part, that he undertook to assume any risk attached to it.. 
The evidence shows it was slowing up all the time and he saw 
everything and was conscious of every physical thing con-
nected with it, as much as Mr. Duke or anybody else could 
have been, and that he made no request for a stop and that 
he was a man riding on trains before, a man of mature age, 
was fully conscious of the effect of stepping off of a moving 
train and under all those circumstances we say if there was 
any negligence on the part of the defendant, that if Mr. Duke 
did ask the gentlemen in the coach to get off before the train 
stopped or g·et off without the train stopping· on account of 
the heavy tonnage of the train, that that is not what is in-
volved in this case at all because they very readily agreed to 
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do it; Mr. Butler very readily agreed to get off and it be-
comes from that point on a voluntary act on his part. He had 
a perfect right to refuse to get off under those cir-
pag·e 85 ~ cumstances had a perfect right to ride on to the 
next station, if necessary, and recover for any 
damage or inconvenience he mig·ht have been put to, but when 
it becomes his own act of g·etting· off that it comes within the 
rule of the case of Wills v. C. (~ 0., where a man got on the 
train going in the wrong direction at Gordonsville, Virginia; 
when he wanted to go east he got on the train going west and 
he got off of that train. Now, !fr. Butler is not a small child;· 
Mr. Butler is a man of mature responsibility and feelings and 
able to judge physical conditions just as well as anybody else 
could do so and on his statement there is no wav in which 
any neglig·ence on the part of the defendant, if it was any 
negligence to ask him to get off while the train was moving, 
could have caused or proximately caused the act because of 
the voluntary act of a responsible party without intervention 
before he did get off or before he did touch the ground, so 
to speak, and there is no effort on his part to show that the 
conductor forced him off or required him to get off; the evi-
dence is entirely to the contrary and his conduct on that and 
his frank statement of what happened places the responsi-
bility directly upon him and, therefore, even assuming the 
correctness of his statement of what the conductor told him 
that wasn't the cause of any damage per se, that there was 
the voluntary act of a responsible party; he got off 
page 86 ~ apparently a.t the moment when he thought him-
self he could get off. in perfect safety and he does 
not even claim the conductor told him to get off at that par.-
ticular point or spot. It wasn't anything there that could 
be attributed to the conductor and even if he savs and it is 
true that the conductor knew he was g·oing to get off there, 
that does not change the character of the situation because. 
the door there was open and he was on the step and coulcl 
see where he was getting off at and there was no obstruction, 
no post or switch or anything of that kind that was in hi8 
way that prevented him from seeing where he was g·etting 
off. 
Under those circumstances we submit there is no negli-
gence on which to base a rec?very here, that bis evidence goes 
forward and shows affirmatively that the proximate ca.use of 
it was his own act in getting off the train under the circum-
stances and, therefore, the evidence should be stricken out. 
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The Court: In other words, the sole ground for your mo-
tion to strike is that this was a voluntary act on this occasion 
on the part of this plaintiff for which he assumed the risk. 
Mr. Spicer: Yes, the responsibility. 
The Court: I will def er passing on your motion until the 
evidence is all in. \Vhen the evidence is all in I 
page 87 ~ will pass on the motion . 
.Mr. Spicer: We note an exception. 
Mr. Hannah: I overlooked the proof of the doctor's bill. 
Is there any objection to introducing that nowt 
Mr. Spicer: No objection to that. 
Mr. Hannah: I want to recall l\fr. Butler to prove the ex-
penses. 
Note: The jury returned into the courtroom. 
page 88 ~ S. O. BUTLER, 
the plaintiff, being· recalled to the witness stand, 
testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Hannah: 
Q. Mr. Butler, I failed to ask you this morning· whether or 
not you had incurred any medical expense in the treatment 
of this foot or for examination or anything of that charac-
ter¥ 
A. I don't know what the expenses are going to be. You 
see, I went to the hospital and had this foot X-ra.yed. Pos-
sibly Dr. Whitley could tell you more about it than I could. 
I don't know what the charges are and I don't know what 
they are going to charge up at the hospital. He has got the 
report from the hospital and I reckon he has the facts. I 
don't know that at all, but I guess he does. 
Q. Did you purchase any medicine or anything of that sort"? 
A. The only medicine I purchased was only of a very low 
cost, nothing· but some liniment and iodex, paid 50c for the 
iodex and 50c a bottle for the liniment; I don't know ex-
actly. 
pag·e 89 ~ Q. Can you form some estimate of the approxi-
mate amount of your reasonable debts incurred hv 
reason of this injury! · 
A. Well, I couldn't say. That is hard for me to say be-
cause I haven't had any bills concerning it and that would 
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be rather hard for me to answer that question as I should. 
If I had had the bil1s, I could answer it right off. 
Q. Dr. Yeatman examined you, didn't he? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And Dr. Whitleyf 
A. Yes. 
Q. And some doctor in Charlottesville 'f 
A. Some doctor in Charlottesville, but I can't recall his 
name. He is in the X-ray room. 
Q. Have you had any drug bills? 
A. No; only those liniments and this iodex I told you about. 
Q. .And you can't give any idea about what your expenses 
have been? 
A.. No, I can't. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Spicer: 
Q. When was your foot X-ra.yed at the hospital? 
A. ·wen, I don't know whether it was June or July; I 
don't remember. You ask Dr. Whitley; he will tell you. 
Q. Last year, you mean, or this year? 
page 90 } A. I don't know whether last year or this year. 
He can tell you ; he has all the reports and every-
thing; he can tell you about it. 
Q. They haven't sent you a bill for it, have they 1 
A. No, they haven't sent me any bill. 
Q. You say you went to see Dr. Whitley, too 1 
A. Yes, sir; Dr. Whitley examined the foot. 
Witness stood aside. 
i\Ir. Hannah: The plaintiff rests. 
Note: At this point the Court recessed until 2 o'clock P. l\t 
at which time the trial was resumed. 
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page 91 ~ R. W. TALLEY, 
a witness introduced in behalf of the defendant, 
being first duly sworn, testified as follows ~ 
DIRECT E:XAMINATION. 
By Mr. Spicer! 
. Q. Mr. Talley, what is your business 1 
A. Clerk for Mr. Baker in the store and railroad station. 
Q. Clerk for Mr. Baker? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. :Mr. Vv. C. Baker! 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Where? 
A. Carysbrook. 
Q. Does ::M:r. Baker act as agent for the C. & 0. railroad at 
Carvsbrook·f 
A.. He is the agent, but I work it for him. 
Q. Do you keep records of the tickets that are sold passen-
gers riding on trains out of CarysbrookY 
A. Yes, sir, I keep a record of the date they are sold and 
enter it on the cash book. 
Q. Now did you hold that position in the year 1939? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you have any ticket sold from Carys brook 
page 92 ~ to Palmyra. on June 10, 1939? Will you look at 
the records and see Y You hold in your hand the 
cash book you referred to! 
A.. Yes, sir. (examines book) No, sir, not any for June 
10th. 
Q. Was any ticket sold from Carysbrook anywhere on that 
day? 
A.. No, sir, not any on that day. 
By the Court: 
Q. This is June 10, 1939, you are speaking abouU 
A. Yes, sir. 
By Mr. Spicer: 
Q. What is the nearest date since June 10, 1939, on which 
you sold a ticket from Carysbrook to Palmyra Y 
A. October 24, 1939. 
The Court: If I understand you, you asked him what was 
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the next date after June 10, 1939, that a ticket was sold from 
that point to Palmyra? 
Mr. Spicer: Yes, sir. 
By the Court: 
Q . .And your answer is October 24, 19397 
A. Yes, sir. 
By Mr. Spicer: 
Q. Now prior to June 10, 1939, what was the nearest d~te 
on which there was a ticket sold from Carysbrook to Pal-
myra? 
A. One sold on May 20, 1939. 
page 93 ~ Q. And there were none sold between May 20, 
1939, and October 24, 1939? 
A. No, sir, I don't have any record of it. 
Q. Well, you keep~ rooord of them, don~t you 1 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Have you g·ot the stubs of the tickets sold 1 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Do the ticket stubs correspond with the inf orma.tion you 
have just g·iven, that there were no tickets sold in that period 
from Carysbrook to Palmyra t 
A. Yes, sir, not any between those two. 
I 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Hannah 2 
Q. May I see those stubs? 
A. Do you want them all? 
Q. Ye~. Now where is the book these come out oft 
A. ThQy a.re torn out of a printed form of tickets. 
Q. How many tickets are in that printed form f 
A. I think it is a hundred in a book; I am not positive. I 
think they are put up a hund·red. in a book. 
Q, Now why should you tear these tickets out of that book'1 
A. I tear them out at tl1e end of the month. 
Q. Tear them out and keep them f 
A. Yes, sh, keep those stubs. 
page 94 ~ Q. You are authorized to tear these stubs out of 
the book given you by the railway company at the 
expir&tfon of ~ach month; do I understand you to say that 1 
A. Yes, sir, that is when I take them out; at the end of enoh 
month. 
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Q. What do you do with them 1 
A. Put them away for filing. 
Q. When did you write these dates that you have on the 
hack of them? 
A. That is the date of sale when the ticket is sold. · 
Q. Did you ever fail to write a date on one 1 
A. I don't recall that I have. 
Q. Never been in a hurry selling a ticket, have you f 
A. Well, I take time to check up after the train is gone. 
Q. You are reasonably certain you always check up imme-
diately? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Now, Mr. Butler has traveled on that train quite fre-
quently, hasn't he! 
A. Well, I don't keep a record of who I sell them to. 
Q. I didn't ask you that; I asked you if Mr. Butler had 
not been on that train quite frequentlyt 
A. He has been a passenger sometimes, yes, sir. 
Q. Hasn't he, as a matter of fact, been a passenger ou a 
number of times f 
A. Well, hack that fa.r it is hard for me to re-
page 95 ~ member who bought those tickets. 
Q. You can't pick out an individual ticket here 
that you can say whether :M:r. Butler bought it or whether 
somebody ~lse bought it, can you? 
A. Well, I wouldn't like to say back that distance that I 
recall that length of time. 
Q. You don't sell but a very few tickets to Palmyra or other 
places; isn't that true? 
A. Yes, sir, very few sold. 
Q. I notice some of these tickets are stamped Carysbrook 
on the back of them and some of them are not-most all of 
them. 
A. Are you certain about that? 
Q. The only stamp I see. on these tickets giving the date 
is the one on ,June 5, 1939. Don't you have some regular 
stamp and process to determine the date that you sell these 
tickets f 
A. Well, I either stamp it or I can write it on ther<::. 
Q. Aren't you supposed to stamp it on there with a stamp 
carrying the date? 
A. I think stubs call for a station stamp on the back, but 
don't say for the date to be stamped. 
Q. It is no date on the front? 
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A. I can put the date on there with pencil or pen and ink. 
Q. Any time you want toY 
page 96 } A. Put it on at the time it is sold. 
Q. You could do it at other times¥ 
A. Yes, only I put it on at the time it is sold. 
Q. Now you keep the book as I understand it in which these 
tickets are a part of-the whole ticket; that stays with you 
indefinitely 1 
A. "\Ve keep them until the tickets are sold up. 
Q. Then what do you do with the book1 
A. It is nothing to it then but just a piece of cardboard. 
Q. Don't you have tickets on the Virginia Air Lines, two 
separate pieces of cardboard; that is, a small cardboard ticket 
to Palmyra and for Troy, Zion, Fork Union or Cohasset? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. You never had those? 
A. It has been a long time since I had any. 
Q. You don't know how long a time? 
.A. Possibly had them seven or eight years ago. 
Q. They don't furnish those any more? 
A. You have to sell a certain number before thev will fur~ 
nish you with that kind of ticket. ·· 
Q. Have you ever thought that it was any specific date like 
the 28th or 29th, when it might have been the 30th! In other 
words, have you ever made a mistake as to a date f 
}lage 97 } A. Well, I don't know about that. 
Q. You couldn't answer that, could you t 
A. The thing I have here is the record, the date I entered 
them for sale. That is the date I am going by, the date they 
were sold. · 
Q. I am asking you now couldn't you have made a mistake 
as to a date? Couldn't you have thought the 29th was tl1e 
~loth or the 3oth was tl1e 29th or something· of that sort 1 
A. Well, I don't know. It is po~sible any of us can miss 
a date occasionally, but I don't think I missed any there tl1e 
way I kept the record. 
Q. You were using· a regular railroad company record there, 
were you not? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. May I see that t 
Note : Book banded to counsel. 
Q. Freight l'eceived hel'e has nothing- to do with these tick-
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ets, has it-collections for freight received and freight for-
warded! · 
A. No.-
Q. W.hat is the fare from Carysbrook to Palmyra T 
A. 10c. 
Q. You handle the freig•ht encl of the matter a.s well, do 
you 0l 
A. Yes, sir. 
page 98 ~ Q. By the way,. this mixed train tha;t comes up-
402 is a mixed freiglht and passenger tr.nin, isn't 
iU 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Have you any help there to take care of the freight end 
of it that comes in y 
A. I am the only one there, the only one working in the sta-
tion. 
Q. I notice in your book here that you have an item here 
on one sheet; for instance, May 22nd to 31st. Is t)lat the re-
port you made on that sheet from May 22nd to J\fay 31st T 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you have one ticket to Palmyra there on that sheet 
-one 10c ticket. Does that show you where it comes from 
or goes to~what is that word there? 
A. That is ~ 'p-revious n_,broug·ht forward f1~om the pr!evi-
ous sheet, total brought forward. 
Q. That is June 11th to 17th. Let's g'ot these things in 
sequence so we will know wlu1,t we are doing. The older ones 
are on top, aren ?t they? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. This shows the proceeds from July 1st to 7th, 1939¥ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. W"lrnt is this adjoining sheet! 
A. That is for June 21-80. 
pag·e 99 ~ Q. Now what is this one t 
A. That is the 14th to 21st of June. 
Q. Now the one adjoining it is June 21 to 30f 
A. Yes, sir, and this is the 14th to the 21st. 
Q. And this is July 1st to 7th. It looks like you jumped 
over July 7th to June 21st; I can't understand that. 
A. The 30th is the last of June, isn't it Y 
Q. You kept a report all through did you not f 
A. The 30th was the last day of June and then begins the 
month of July. 
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Q. June 21st to 30th and July 1st to 7th, and this is June 
14th to 21st Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You have to look at some of the others to get them in 
orderf 
A. I can give them to you. 
Q. Now this sheet here is not locked or anything of that 
sort, is it? 
A. No, that is the method we have of filing those old records. 
Q. So the last ticket sold before that time was May 20, 1939, 
and your :fi.rst ticket sold after that time was what after June 
10th? 
Mr. Spicer: The first ticket to Palmyra Y 
Mr. Hannah: Yes. 
A. You mean after what date! 
Q. We are speaking of June 10th. You made 
page 100 ~ the statement that on October 24, 1939, a ticket 
was sold and between that date, I believe, and 
June 20, 1939, there were no sales. Am I right on that? 
.A.. Between October and what date T 
Q. And June-1\ifay 20th. 
A. One ticket sold on May 20th. 
Q. To what point! 
A. Palmyra. 
By Mr. Hannah: 
Q. And one sold in October; is that righU 
.A. Not any more sold to Palmyra until in October. 
By the Court: 
Q. October what date? 
A. Judge, I would like to make a correction on that. I gave 
the 24th and it should have been tlie 25th. 
Q. Should have been the 25th? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. 25th of Octo her? 
.A. Yes, sir. 
By Mr. Hannah: 
Q. How about May 23rd; any ticket sold then 1 
A. May 23rd? 
Q. Yes. 
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A. No, sir, no ticket sold on May 23rd. 
Q. Anything along there about May 21st or 
page 101 ~ 22nd t 
A. One sold on l\iay 2oth. 
Q. How about the 24th f 
A. Not any on the 24th. 
Q. Anything back in April-no, that is too far back. Let 
it g·o. Now which ticket did l\fr. Butler buy here to go to 
Palmyra? 
Mr. Spicer: Mr. Talley has not undertaken to say what 
ticket was sold to Mr. Butler. 
Mr. Hannah: I am asking if he knows. 
The Court: I think he has been asked the question and an-
swered it. He told you he did not keep a record of who he 
sold them to. 
By the Court : 
Q. Can you tell us whether or not Mr. Butler bought any 
particular ticket to Palmyra? 
A. No, sir, I don't have a record of what person buys them; 
I just keep a record of the tickets sold. 
Bv Mr. Hannah: 
·Q. Do you remember Mr. Butler coming to Palmyra on the 
train f 
A. I don't know whether he came along at the time or not. 
Q. You remember he has made trips on the train from 
Carysbrook to Palmyra f 
A. Yes, sir. 
page 102 ~ RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Spicer: 
Q. Mr. Talley, you are not required to keep any record of 
the purchasers of tickets, are you, not required to put down 
the name of the person who buys a tickeU 
A. No, sir. 
Q. And you have had custody of those records since Ul:39 
when they were made? 
A. Yes, sir. · 
Q. And the ticket included the batch of tickets which you 
bad just now-Mr. Hannah referred to one of ~Tune 5, 19'39. 
That is a ticket to some other point? 
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A. I would rather look before I answ·ered. 
Q. Mr. Hannah referred to one bearing your stamp June 5, 
1939. -
Note: Witness examines ticket. 
A. This is Gordonsville. 
By the Court: 
Q. The one on June 5th is to what place f 
A. Gordonsville. 
By Mr. Spicer: 
Q. .And the cash book shows the amount paid for the ticket 
-each ticket? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And that record does not show-the cash book does not 
show that was a 10c ticket to Palmvra? 
J)age 103 } A. No, sir, it would show 64c to .. Gordonsville. 
RE-CROSS EXAMINATION. 
:By Mr. Hannah: 
· Q . .And that is the only ticket in your possession tl1at show~ 
a date stamped? 
A.. I have the date written on here. 
Q. I am asking you if that is the only ticket in yonr posses-
sion showing the actual date stamped? 
A. I will have to check that over again for that. ( examines 
tickets) I have one here in November that is stamped with 
the date. 
Q. That is two you have stamped 1 
A. The others are written on the date of sale. 
Witness stood aside. 
page 104 ~ DR. F. J. CLEMENT8, 
a witness introduced in behalf of the defendant, 
llcing first duly sworn, testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Spicer: 
Q. Dr. Clements, what is your profession? 
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A.. At the_present time I am Health Officer in Sussex and 
Prince George counties. 
Q. You .had a medical education! 
A. Y.es," ._sir. 
Q. A medical education leading to an M. D. degreet 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. In other words, you are a qualified physician under the 
laws of Virginia t 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How long have you been Health Officer in the counties 
vou mentioned 1 
· A. Since March 16, 1938. 
Q. Now prior to that time had you engaged in private prac-
tice in medicine Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Where and since what time? 
A. I started practicing in Fork Union in 1923; 
page 105 ~ I took over this neighborhood practice about 1928 
and practiced here until 1938 in March. 
Q. Did you have occasion to treat or attend or render medi-
cal attention to Mr. Butler-Mr. S. O. Butler during the time 
you were practicing in the neighborhood T 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did Mr. Butler come to you as a patientf 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Over what period of time, speaking in general terms, 
was Mr. Butler a patient under you! 
A. Mr. Butler's family has been coming to me since my 
early years in the county. I don't recall treating him until 
after I moved to Palmyra. I waited on him at several inter-
vals during the last five years of my practice here. 
Q. During that time did you treat Mr. Butler or did Mr. 
Butler come to you in connection with any particular trouble 
or physical condition? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Will you state what that condition was 1 
A. Mr. Butler came to me as a patient complaining mostly 
of what he termed heart trouble. At that time a physical ex-
amination, as I best remember it-
Mr. Hannah: May it please the Court, I don't 
page 106 ~ know as this evidence is material to this case. 
The doctor stopped practicing here in 1938 and 
that is several years ago. 
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The Court: It may not have been more than six montl1s 
before this alleged accident. 
Mr. Hannah: It goes back over a period five years preced-
ing that date. I think that is covering too much territory. 
Mr. Spicer: It is right in line with what you introduced. 
The Court: I think you have a right to make that inquiry. 
By Mr. Spicer: 
Q. You said you treated him for what he termed heart 
troubleY 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What symptoms did he have and what did you diag·nose 
his trouble as being due to 1 
A. Well, his main symptoms were palpitation or distress 
in his stomach or his chest, as he might call it. Mr. Butler 
was a hard-working individual and he showed evidence of a 
weakness of his heart muscles and naturally a physician is 
called upon to try to get at the source of the trouble and at 
that time I found a number of bad teeth. Of course, I might 
be an extremist on that, but I knew a lot of cases 
page 107 ~ that bad teeth poisoned persons and caused such 
symptoms as that and I treated him sympto-
matically, tried to give him relief and rest-gave him orders 
to rest; in other words, something to slow his heart action 
down and tried to get him to correct the bad teeth. 
Q. ,Could the conditions which you found to exist at that 
time, assuming that they continued into 1939, cause the pain 
in his footf 
A. vVell, a focus of infection in the tonsils or sinus or teeth 
frequently goes down in another part of the body as a result. 
of the infection getting in your blood stream. It may cause 
pain at any part of the body or affect any organ of the body 
and, of course, the foot is one of those. 
Q. Those conditions could cause the pain in his foot that 
you found? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Where pain starts in a person's foot, for instance, or 
any other part of the body is it always possible to attribute 
the suffering or the pain to any specific cause; I mean start-
ing it? 
A. No, sir. I would have to say doctors are right uncer-
tain about that. Frequently we have to acknowledge our ig--
norance when we can't understand why things· occur at a 
certain time. · 
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page 108 ~ Q. Is it frequently true that a person will wake 
up in the morning with a pain starting, having 
had no blow or no outside disturbance or outside explana-
tion as to why such pain should start¥ 
A. Yes, rather frequently. 
Q. Dr. Clements, if a tendon had been torn in Mr. Butler's 
ankle in getting off of a train, what would have been the ef-
fect at that time? 
A. A sprained tendon or any torn tissue is usually very 
painful at the site of the tear. 
Q. You didn't examine Mr. Butler any time in June, 1939, 
or afterwards, did you t 
A. No, sir. 
Q. And have not treated him since then f 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Would you say l\Ir. Butler at the time you were treat-
ing him suffered from-had symptoms of arterio-sclerosis? 
A. Yes, sir, he had evidences of arterio-sclerosis at that time. 
Q. Is that something that improves with age 0? 
A. The condition grows with age. It usually becomes more 
conspicuous with age. 
By the Court: 
Q. You mean by that that as one gets oldcl' the arterio-
sclerosis gets worse? 
page 109 ~ A. l\forc pronounced, yes. The symptoms get 
worse. 
By Mr. Spicer: 
Q. Is it at all unusual for persons suffering from arterio-
sclerosis to suffer pain and discomfort in their lower parts of 
their legs? 
A. Advanced arterio-selerosis usually causes pain in their 
legs and feet. 
CROSS EXAMlNATION. 
Bv l\f r. Hannah: 
· Q. Doctor, you happen to be one of the--did happen to be 
while you were here at Palmyra the surgeon and doctor for 
the railroad company, didn't you? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Is it true or not that Mr. Butler when he was talkino· ~ 
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to you complained about a sort of fullness around the heart 
or an indigestion, something of that sort f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And he wasn't a very satisfactory patient; wouldn't take 
the medicine, would he 1 
A. He wouldn't follow my directions, no, sir. 
Q. He told you he had indigestion and if you would give 
him something for that he would be all right 1 Do you remem-
ber his telling you thaU 
A. I don't remember those words. 
Q. But words to that effect and you did change 
page 110 } his medicine after a while ; is that right? 
A. Yes, I wouldn't give him the same thing or 
exactly the same words of instruction. 
Q. You would give different medicines and try them out for 
a while. You have testified, I believe a moment ago, that his 
I1eart action might affect the feet. Now as you made that 
statement were you ref erring to ·both feet? 
A. If I remember correctly, I said arterio-sclerosis would 
cause pain in the leg·s and feet. 
Q. Well, now, arterio-sclerosis wouldn't likely he worse in 
one foot than in the other, would iU 
A. There are no two organs exactly alike, Mr. Hannah, and 
it may or may not be, as I would see it, more painful in one 
than in the other. 
Q. Isn't it a fact if he had artcrio-sclerosis and superim-
posed on that a sprain you might expect greater trouble there 
than in the other foot, wou]dn 't you! 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. This tearing of ligaments, as a sprain generally is con-
sidered to be, is rather hard to heal, isn't iU · 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. It is not like a muscular tisime that heals in a very little 
while. The tendon itself when once ·pulled aloose seldom 
grows back ; am I right on that? 
page 111 ~ A. It may or ma.y not, yes. 
Q. As a matter of fact, the largest hospitals sort 
of tie ligaments or tendons up with catgut or silk or steel be-
cause they won't heal back and so g-et a finger or toe to func-
tion; am I rig·ht on that T 
A. Mr. Hannah, I never had the privilege of working much 
in a surgical hospital, so I rather not commit myself on some-
hodv else's work. 
Q·. It is furt.J1er true that arterio-sclerosis is generally re-
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garded by the medical profession to begin at the age of in-
fancy and become progressively worse until death as age ad-
vances; is that not true, as a normal condition t 
A. I nev~r · smv an a rterio-sclerosis in a young child. 
Q. When would you say that in a normal individual a con-
dition which you might term hardening of the arteries or 
arterio-sclerosis would begin to set in¥ 
A. You are getting rather deep in medical terms and ex-
planations. If you will allow me to explain to the jury the 
best I can in a simple way it would be that we frequently in 
explaining such matters to patients describe their vessels as 
rubber tubes and when it is now it is more pliant than when it 
is old. 
Q. And that condition applies to all individuals whether 
they have any other particular peculiar trouhle 
page 112 ~ or otherwise; isn't that true¥ 
A. W·e accept that, but there is nothing abso-
lute in medicine. 
Q. Your treatment for a sprain includes hot water, steam 
and such stuff, hot cloths, is that true? 
A. Whose treatment! 
Q. The normal treatment for a sprain T 
A. At times, yes. 
Q. To reduce the swelling· and bring more blood to the tis-
sues. 
A. Yes, sir, for chronic sprains. 
Q. You know nothing of Mr. Butler's injury or alleged in-
jury, do you? 
A. No, sir. 
RE-DIREffr EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Spicer: 
Q. You came here in response to a summons? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Witness stood aside. 
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page 113 ~ DR A. C. WHITLE,Y, 
a witness introduced in behalf of the defendant, 
being first duly sworn, testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXA.ivIINATION. 
By Mr. Spicer: 
Q. Doctor, you are a practicing physician in Palmyra at 
the present time¥ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How long have you been qualified to practice medicine f 
A. Since 1935. 
Q. How long have you been located in Palmyra f 
A. Since the 4th of August, 1938. 
Q. Did Mr. Butler come to see you sometime in the spring 
of last year 1 
A. This year. 
Q. I beg your pardon; sometime in the spring of this year f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Do you know about when that was? 
A. In March. I don't remember the exact date. 
Q. He had not been to see you before that time? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. What particular symptoms or condition did 
page 114 ~ he complain of a.t that time? 
A. As I remember, he came in the office com-
plaining of pain in his left foot. I had him take his shoe off 
and examined it and I found a little tenderness about the size 
of a quarter over his navicular bone of his left foot. 
Q. Where is that T 
A. Right in this region right there (indicating·). 
Q. Pointing on the top of the- shoe about the third lace hole 
from the top or second? 
A. Right there, the most prominent bone there. He com-
plained of tenderness right over it on pressure. 
Q. That is on the top of the fooU 
A. Yes, sir. I inquired into the history of it, how it hap-
pened and when it happened, trying to determine what wm; 
the cause of it. He told me he had sprained his ankle some 
several months ago on alighting from the train here in Pal-
myra. 
Q. Was his foot swollen at that time'¥ 
A. No, sir. That is all I found, tenderness on pressure. 
Q. I didn't mean to interrupt you. 
A. In view of that and in view of the history he had fallen 
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and sprained his ankle some several months previous to that 
and had no medication I referred him in to the hospital for 
X-ray. 
page 115 ~ Q. What hospital was that 1 
A. I sent him to the University. 
Q. The University of Virginia HospitaH 
A. Yes, sir, a.t Charlottesville. 
Q. Did he complain of pain at any other point? 
A. No, sir, he complained of pain-said his foot hurt him 
and upon examination that is the only tenderness I could 
elicit. 
Q. About the size of a quarter 01 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did he go to the University Hospital and have an X-ray 
examination made there¥ 
Mr. Hannah: We object to that unless he knows of his 
own knowledge. That is all right; go ahead. 
A. Well, about a month later-I didn't see Mr. Butler any 
more until a month later I received a letter from Dr. Archer-
M:r. Hannah: I object to that. 
Mr. Spicer: He is your own client. 
Mr. Hannah: That doesn't make any difference. If Dr. 
Archer is here to testify and we can cro·ss examine liim, that 
is all right. 
pag·e 116 ~ By Mr. Spicer: 
Q. Did Dr. Archer make a report to you of the 
examination Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And Mr. Butler went to Dr. Archer under your direc-
tions? 
A. Yes, sir. I gave him a note to Dr. Archer. 
l\ir. Spicer: I submit it is entirely proper for him to give 
the result of the report. 
Mr. Hannah: I object. 
By Mr. Spicer: 
Q. Did Mr. Butler come back to you afterwards? 
A. I saw him on the road and he asked me ,,,hat the X-ray 
report showed and I told him. · 
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Q. You told him what it showed 1 
A. Yes, sir. 
:Mr. Spicer: I submit under those circumstances he is en-
titled to state what the X-ray showed. 
The Court: Do you object to that, Mr. Hannah 1 
Mr. Hannah: I object to that. That is an independent 
statement. I don't know whether Dr. Archer did it. I happen 
to know Dr. Archer and know his method of handling things; 
he sends a patient out to one of the girl techni-
page 117} cians in the office and that is the end of it. He 
is not here under cross examination and we re-
spectfully object to it. 
The Court: Can you get Dr. Archer here"? 
Mr. Spicer: We haven't made any effort to do so, Your 
Honor. 
The Court: I will have to sustain the objection unless you 
can get Dr. Archer here subject to cross examination. 
By Mr. Spicer: 
Q. Now in view of the X-ray report made to you did you 
reach any opinion as to what the pain was due to? 
A. Well, after I got the report-
Q. Without stating what the report showed. 
A. It was my impression he did have arterio-sclerosis ancl 
that was the basis of his pain because I couldn't elicit any 
other physical finding·s so far as his foot was concerned. 
Q. You didn't find any pain 8 or 9 inclies above his ankle, 
did you? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Or 8 or 9 inches above his heel t 
A. No, sir. 
Q. He made no complaint of guch pain at the time you saw 
him? 
page 118} A. No, he made complaint of pain on the upper 
part of his foot. 
Q. You ca.me into Court in response to a summons, di<ln 't 
vou? 
· A. Yes, sir; wouldn't have otherwise. 
CR.OSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Hannah: 
·Q. Now did you ever see a man sixty-six years old that 
didn't have arterio-sclerosis? 
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A. Well, Mr. Hannah, physiologically they have it; they 
may not have symptoms of it. 
Q. Let's assume a man sixty-six years of age having arterio-
sclerosis normally; in other words, having the normal hard-
ening of the arteries that comes with age, and he receives an 
injury; that injury will, of course, be more pronounced on 
account of ~he-that is, the traumatic injury will be more pro-
nounced on account of his condition, will it noU 
A. Well, it may or may not, depending upon the extent of 
the injury. 
Q. All right. If he gets a blow on the soft tissues of the 
leg you can't get much result there or wouldn't have much 
complication by result of the hardening of the arteries, would 
youf 
A. vVell, yes and no. 
Q. Well, where the tissues are soft and there 
page 119 ~ are no arteries close to the skin, no bony tissue 
and the arteries not adjoining close to the skin, 
you wouldn't get a disagreeable result particularly, would 
you? 
A. You are going to have arteries close to the skin, or 
branches, because you have blood supply to all of the body. 
Q. ·what is a sprain Y 
A. A sprain is a pulling or tearing of one or more liga-
ments. 
Q. So a sprain of the foot would be the tearing of the liga-
ments of the foot¥ 
.A. Yes. 
Q. Now it is a condition involving, not bones, but the soft 
tissues of the foot if it affects the foot? 
A. Anything external to the bone. 
Q. Now does it bother the tissues between the bones of the 
foot1 
A. If you get a tearing of the lig·aments on the bones, it 
will, yes. 
Q. Now when that happens isn't it bound to involve the 
arteries and veins where ligaments are torn f Isn't there a 
misplacement temporarily, if not permanently? 
A. It is not going to be unless an actual artery is torn. 
Q. Blood vessels run through some of the bones of the foot, 
don't they? 
page 120 } A. Yes, you have blood vessels there because 
you have to have food for them. 
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Q. And when you tear those bones apart-tear the soft tis-
sues apart or stretch them apart with a sprain with a tearing 
of those ligaments are you invoh1"ing the blood vessels of the 
foot·f 
A. To a certain degree, yes. 
Q. Now whether there was arterio-sclerosis there or not, 
that condition would exist? 
A. Yes, it would. 
Q. Now this arterio-sclerosis or hardening of the arteries 
would affect the other foot just as much as it would the one 
that was injured, would it not, in the absence of an injury :r 
A. No, as Dr. ·Clements told you before, different organs 
are affected differently. You may have one thing in one foot 
and another thing in another foot. 
Q. You found nothing wrong with this man's right foot, 
did youf 
A. No, sir, I didn't examine it. 
Q. There was no complaint about his right foot 1 
A. No, sir. I examined only his left foot. 
Q. When you wrote Dr. Archer didn't you tell him that you 
had a man down here with a history of a sprained ankle? 
A. He had the history. 
page 121 ~ Q. And that was your diagnosis at that time f 
A. I did not make a diag·nosis. 
Q. You just reported the history as you found iU 
A. Reported it to him and requested the X-ray to rule out 
any possibility of any bone deformity or anything· else be-
cause the diagnosis was free of bone injury. 
Witness stood aside. 
Mr. Spicer: It is agreed and stipulated between counsel 
that no claim of injury on behalf of Mr. Butler was broug·ht 
to the attention of the Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Company 
until Ma,y 9, 1940. That is agreed, isn't it, Mr. HannaJ1 f 
Mr. Hannah: Yes. 
Mr. Spicer: If Your Honor please, in view of those cir-
cumstances, the defendant rests at this time. 
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page 122 ~ S. 0. BUTLER, 
the plaintiff, being recalled in rebuttal, testified 
as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Hannah: 
Q. Mr. Butler, you testified this morning· tha.t you made 
this trip to Palmyra as a passenger on the train of the 0. & 
0. Railway Company on June 10, 1939! 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You further introduced some exhibits dated on that date. 
Is there any question in the world in your mind as to the date 
you made this trip t 
A. No, sir; there is the reference laying right down before 
you. 
Q. In Mr. Talley's testimony he stated that he had not sold 
a ticket to Palmyra from l\fay 20, 1939, until October 24, 1939. 
Did you or did you not come as a pa.ssenger-
A. Several times. 
Q. -between Oarysbrook and Palmyra during those dates'? 
A. Yes, sir, I certainly did; came up here three times and 
my son was with me once. I think the conductor 
page 123 ~ is going to verify that statement; I don't think 
he is a man that will falsify a single instance. 
Q. Is it possible that you would have paid your way on the 
train without purchasing· a ticket 1 
A. No, sir, for I was down there in ample time to purchase 
a ticket before the train came. 
Q. Mr. Butler, has that right foot ever bothered you? 
A. No, sir, not in a single instance. 
Witness stood aside. 
Testimony concluded. 
Mr. Leake: We would like to make a motion before the 
Court. 
Note: The jury retired from the courtroom. 
Mr. Spicer: If Your Honor please, we desire to renew the 
motion which we made to strike previously, being a motion now· 
to strike out all of the evidence in the case on the ground that 
it is insuffici<-mt to support a recovery hy the plaintiff: 
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1st upon the ground that here is no negligence 
})age 124 } shown, 
2nd that the evidence fails to show any negli-
gence which had any proximate causal relation to the injuries 
con1plained of, · 
3rd that the failure to stop the train prior to the time the 
l)laiutiff alighted from it had no proximate causal relation to 
any injuries suffered by him, he bein&' an adult in full pos-
session of his faculties and fully cogmzant of the surround-
ing physical conditions when alighting from the train. 
4th that liis act in alig·hting from the train if danger be 
incident thereto was the voluntary act of a responsible party 
under no compulsion, an act which insulated or cut off any 
}Jossible negligence on the part of the defendant and repre-
sented a free choice on his part, 
5th that in alighting from the train he voluntarily assumed 
all risks ·incident thereto and his conduct amounted to negli-
gence as a matter of law. 
6th The plaintiff has failed to sustain the burden o_f proof 
by showing· by a preponderance of the evidence that the in-
juries complained of resulted from alighting from the train 
on the occasion in question and that the cause of such con-
dition as he now complains of is just as probable to have come 
from causes for which the defendant is in no way responsible 
and that the injuries complained of are not shown to be the 
natural and probable consequence of any act com-
page 125 r plained of or such a consequence as oug·ht to have 
been foreseen under the circumstances, and the 
general statement that the plaintiff has failed to sustain tl1e 
lmrden of proof. 
1mge 126 } ·whereupon, this being all of the evidence in-
troduced in the case, and the defendant having 
moved the court to strike out all of tbe evidence, upon grounds 
then stated to the court, as set forth above, the court over-
ruled said motion of the defendant, and the defendant, by its 
attorneys, excepted to said ruling and action of the court, upon 
the grounds theretofore stated in support of said motion. 
The defendant then objected to any instructions being 
given for the plaintiff, on the ground that under the evidence 
in this case, no verdict in favor of the plaintiff could be prop-
erly rendered, for the reasons previously set forth in support 
of the defendant's motion to strike out all of such evidence, 
but the court overruled said objection, to which action of t11e 
court, the defendant, by its attorneys, excepted. 
And the jury having received the instructions gh,en by the 
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court, as set out in Defendant's Bill of Exceptions No. 2, and 
having heard the oral arguments of the attorneys for the re-
spective parties, retired to consider of their verdict, and later 
returned .into court with a verdict in favor of the plaintiff 
for the.·sum- of :F11ive Hundred Dollars ($500.00), which is set 
out in the_· orders of the court herein. 
And the defendant, by its attorneys, then moved the court 
to set aside the verdict of the jury and to enter judgment for 
the defendant, and failing so to do, to set aside the verdict 
of the jury and to a,vard the defendant a new trial in this 
case, upon the following gi:ounds set forth in writing: 
page 127 ~ ''GROUNDS OF MOTION OF DE:F,·ENDANT 
T-0 8ET ASIDE THE VERDICT OF THE 
JURY AS CONTRARY TO THE LA."\V A.i~D THE EVI-
DENCE, AND WITHOUT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT 
IT, AND TO ENTER UP FINAL JUDGMENT FOR THE 
DI~FENDANT, A.ND ].,AILING SO TO DO, TO A WARD 
THE DE.FENDANT A NIDW TRIAL. 
I. No negligence on the part of the defendant shown. 
2. The evidence fails to show any negligence on the part 
of the defendant which had any proximate causal relation 
to the injuries complained of. 
3. Failure to stop the train prior to the time the plaintiff 
alighted from it had no proximate causal relation to any in-
juries suffered by him, he being an adult in full possession 
of his faculties and fully cog·nizaut of the surrounding phvsi-
cal conditions, when alightin~ from the train. " · 
4. The plaintiff's act in ahg·hting from the train, if danger 
be incident thereto, was the voluntary act of a responsible 
party, under no compulsion, an act which insulated or cut off 
any possible negligence on the part of the defendant and 1·ep-
resented a free choice on his part. 
5. In alighting· from the train the plaintiff voluntarilv as-
sumed all risks incident thereto, and his conduct amounted to 
negligence as a matter of law. 
6. Plaintiff has failed to sustain the burden of proof by 
showing by a preponderance of the evidence that the injuries 
complained of resulted from alighting from the train on the 
occasion in ']uestion. 
7. The cause of such condition as the plaintiff now com-
plains of is just as probable to have come from 
page 128 ~ causes for which the defendant is in no wav re-
sponsible. · 
8. The injuries complained of are not shown to he the 
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natural and probable consequences of any act complained of, 
or such a consequence as ought to hav.e been foreseen by the 
defendant under the circumstances. 
9. Plaintiff has failed to sustain the burden of proof. 
10. Errors in· rulings of the court in the introduction and 
exclusion of evidence during the course of the trial. 
11. Errors in rulings of the ~ourt in instructions given and 
refused, and instructions given as amended by the court, as 
heretofore pointed out. 
12. Damages awarded by the jury are excessive.'' 
But the court thereafter overruled the said motion of the 
defendant to set aside the verdict of the jury and to enter 
up judgment for the defendant, and also overruled the motion 
of the defendant to set aside the verdict of the jury and to 
a ward a new trial in this case, and thereupon did enter up 
judgment for the plaintiff on the verdict of the jury, to which 
ruling and action of the court, the defendant, by its attorneys, 
excepted, upon the grounds set forth above, and the defend-
ant tenders this, its Bill of Exceptions No. 1, and prays that 
the same may be signed, sealed and made a part of the record 
in this case, which is accordingly done, on this 28th day of 
April, 1941, within the time prescribed by law, and after rea-
sonable notice in writing to counsel for the plaintiff, as re-
quired by law. 
EDWARD MEEK:S, Judge. (Seal) 
page 129 ~ Virginia : 
In the Circuit Court of Fluvanna County. 
S. 0. Butler, Plaintiff, 
v. 
The Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Company, a corporation, 
Defendant. 
DEF·ENDANT'S BILL OF EXCEPTIONS NO. 2-IN-
STRUCTIONS. 
BE IT REMEMBERED, that on the trial of this case, and 
after all the evidence had been introduced before the jury, 
which evidence is set out in Defendant's Bill of Exceptions 
No. 1, to whic.h reference is hereby made, the defendant ob-
jected to any instructions being given by the court authoriz-
ing a recovery by the plaintiff, on the ground that under the 
138 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia · 
evidence in this case, no verdict in favor of the plaintiff could 
be properly rendered, for the reasons previously set forth in 
support of the defendant's motion to strike out all of such 
evidence, but the court overruled said objection, to which ac-
tion of the court, the defendant, by its attorneys, excepted. 
Whereupon, the plaintiff, by his attomeys, tendered and 
moved the court to give to the jury the following instructions, 
numbered respectively, l, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7 and 8. 
page 130 ~ PLAINTIFF'S INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN RY 
THE COURT. 
Instruction No. 1. 
The Court instructs the jury that the relationship of car-
rier and passenger commences when a person in good faith 
purchases a ticket to a designated point and boards the train, 
or other conveyance of the carrier, and that this relationship 
continues to exist until the passenger has alighted from the 
train, or other conveyance, in which the passenger is being 
transported and for a sufficient and reasonable time there-
after for the passeng·er to reach a place of safety, and if you 
believe, from a preponderance of tbe evidence in this case, 
that the plaintiff was a passenger on the train of the defend-
ant on the date set out in the notice of motion then you are 
instructed that the defendant owed to the plaintiff the utmost 
degree of diligence and care in safely transporting him to 
his destination, and if such a degree of diligence and ca re was 
not used bv the defendant then the said defendant is liable 
in damages"' for any neg·lig-cnce occasioning injury to the plain-
tiff unless you also believ·e, from a preponderance of the evi-
dence, that the plaintiff was guilty of negligence which con-
tributed to the accident and injuries complained of. 
Instruction No. 2. 
The Court instructs the jury that if you believe, by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence, that the agent of the Railway 
Company requested, permitted, or invited the plaintiff, S. 0. 
Butler, to alight from the train while it was in motion and at 
a point not safe and suitable for the discharge of 
page 131 ~ passengers from its trains then tl1is was negli-
gence on the part of the defendant-the C. &- 0. 
Railway Company-and you should find a verdict for the 
plaintiff-S. 0. Butler-unless you also believe, from a pre-
ponderance o~ the evidence, that the said plaintiff was guilt)~ 
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of negligence under the facts and circumstances, then ex-
isting, in alighting and dismounting the train, which con-
tributed to the accident and injuries complained of. 
Instruction No. 3. 
The Court instructs the jury that in considering whether 
or not the plaintiff was guilty of negligence on his part at the 
time of the accident complained of, you should consider 
whether an ordinarily prudent person would have been war-
ranted in attempting to alight from the moving train under 
such circumstances as have been shown, by the evidence, to 
exist at the time the plaintiff alighted from the train, for it 
is not negligence, in itself, for a person to alight from a mov-
ing train, but whether it be neglig·euce or not is to be de-
termined by you from all the relevant facts and circumstances 
disclosed by the evidence at the time of the accident. 
Instruction No. 4. 
The Court instructs the jury that if you believe, from the 
evidence introduced in this case, that S. 0. Butler agreed 
with the agent and employee of the C. & O. Railway Company 
to alight from the train, on which he was a passenger, while 
it was moving thereby assuming some degTee of responsibility 
for injury which might ensue from said· act, 
page 132 } yet ·if you further believe that an ordinarily rea-
sonable and prudent person would, under all the 
circumstances and facts existing, as shown by the evidence, 
have deemed it safe to attempt to alight from the said train 
while it was in motion, then the said S. O. Butler should not 
be charged with contributory negligence in so alig·hting· from 
tbe moving train. 
Instruction No. i'i. 
The Court instructs the jury that if you believe from a 
preponderance of the evidence, that the plaintiff, S. 0. Butler, 
was requested, permitted, or invited to alight from the passen-
g·er car, on which he was a passenger, while the said convey-
ance was in motion, and at a point along the track of the 
-said defendant with which he was unfamiliar, then the said 
Butler had a right to presume that the place where he was 
asked to alight was a reasonably safe one for alig·hting· under 
the circumstances shown by the evidence to exist, unless under 
the then existing facts and circumstances, considering the 
duty he owed to take care of his own safety, he was guilty 
of negligence contributing· to the accident and resultant in-
juries in ·which event he could not recover. 
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Instruct-ion No. 7. 
The Court instructs the jury that if you believe, from a 
preponderance of the evidence introduced in this case, th~t 
the plaintiff had voluntarily agreed to alight from the tram 
of the defendant while it was in motion, or had agreed to do 
so at the instance of the defendant, and that the plaintiff 
elected to alight from the train, while it was in motion and at 
an improper place, and this election was know111 
page 133 ~ to the agent of the defendant, and the said agent 
permitted the plaintiff to so alig·ht from the de-
fendant's moving train, and in alighting, under these circum-
stances, the plaintiff was injured, and such injury was proxi-
mately caused by the permission of the defendant Company, 
through its ag·ent, then you should find a verdict for the plain-
tiff, unless the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence, 
under all the facts and circumstances, in which event he could 
not recover. 
Instruction No. 8. 
The Court instructs the jury that if you believe, from the 
evidence introduced in this case, that the plaintiff is entitled 
to recover damages by reason of the negligence of the de-
fendant then in assessing his damages you should take into 
consideration any bodily injury he may hav:e sustained by 
reason of the accident complained of; any physical and men-
tal pain he may have suffered thereby; if any, as the natural 
result of the injury; any loss sustained by him by reason of 
disability to attend to his ordinary business and affairs by 
reason of the said accident; a.ny expenses for medical treat-
ment, medicine, etc., made necessary by the injury complained 
of in this action, shown by the evidence; whether or not the 
injury complained of is of a temporary or permanent nature, 
and if the latter, what disabilities the plaintiff will labor un-
der for the remainder of his life by reason of said injury, and 
find your verdict for such an amount as, under the evidence 
you feel is fair and just, not to exceed the sum sued for, hut 
in no event can you consider any such disabilities, losses, ex-
penses, damages, or distresses not shown to be attributed a~ 
a result of the accident which produced the injuries sued for 
and complained of. 
page 134 ~ Prior to the giving of any of the said instruc-
tions tendered by the plaintiff, the defendant, hy 
its attorneys, made the following specific objections and ex-
ceptions to said instructions : 
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As to Instruction No. 2. 
This instruction is erroneous in its statement of law as 
to the effoot of the defendant's conductor requesting·, per-
mitting or inviting the plaintiff to alight from the trnin, be-
cause the evidence shows conclusively that he acquiesced, 
ag·reed and consented to get off while the train was in motiou 
and after it was beyond the station platform. 
As to Instruction No. 3. 
This instruction is erroneous in its statement that it wns 
not negligent in itself for the plaintiff to alight from the 
moving train, and also in not stating that persons alighting 
under such circumstances as shown, are charged with the con-
sequences of their own act, unless forced to act by those iu 
charge of the train. 
As to In.struction No. 4. 
This instruction is erroneous in that the conclusion ought 
to be exactly opposite to that which is stated therein. The 
conclusion stated is that Butler is entitled to recover unde1· 
the conditions there indicated, whereas if the facts stated in 
the first part of the instruction are true, under the law he can-
not recover. It is a case of volenti non fit injuria-a we11 
known maxim of law. 
page 135 ~ As to Instruction No. 5. 
This instruction is erroneous in assuming that the plaintiff 
was directed to get off at the particular point at which 110 
did alight, whereas there is no such evidence in the case. 
As to Instruction No. 7. 
This instruction is erroneous in not stating all the facts 
necessary under the evidence for a finding instruction, and 
is erroneous in the legal conclusion stated, based upon such 
facts as were stated, since the plaintiff, by voluntarily agree-
ing or consenting to alight while the train was in motion, 
thereby waived any right to recover for any result accruing 
therefrom. 
As to Instruction No. 8. 
This instruction is erroneous in that the evidence shows 
that the condition of which the plaintiff complains, was not 
proved to have been more probably due to getting- off of the 
train than to some other cause, and is also erroneous in that 
there was no proof of any expense of medical treatment. 
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But the Court overruled each and every one of said objec-
tions of the defendant, set forth above, and gave to the jury 
instructions Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7 and 8, to which action of the 
court in giving each and every instruction, the defendant, by 
its attorneys, excepted. 
page 136 ~ Thereupon, the defendant tendered and moved 
the court to give to the jury the following· instruc-
t ions, numbered respectively, A, B, C, D, E, F and G: 
DEFENDANT'S INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN BY THE 
COURT. 
Instruction A. 
The Court instructs the jury that even though they may be-
lieve from the evidence that the def cndant 's conductor per-
mitted or requested the plaintiff to alight from the moving 
train, yet if they further believe from the evidence that the 
plaintiff, in view of the speed of the train and his knowledge 
and opportunity for observing the nature of the surrounding 
conditions, failed to exercise reasonable care for his own 
safety, either in alighting or attempting to alight from the 
train, the jury must find a verdict for the defendant. 
J,nstruction B. 
The Court instructs the jury thnt this suit is based upon 
a charge of negligence ag·ainst the defendant, and in order 
for the plaintiff. to recover, it is necessary for him to prove 
by a clear preponderance of the evidence, (1) that the de-
fendant was negligent in respect to some duty owed to the 
plaintiff as a passeng·er on its train, and (2) that such negli-
gence was the sole proximate cause of some injury sustained 
by the plaintiff, and in the absence of such proof, the jury 
must find for the defendant. 
page 137 ~ Instruction C. 
The Court instructs the jury that even thoug·h they should 
believe from the evidence that the defendant's employees did 
not stop the train at the plaintiff's destination, as understood, 
yet the plaintiff was not required to alight from the train 
,vhile it was in motion, in an unsafe place, if so known to him 
or reasonably apparent, but should proceed to the next stop 
and thereafter recover any loss and inconvenienc<-? thereby 
sustained, and if he did so and was injured, he cannot re-
cover the ref or. 
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Instruction D. 
The Court instructs the jury that the plaintiff, as a passen-
g·er on the defendant's train, was charged with the duty of 
exercising· reasonable care for his own safety, and if the jury 
believe from all of the evidence, including the speed at which 
the train was running and the plaintiff's knowledge and op-
}Jortunity of observing the nature of the surrounding ground, 
that the plaintiff, either in undertaking to alight, or in alight-
ing from the train, failed to exercise reasonable care for his 
own safety, then the jury must find for the defendant. 
I n.struction E. 
The Court instructs the jury that even though they may be-
lieve from the evidence that the defendant's conductor re-
quested or suggested to the plaintiff, that he alight from the 
train under the circumstances shown in evidence, yet if they 
further believe from the evidence that whatever injuries the 
plaintiff may have received in alighting from the 
page 138 } train under the existing circumstances, resulted 
from a risk or danger, the nature of which was 
obvious or clearly apparent to him before he undertook to 
alight, then the plaintiff's voluntary act in thereafter alight-
ing from the train, was the sole proximate cause of such in-
juries as he may have received, and the jury must find for the 
defendant. 
I nstritction Ji'. 
The Court instructs the jury that if they believe from the 
evidence that it is just as probable that the injury complained 
of by the plaintiff, resulted from some cause with which the 
defendant was in no way connected, as it is that such injury 
resulted from any negligence on the part of the defendant, 
then the jury must find for the defendant. 
.And the Court gave to the jury said instructions A, B, C, 
D, E and F, but refused to give instruction G, which is as fol-
lows: 
DEFENDANT'S INSTRUCTION RE.FUSED BY THE 
COURT. 
Instruction G. 
The Court instructs the jury that if they believe from the 
evidence that whatever injuries, if any, the plaintiff may have 
~mstained, as a result of alighting from the moving train, were 
due to an accident which was not reasonably to be foreseen 
or anticipated either by the plaintiff or by the defendant's con-
ductor, then the jury must find for the defendant. 
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page 139 ~ DEFENDA'.NT'S OB.JECTION TO COURT'S 
REFUSAL TO GIVE INSTRUCTION G. 
The defend~nt objected and excepted to the refusal of the 
Court to grant Instruction G, on the ground that it states a 
proper principle of law applicable to the evidence in this case,. 
unless it be held, as it should be held, that the plaintiff was 
negligent or assumed the risk of the injuries received, as a 
matter of law. 
Instructions 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, A, B, C, D, E and F were all 
the instructions that were given to the jury by the Court. 
The defendant accordingly tenders this its Bill of Excep-
tions No. 2, and prays that the same may be signed, sealed 
and made a part of the record in this case, which is accord-
ingly done on this 28th day of April, 1941, within the time 
prescribed by law, and after notice in writing to counsel for 
the plaintiff, as required by law. 
EDWARD MIDEKS, Judge. (Seal) 
page 140 ~ Virginia: 
In the Clerk's Office of the Circuit Court of the County 
of Fluvanna, on the 28th day of April, in the year, 1941. · 
I, .A. S. Haden, Clerk of the Circuit Court of the County of 
Fluvanna, do certify that the foregoing is a true transcript 
of the record in the suit of S. 0. Butler, Plaintiff, against The 
C. & O. Railway Company, Def enda.nt, lately pending in said 
Court. 
I further certify that the same WllS not made up and com-
pleted and delivered until the plaintiff had received due notice 
thereof, and of the intention of the defendant to apply to the 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia for a writ of error 
and supersedeas to the judgment therein. 
I do further certify that the defendant has given and filed 
in my office a suspending and supe-rsedea-s bond, with with the 
United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company, as surety in 
the penal sum of One Thousand ($1,000.00) Dollars, condi-
tioned as required for a supersedeas in section #6351 of tlie 
Code of Virginia. ' 
Teste: 
A. S. HADEN, Clerk. 
A Copy-Teste : 
M. B. WATTS, C. C. 
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